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The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC)
Response to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Rights: A Challenge to Equality and Nondiscrimination
Under International Law
Robert C. Blitt*
This article further explores the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation’s (“OIC”) peculiar understanding of international
nondiscrimination and equality norms by considering how it
engages with sexual orientation and gender identity (“SOGI”)
rights. After reviewing the OIC’s historical approach to human
rights and its ambivalent acceptance of universality, the article
focuses on the organization’s contemporary effort to promote the
“protection of the family” within the international human rights
arena. This campaign—driven by the OIC’s belief that “Islamic
family values” are under legal and intellectual assault—
champions only those families premised on marriage between a
man and a woman. Consequently, families built around
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (“LGBTI”) and
other relationships risk exposure to inequality, discrimination
and denial of existing rights under international human rights
law.
OIC advocacy of protection of the family, however, is by no
means the only area where the organization has sought to
exclude the LGBTI community. Nor does the OIC’s position in
the narrow context of family reflect a complete accounting of its
motives for opposing recognition of SOGI rights. Accordingly,
the article proceeds to consider how other core components of the
OIC’s human rights platform and accompanying rationales
manifest hostility even to the slightest hint of SOGI rights
recognition. As will be demonstrated, this hostility cuts across
a wide swath of human rights issues, ranging from
extrajudicial killings to the right to health. And while by no
means reflective of the sole possible interpretation of Islamic
norms, the OIC continues to press its view as authoritative,
generating significant controversy and fallout, particularly at
the United Nations.
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Problems, for their professionalism and attention to detail in readying this manuscript for
publication.
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After highlighting the shortcomings and inconsistencies
associated with the OIC’s position on SOGI recognition, the
article concludes by offering several recommendations. These
recommendations, directed at states and civil society, outline
responses to the OIC’s attempt to undercut international
equality and nondiscrimination norms and are intended to
ensure that the principle of universality is not undermined in
the formulation and enforcement of international human rights
law.
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INTRODUCTION

This article is the second in a two-part series exploring the Organization
of Islamic Cooperation’s (“OIC”) understanding of the international human
rights norms that govern the principles of nondiscrimination and equality. The
first article,1 focusing on women’s rights, established a baseline for the OIC’s
relationship with the principles of equality and nondiscrimination by
examining how the organization’s founding Charter and subsequent policy
statements have come to frame these principles. It then proceeded to assess
how the OIC’s contemporary understanding of these principles manifests itself
in international debates surrounding women’s rights, as well as in the
organization’s effort to advocate on behalf of its amorphous concept of “Islamic
family values.” From the OIC’s perspective, its undefined religious values
necessitate state protection because the family unit’s identity and existence
are under legal and intellectual threat. Accordingly, any governmental
measures adopted to protect the family should take precedence over the right
of women to equality.
The OIC’s emphasis on “protection of the family” has even more farreaching consequences; it operates as a nexus for discrimination, and the
inequality that flows from the OIC prioritizing this value is by no means
limited to harming the rights of women. Therefore, the present article picks up
where the first left off, by examining the discriminatory effects of the OIC’s
peculiar understanding of nondiscrimination and equality norms in the context
of sexual orientation and gender identity (“SOGI”). After reviewing the OIC’s
historical approach to human rights and its ambivalent acceptance of
universality, the article uses the organization’s promotion of protection of the
family as a pivot point to shift focus from women’s rights to the OIC’s
engagement with SOGI rights. As this paper will demonstrate, because the
OIC’s framing of “Islamic family values” extends protection of the state only to
those families that satisfy a narrow definition of “family”—namely one
premised on marriage between a man and a woman—its invocation necessarily
obviates equal protection for families built around lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex (“LGBTI”) and other relationships. Imposing this
protection likewise operates to invalidate any recognition of SOGI-related
individual rights founded on equality and nondiscrimination.
See generally Robert C. Blitt, Equality and Nondiscrimination Through the Eyes of an
International Religious Organization: The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) Response
to Women’s Rights, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 755 (2017).
1
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At the same time, advocacy of protection of the family is not the only area
where the OIC has insisted on a narrow framing of equality and
nondiscrimination principles that excludes the LGBTI community. Nor is the
OIC’s motivation in this context reflective of a complete accounting of its
rationale for opposing recognition of SOGI rights. Accordingly, after discussing
developments related to protection of the family, the article considers how
other core components of the OIC’s human rights platform and their related
justifications manifest hostility to recognition of SOGI rights. As will be
demonstrated, this antipathy cuts across a wide swath of human rights issues,
ranging from extrajudicial killings to the right to health.
After highlighting the shortcomings and inconsistencies associated with
the OIC’s position on SOGI recognition, the article concludes by offering
several recommendations aimed at developing appropriate responses to the
OIC’s attempt to undercut international equality and nondiscrimination
norms. Prioritizing these recommendations—as well as those offered
previously within the context of women’s rights—is especially critical. The
failure to decisively confront the OIC’s ongoing efforts to promulgate a
distorted and religiously-restrictive framing of equality and nondiscrimination
serves to undermine the spirit of universality reflected in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights’ (“UDHR”) grundnorm that “[a]ll human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 2 But more urgently still,
allowing the perpetuation and expansion of the OIC’s vision risks legitimizing
real and ongoing rights violations against LGBTI persons, women, and others.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE OIC’S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The OIC’s Early Engagement with Human Rights
Consisting of 57 member states, the OIC describes itself as “the second
largest inter-governmental organization after the United Nations.” 3 As the
self-proclaimed “collective voice of the Muslim world,” the OIC’s raison d’être
is “safeguard[ing] and protect[ing] the interests of the Muslim world.” 4 In
asserting this mandate, the OIC also embodies the only contemporary
intergovernmental organization that claims to unify its member states around
the common banner of a single religion.5
2

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].

History, ORG. ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en
(last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
3

Id. While the OIC may be one of the most vocal and prominent voices of the Muslim world, as
this article demonstrates, its claim to represent the “collective voice” of the Muslim world is
contested.
4

Abdel Monem Al-Mashat, The Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Post Cold War Era,
in THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD 147, 150 (El Sayed
Selim ed., 1994); see also IOANA CISMAS, RELIGIOUS ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 241
(2014) (describing the OIC as “the sole inter-governmental actor to display religious contours and
to claim the role of interpreter of human rights in the context of Islam” and as an organization
where “the role of religion is intertwined with political goals”).
5
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The OIC’s founding 1972 Charter evidenced little specific regard for human
rights. The Charter’s preamble generally reaffirmed a “commitment to the
U.N. Charter and fundamental Human Rights” 6 and asserted as one of the
organization’s stated objectives “to endeavor to eliminate racial segregation,
discrimination and to eradicate colonialism in all its forms.” 7 At the same time,
the Charter’s only reference to equality related to equality between member
states of the organization in the context of national sovereignty, 8 rather than
to equality among individuals.
As the organization began holding regular meetings and developing a work
program, a small number of resolutions emerging from its Council of Foreign
Ministers (“CFM”) sessions and Islamic Summit conferences (attended by
heads of state) made explicit reference to human rights. Few, if any, of these
sought to elaborate on the human rights obligations of OIC member states or
on the organization’s understanding of these norms. Rather, these early
resolutions evidenced the OIC’s willingness to invoke human rights as a basis
for condemning non-OIC states for perceived human rights violations. For
example, already in 1973, the CFM appealed
to peace-loving states, [and] religious and international
authorities to use their good offices with the Philippines
government in order to halt the campaigns of violence against
the Muslim community in the Philippines and ensure their
safety and the basic liberties guaranteed by the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and their country’s Constitution
. . . .9
In 1979, the OIC’s CFM established a consultative commission of Muslim
experts “to draw up a document on Human Rights” based on the outcome of an
OIC seminar that occurred the previous year.10 One year later, the CFM opted
to revise this first effort and tasked the experts with “preparing an alternative
document” based on Member States’ observations. 11 In 1983, the CFM—
expressing its conviction “that the individual’s enjoyment of freedom, justice &
equal opportunities is commensurated with the genuine authenticity of any
sound community [and] . . . [r]ecognizing the close relationship between human
rights and world peace”12—unanimously adopted the Dhaka Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam. This brief seven-paragraph declaration set out a

6

OIC, Charter of the Islamic Conference, pmbl. (Mar. 4, 1972) [hereinafter 1972 OIC Charter].

7

Id. art. II(A)(3).

8

Id. art. II(B)(1).

OIC Res. 4/4, ¶ 4 (Mar. 24, 1973). Similarly, the second Islamic Summit in 1974 “[c]ondemn[ed]
Israel’s violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories.” OIC Res. 1/2-IS, ¶ 1(8) (Feb.
22–24, 1974).
9

10

OIC Res. 9/10-C, ¶ 1 (May 8–12, 1979).

11

OIC Res. 19/11-C (May 17, 1980).

12

OIC Res. 3/14-ORG (Dec. 6–11, 1983).
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religiously-infused and nebulous vision of human rights that affirmed, among
other things:
“the cultural and historical role of the Islamic Ummah . . . [is] to
contribute to the effort of mankind to assert human right [sic] to
protect man from exploitation and persecution, and to affirm his
freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the Islamic
Shariah”;
“Fundamental rights and freedom according to Islam are an
integral part of the Islamic faith and that no one shall have the
right to abolish . . . violate or ignore them”; and
“all human beings from [sic] one family whose members are
united by their subordination to Allah and, being the
descendants of Adam, all men are equal in dignity end [sic]
basic duties and responsibilities without any discrimination on
account of race, colour, language, religion, sex, political
opinion, social status or other considerations . . . .” 13
OIC heads of state subsequently identified the Dhaka Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam as “embod[ying] the preamble” of a more detailed final
document on “Human Rights in Islam,” and called for further study.14 Member
states would go on to grapple with the substance of this final document over
the following six years,15 before ultimately approving the Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam (“CDHRI”) in 1990.16
During this protracted negotiation period, however, the OIC continued to
expand its reliance on human rights as a tool for framing the organization’s
resolutions targeting non-member states. In 1986, for example, the OIC
urged its members to “exert utmost efforts” on non-member states to demand
that “oppressed Islamic minorities” be treated “on the basis of equality and
non-discrimination and . . . [be] grant[ed] . . . all their legitimate rights,

OIC, Fourteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, The Dhaka Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam (Dec. 6–11, 1983), http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/14/14%20icfm-orgen.htm#THE%20DHAKA%20DECLARATION%20ON%20HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20IN%20ISLA
M.
13

14 OIC,

Final Communiqué of the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, ¶ 28 (Jan. 16–19, 1984),
http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/4/4th-is-sum.htm.
See generally OIC Res. 2/16-ORG, ¶ 28 (Jan. 6–10, 1986) (calling for “[m]ember States to send
their final observations on the Draft Document on Human Rights in Islam to the General
Secretariat.”); OIC Res. 44/17, ¶ 1 (Mar. 21–25, 1988) (“[r]ecognizing the importance of issuing a
Document on Human Rights in Islam” and referring “the draft Document on Human Rights in
Islam to the Ministers of Justice in the Member States for study and finalization.”); OIC Res. 41/18,
¶ 1 (Mar. 13–16, 1989) (urging “Member States to send their observations on the draft Document
on Human Rights in Islam to the OIC General Secretariat as soon as possible.”).
15

OIC Annex to Res. 49/19, art. 5 (Jul. 31–Aug. 5, 1990) [hereinafter CDHRI]; see also World
Conference on Human Rights, Contribution of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (June 9, 1993).
16
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including their religious and cultural rights.” 17 Subsequent renewal of the
OIC’s resolution on Muslim communities in non-Muslim states elaborated on
its human rights-based approach. By 1990, the resolution text invoked
“international conventions and agreements particularly those agreements
which call for the observance of Human Rights and political, social, cultural,
economic and religious freedoms.”18 These resolutions further urged OIC
members “to make . . . [non-OIC states with Muslim minority communities]
grant these Islamic communities all their civil and religious rights and treat
them with equity in accordance with the international law and criteria
relating to human rights and basic freedoms.”19
B. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam: A Fatally Flawed
But Persistent First Contribution
The OIC’s recognition of the need to engage more substantively in shaping
the contours of international human rights emerged at least in part because
the field had become an increasingly significant and strategic arena for
international engagement. Already in 1982, the OIC resolved to “cooperate
more closely [with the UN in the] common quest for solutions to world
problems, such as issues related to international peace and security . . .
fundamental human rights and the establishment of a New International
Economic Order.”20 As noted above, in adopting the Dhaka Declaration, the
organization similarly acknowledged “the close relationship between human
rights and world peace.”21 Ultimately, the OIC’s framing of the CDHRI—its
long-negotiated final human rights declaration—attested to the newfound
strategic importance the organization ascribed to human rights as a currency
of international relations.22 The Declaration’s preamble confirmed the OIC’s
“[w]ish[] to contribute to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights.” 23
Further, it signaled the organization’s recognition of “the utmost importance
[of] human rights at the international level [and at] the level of relations

17

OIC Res. 29/16, ¶ 2 (Jan. 6–10, 1986).

18

OIC Res. 42/19, pmbl. (Jul. 31–Aug. 5, 1990).

19

Id. ¶ 1.

20

OIC Res. 20/13, ¶ 4 (Aug. 22–26, 1982).

21

OIC Res. 3/14-ORG, supra note 12.

Others have observed this phenomenon elsewhere. In the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s
(GCC) member states,
22

[t]he trend for increased ratifications of UN human rights treaties . . . show
that the GCC states consider UN human rights treaty ratification an
important aspect of integrating into the international system and view
remaining outside of the human rights system as costly for their standing in
the international community.
Başak Çali et al., Big Promises, Small Gains: Domestic Effects of Human Rights Treaty Ratification
in the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 21, 56 (2016).
23

CDHRI, supra note 16, pmbl.
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among the OIC . . . resulting from the current interactions in the international
arena.” 24 To be certain, the CDHRI embodied a significant organizational
milestone. In addition to culminating a lengthy negotiation process, 25 the
Declaration remedied the OIC Charter’s dearth of human rights content by
setting out “general guidance for Member States in the field of human rights.”26
Still, as “general guidance,” the CDHRI—despite fourteen years of OIC
drafting and the coincident growth of international recognition surrounding
the import of human rights law—signaled no more than an organizational
declaration rather than a binding treaty. In other words, the CDHRI did not
formally generate legal obligations for member states or provide means for its
enforcement.27
Although the CDHRI in principle is non-enforceable, two significant
realities persist. First, a review of the Declaration’s substantive provisions
raises genuine concern for compliance with universal human rights norms.
And second, despite the CDHRI’s status as “general guidance,” it remains
central to the OIC’s approach to human rights and indicative of the types of
binding norms to which the organization aspires. With respect to the first
point, the Cairo Declaration variously lessens, qualifies, or altogether omits
recognition of fundamental rights protections already enshrined under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and other related
international human rights instruments.28 Specifically regarding equality and
nondiscrimination, article 1 of the CDHRI provides that “men are equal in
terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities,
without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex,
religious belief, political affiliation, social or other considerations.” 29 To be fair,
this provision encouragingly leaves open the possibility of acknowledging that
discrimination impacting human dignity might flow from “other
considerations” besides those specifically enumerated. 30 However, it more
glaringly signals a decisive retreat from the sweeping promise enshrined forty
years earlier under the UDHR—a promise not merely of equal dignity but of
equal rights for all. Articles 1 and 2 of the UDHR provide that “[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” and that “[e]veryone is
24

OIC Res. 37/20, ¶ 4 (Aug. 4–8, 1991).

The CFM’s Political Committee stated “that, after 14 years of deliberations and studies relative
to the document on Human Rights in Islam, it had arrived at a consensus on the final draft of the
document to be entitled ‘The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam.’” OIC, Nineteenth
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Report of the Political, Legal and Information Affairs
Committee (Jul. 31–Aug. 5, 1990), http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/19/19%20icfm-politicalen.htm#REPORT%20OF%20THE%20POLITICAL,%20LEGAL%20AND%20INFORMATION%20
AFFAIRS.
25

26

OIC Res. 49/19, ¶ 1 (Jul. 31–Aug. 5, 1990).

27

Still, the OIC appeared to want it both ways. See infra Part II(C).

28

See UDHR, supra note 2, art. 1; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].

29

CDHRI, supra note 16, art. 1(a).

30

Id.
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entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in [the UDHR], without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 31
One might make the case that article 1 of the CDHRI represents a
salvageable departure point for human rights engagement. But the
provisions that follow make such a claim highly implausible. Among other
things, the Cairo Declaration permits religion to serve as a valid basis for
discrimination;32 assigns distinct rights and responsibilities on the basis of
gender;33 and restricts the rights to freedom of movement, freedom of
expression, and participation in public affairs on the basis of undefined
sharia law.34 The CDHRI’s penultimate incompatibility with international
human rights norms is confirmed by the document’s final provisions. These
provisions make all rights contingent upon ambiguous religious law and
require that any interpretive guidance for the document itself occur within an
Islamic vacuum, detached from the relevant international human rights
instruments.35
C. A Legacy That Persists: CDHRI as Anchor Point for OIC Human
Rights Engagement
Some observers have ventured that, with the passage of time, the OIC has
backed away from the CDHRI and now tacitly downplays its relevance. 36 This
perceived shift in approach may be driven, at least in part, by the justifiable
criticism leveled by human rights advocates against the CDHRI 37 or the OIC’s
desire to present a more “mainstream” approach to rights. In either instance,

31

UDHR, supra note 2, arts. 1–2 (emphasis added).

CDHRI, supra note 16, art. 5. Article 5 allows for the imposition of marriage restrictions based
on religion: “Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race,
colour or nationality shall prevent them from enjoying this right.” Id.
32

Under article 6, women’s equality is limited to “human dignity” and “[t]he husband is responsible
for the support and welfare of the family”; under article 12, freedom of movement and related
rights appear to be limited to men. Id. arts. 6, 12.
33

Id. arts. 12, 22–23 (limiting free movement rights to undefined “framework of Shari’ah,” and
minimizing government obligations where asylum “motivated by an act which Shari’ah regards as
a crime”; limiting rights to expression, advocacy and information on basis of undefined sharia
“principles” and “norms”; and limiting right to assume public office on basis of undefined
“provisions of Shari’ah”).
34

Id. arts. 24–25. Articles 24 and 25 provide: “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this
Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari’ah,” and “[t]he Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of
reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration.” Id.
35

See, e.g., TURAN KAYAOGLU, THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION: POLITICS, PROBLEMS,
POTENTIAL 99 (2015) (claiming that “most OIC staff largely ignore the declaration in their
discussions of Islam and human rights”).
36

AND

See, e.g., Yakin Erurk (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
against Women, Its Causes and Consequences on Intersections Between Culture and Violence
Against
Women,
U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/4/34
(Jan.
17,
2007),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/461e2c602.html.
37
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the second critical reality that characterizes the CDHRI must not be
obfuscated. Namely, the OIC continues to validate the document—including
its rejection of universality in favor of religious relativism—as a legitimate
basis for limiting existing international human rights commitments and for
demarcating the substance of its own more recent human rights initiatives. To
this point, suggesting that the CDHRI no longer informs the OIC’s perspective
on human rights or that its relevancy is otherwise diminished ignores
numerous warnings to the contrary.
As early as 1991, the OIC heads of state urged member countries to
consider becoming party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, but
only “in so far as the stipulations contained in it are compatible with the
Declaration of Human Rights in Islam.”38 Since this time, the OIC has not
taken any formal measures to repeal the Cairo Declaration or otherwise
distance itself from the norms espoused therein. 39 Instead, as recently as
2014, the OIC Secretary General asserted that “[t]he Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam embodies the OIC’s most complete statement on
human rights in Islam as seen by the Member States.” 40 More than this, a
clearly discernable pattern in the OIC’s recent activities confirms its

OIC, Final Communiqué of the Sixth Islamic Summit Conference, ¶ 55 (Dec. 9–11, 1991)
(emphasis added).
38

A 2015 OIC resolution welcomed the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Human Rights
Declaration and instructed its own human rights commission to “[take] the lead from this forward
looking document . . . to review [the CDHRI] against existing universal human rights instruments
and make suggestions for its improvement, if and where necessary.” OIC Res. 1/42-Leg, ¶ 12 (May
27–28, 2015). All six GCC members are OIC member states. No outcome from this review was
available when this article went to press. For the text of the GCC Declaration, see The Cooperation
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, GCC Human Rights Declaration (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.gcc-sg.org/enus/CognitiveSources/DigitalLibrary/Lists/DigitalLibrary/Human%20Rights/1453192982.pdf.
Pegging an organization’s human rights aspirations to those of the GCC is inherently problematic.
According to one scholarly assessment, the GCC brings:
39

together six of the least politically liberalized countries in the Arab world . . .
. The form and content of [its human rights] initiatives . . . suggest a continued
demand for symbolic measures to alleviate domestic and international
pressure rather than measures that effectively support political reforms for the
liberalization and modernization, if not democratization, of incumbent regimes
in accordance with a global governance script.
Vera van Hüllen, Just Leave Us Alone: The Arab League and Human Rights, in GOVERNANCE
TRANSFER BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PATCHING TOGETHER A GLOBAL SCRIPT 125, 140 (Tanja
A. Börzel & Vera van Hüllen, eds. 2015). Two years after the GCC adopted its Human Rights
Declaration, Amnesty International accused its member states of having “appalling human rights
records” and sweeping the issue of human rights “under the carpet.” GCC Summit: Systematic
Clampdown on Freedom of Expression in Gulf, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/12/gcc-summit-systematic-clampdown-on-freedomof-expression-in-gulf/.
Press Statement, Statement of His Excellency Iyad Ameen Madani, Secretary General of the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation at the Fourth Session of the OIC Independent Permanent
Human Rights Commission (IPHRC), (Feb. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Statement of Iyad Ameen
Madani].
40
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unabated advocacy of the flawed vision originally espoused by the CDHRI,
whereby universal human rights norms are subverted in name of ill-defined
religious imperatives.
Three recent milestones in the OIC’s institutional development are useful
for illustrating the extent of the entrenchment and durability of the CDHRI’s
vision. The first is evidenced in the OIC’s 2005 Ten Year Program of Action, a
document intended to set out the challenges facing the Muslim world and the
“means to address them.” 41 This action plan called on the organization to
consider “establishing an independent permanent body to promote human
rights in the Member States, in accordance with the provisions of the
[CDHRI].” 42 Further, it affirmed the idea of establishing a parallel Islamic
rights regime, also “in accordance with . . . the [CDHRI].” 43 The Ten Year
Program also sought to give life to the CDHRI’s rights–limiting approach by
conditioning “the advancement of women in Muslim societies,” and member
state adherence to the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women,44 on the basis of undefined “Islamic values of
justice and equality.”45
The OIC’s overhauled organizational Charter provides the second
milestone. This updated Charter, adopted in 2008, signaled a partial break
from the past by more explicitly incorporating human rights language. Still,
this shift was saddled by other competing provisions that attenuate the
document’s potential impact. For example, the 2008 Charter newly established
the promotion and protection of “human rights and fundamental freedoms
including the rights of women, children, youth, elderly and people with special
needs,” as an explicit OIC objective.46 However, the document also retained an
overriding preoccupation with member state equality rather than expressly
acknowledging equality as a human right ascribed to individuals. 47 The

Ten Year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st
century, 3d Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, intro. (Dec. 7–8, 2005)
[hereinafter OIC Ten Year Program].
41

Id. art. 1(VIII)(2) (emphasis added). The OIC established this body—the Independent
Permanent Human Rights Commission—in 2011. See Statute of the OIC Independent Permanent
Human Rights Commission, OIC Doc. OIC/IPCHR/2010/STATUTE (2010) (originally adopted by
OIC Res. No. 2/38-LEG On the Establishment of the OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights
Commission (IPHRC), 38th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, OIC (June 28–30, 2011))
[hereinafter IPHRC Statute].
42

43

OIC Ten Year Program, supra note 41, art. 2(VI)(3).

Id. art. 2(VI)(1); see G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW].
44

OIC Ten Year Program, supra note 41, art. 2(VI)(1); see also Blitt, supra note 1 (discussing how
sharia-based reservations to CEDAW compromise women’s rights by distorting international
equality and nondiscrimination norms).
45

OIC, Charter of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, art. 1(14), (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter
2008 OIC Charter].
46

47

Id. art. 2(2).
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Charter’s continuing omission of explicit support for the principle of nondiscrimination, 48 and the introduction of new objectives—including the
safeguarding of undefined “Islamic family values”49—generate further human
rights concerns, particularly in the context of this article.
Furthermore, like the CDHRI, the 2008 Charter’s effort to endorse the
promotion and protection of human rights is detached from recognized
international norms. Rather than endorse an international baseline, member
states only “undertake [that] they shall be guided and inspired by [undefined]
noble Islamic teachings and values.” 50 Beyond this undefined touchstone,
member states need only promote human rights and fundamental freedoms to
the extent it is “in accordance with their constitutional and legal systems.” 51
In other words, the revised OIC Charter perpetuates—à la CDHRI—the use of
undefined religious norms to measure human rights compliance. Moreover, it
disconnects itself from international standards by explicitly asserting domestic
law as supreme over existing international human rights norms. 52
Finally, the 2008 Charter, acting on the Ten Year Program’s call to
establish an OIC human rights body, 53 officially blessed the Independent
Permanent Human Rights Commission (“IPHRC”) as a new OIC organ. 54 The
Charter also elucidated the Commission’s mandate to promote “rights
enshrined in the organisation’s covenants and declarations [presumably
including the CDHRI] and in universally agreed human rights instruments, in
conformity with Islamic values.”55 The IPHRC statute, enacted several years
after the 2008 Charter, makes plain the Commission’s raison d’être is grounded
in the CDHRI.56 By requiring the IPHRC to promote the rights enshrined in
the CDHRI, the OIC effectively blanketed the new Commission in the Cairo
Declaration’s relativistic shadow and signaled its desire to use the Commission
to further shape the CDHRI’s aspirations into legally binding norms.
Any lingering doubt over the continuing relevancy of the CDHRI in the
IPHRC’s mandate is put to rest by examining OIC Resolution No. 1/38-Leg on

48

See 1972 OIC Charter, supra note 6, pmbl., art. II(A)(3).

49

2008 OIC Charter, supra note 46, art. 1(14).

50

Id. art. 2.

Id. pmbl. (“We the Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, determined . .
. to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, rule of law, democracy
and accountability in Member States in accordance with their constitutional and legal systems.”).
51

52

Blitt, supra note 1, at 772.

53

OIC Ten Year Program, supra note 41, § 1(VIII)(2).

54

2008 OIC Charter, supra note 46, art. 5, 15.

55

Id. art. 15.

Id. (recalling the CDHRI and provides that the IPHRC “shall promote the . . . rights enshrined
in the organisation’s covenants and declarations and in universally agreed human rights
instruments, in conformity with Islamic values.”); IPHRC Statute, supra note 42, pmbl.
56
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Follow Up and Coordination of Work on Human Rights.57 Passed alongside the
IPHRC statute in 2011, this resolution reaffirms the OIC’s commitment to
prioritizing the enactment of Islamic human rights covenants 58 and the
continued centrality of the CDHRI to this end. 59 The resolution’s preamble
posits that the promotion and protection of human rights can occur only “with
due regard” to the Cairo Declaration. 60 It also endorses the ongoing
“formulation of a set of Islamic covenants on human rights” as a way “to
promote and protect human rights.” 61 Finally, the resolution’s operative
section further promulgates “the right of States to adhere to their religious,
social, and cultural specificities.”62
D. Grappling with Universalism: The OIC’s Shifting Take on Universal
Human Rights
As noted above, much of the impetus for the CDHRI flowed from the
OIC’s recognition that human rights had rapidly become a burgeoning field
with significant implications for diplomacy and public relations. 63 As such,
the organization needed to develop a common policy position from which it
could seek to impact the evolving international discourse. While the CDHRI
may reflect a certain measure of achievement in this regard, its disconnect
from universality has also left the OIC with an unwieldy and problematic
foundation for international engagement that has yet to be repaired.
Overarching claims of compatibility between the OIC’s undefined notions of
sharia and “Islamic values” on one hand, and universal human rights norms
on the other, might withstand superficial probing. But when examined in the
context of human rights in practice—in areas ranging from freedom of

57

OIC Res. 1/38-LEG (Jun. 28–30, 2011).

This priority is also noted above in the context of the OIC’s 2005 Ten Year Program. See OIC
Ten Year Program, supra note 41.
58

59

OIC Res. 1/38-LEG, supra note 57, pmbl.

60

Id.

61

Id.

Id. art. 4. But see World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, § 1(5), (Jun. 25, 1993) [hereinafter VDPA] (requiring “[s]tates, regardless of their political,
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms”).
62

See generally Robert C. Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental
Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 261–398 (2004);
Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human Rights,
19.4 HUM. RTS. Q., 703, 703–723 (1997).
63
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expression64 to women’s rights65 to SOGI rights—such claims expose
compatibility cracks with universality, whether on the grounds of vagueness
or outright conflict with international norms. 66
To date, the organization has failed to repeal or amend the religiouslyprioritized provisions of the CDHRI, and instead has characterized the
Declaration as “embod[ying] the OIC’s most complete statement on human
rights . . . .” 67 This has complicated the organization’s quest for greater
influence in the human rights arena, where the universality of human rights
is sacrosanct. Understanding this tension and the OIC’s failure to resolve it, is
critical to unpacking the organization’s rejection of equality and
nondiscrimination norms regarding SOGI rights.
1. OIC Resolutions Betray Uneasy Relationship with Universality
The OIC’s own resolutions serve as one indicator of the organization’s
uneasy relationship with human rights universality. Starting in 1991, the
OIC Conference of Foreign Ministers began issuing two annual resolutions
relating to human rights. The first addressed general coordination and
cooperation on human rights, and the second focused specifically on follow up
to the CDHRI. The preamble to the human rights coordination resolution
noted that the “increasing importance of human rights throughout the world
calls for further intensification of the efforts of the Islamic Ummah and
Islamic organizations…to take appropriate initiatives at the national,
regional and international level.” It further reasoned “that recent trends
among the O.I.C. to protect the collective interest of the Member States in the
process of ever-changing international developments requires closer
coordination to strengthen the common cultural and social values in

Robert C. Blitt, The Bottom Up Journey of “Defamation of Religion” from Muslim States to the
United Nations: A Case Study of the Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas, 56 STUD. L. POL. &
SOC’Y 121, 155 (2011) (arguing that a “closer look at the OIC’s advocacy favoring a ban on
defamation of religion reveals an approach that embodies not one but several anti-constitutional
ideas that operate to foreclose the principles of nondiscrimination and equality and undercut
universal rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief . . . .”).
64

65

See Blitt, supra note 1.

For example, Jordan has long maintained its reservations to CEDAW art. 16 “because it is
incompatible with the provisions of Islamic law, the Shari’a . . . [o]ver and above this legal reason
. . . we may add the fact that husband and wife have different responsibilities in the framework of
a single family.” Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 302, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JOR/5 (Sept. 24, 2010). Most
recently in 2016, Jordan rejected the CEDAW Committee’s recommendation to withdraw its article
16 reservations, claiming “the issue of lifting the reservations has to be dealt with very sensitively
and gradually, in a manner that balances the promotion of women’s human rights with the
obligation to reject whatever contradicts the provisions of Islamic Shariah.” Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention, ¶ 108, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JOR/6 (June 25, 2015).
66

67

Statement of Iyad Ameen Madani, supra note 40.
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international arenas.”68 However, the resolution’s preamble omitted any
mention of the UDHR or universality, and instead invoked only the OIC
Charter and the CDHRI as the basis for promoting human rights. Although
the original 1991 human rights coordination resolution also exhibited a
dearth of operative content, this changed dramatically in 1993, coincidentally
the year of the UN’s landmark World Conference on Human Rights. 69
The OIC’s intent to weigh in at 1993 UN World Conference was no secret.
Already in 1991, the OIC’s resolution on CDHRI follow up invited “Member
States to coordinate their positions . . .” at the world conference on the basis
of the CDHRI’s guidelines.70 As part of this advance effort, OIC member
states participated in preparatory regional meetings for Africa and Asia, 71 as
well as meetings organized by the League of Arab States (“LAS”).72 OIC
members represented more than half of the 42 states participating in the
African regional meeting in November 1992. 73 The Tunis Declaration, the
African region’s outcome document, reaffirmed the commitment to the
principles contained in the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). It also acknowledged that the “universal
nature of human rights is beyond question; their protection and promotion
are the duty of all States, regardless of their political, economic or cultural
systems.”74 The Tunis Declaration’s embrace of universal human rights,
however, came with a caveat: “no ready-made model can be prescribed at the
universal level since the historical and cultural realities of each nation and
the traditions, standards and values of each people cannot be disregarded.” 75

OIC Res. 22/6 (Dec. 9–11, 1991).

68

See World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFFICE OF HIGH COMM’R,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). (noting that
the World Conference closed with the consensus adoption of the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, “the culmination of a long process of review and debate over the current
status of human rights machinery in the world.”). There was no OIC Conference of Foreign
Ministers meeting in 1992.
69

70

OIC Res. 37/20, supra note 24 ¶ 3.

See Ineke Boerefijn, Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) (noting that in preparation for the World Conference,
regional conferences took place in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. No official regional meeting
was held in Europe, though the Council of Europe organized an unofficial interregional meeting).
71

OF

Profile: Arab League, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east15747941.
72

See World Conference on Human Rights, Report of the Regional Meeting for Africa of the World
Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/AFRM/14 (Nov. 2–6, 1993) [hereinafter The
Tunis Declaration].
73

74

Id. ¶¶ 1–2.

Id. ¶ 5. Although the Tunis Declaration itself omits a specific assertion to the effect that the
principle of non-interference applies to human rights scrutiny, one of the resolutions adopted at
the regional meeting “[s]tresses that respect for . . . human rights and fundamental freedoms also
require the commitment of all Governments to respect fully . . . the principles of national
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.” Id. ¶ 6.
75
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Several months later, the eleventh session of the LAS Standing Committee
on Human Rights “warmly welcomed” the Tunis Declaration “since it [met]
Arab demands.” 76 At the same meeting, the LAS approved its own “plan of
action for the agenda of the World Conference on Human Rights . . . .” 77 This
plan omitted a clear endorsement of universality. Instead, it emphasized
“respect for national sovereignty and . . . the principle that human rights
should not be used as an excuse for interference in the internal affairs of
States.”78 Further, the LAS plan emphasized the need to respect “the cultural
and religious identity of peoples and nations when formulating and
implementing international conventions on human rights.” 79 The same
meeting also called on LAS member states (all of them OIC members) “to
ensure that . . . [its plan of action] is included in the final document to be issued
at the Asian Regional Meeting” and “in the final document of the [World]
Conference.”80
In March 1993, Asian states held their own regional meeting in Bangkok.
OIC members accounted for over one-third of the participating states.81 The
meeting’s concluding document, the Bangkok Declaration, intended to reflect
“the aspirations and commitments of the Asian region.”82 Among other things,
the Bangkok Declaration’s operative section prioritized “the principles of
respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as noninterference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use of human rights
as an instrument of political pressure.” 83 After establishing these priorities,
the Declaration acknowledged that “while human rights are universal in
nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving
process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and
religious backgrounds.”84
The Bangkok Declaration’s assertive “double qualification” of
universality—invoking non-interference to foreclose external scrutiny and
imposing “national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural

Comm’n on Human Rights, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of Programme and Methods of Work of the
Commission, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/90 (Feb. 12, 1993).
76

Id. Annex III (“Preparation of ideas and final plan of action for the agenda of the World
Conference on Human Rights to be held in June 1993.”).
77

78

Id. Annex III ¶ 3.

79

Id. Annex III ¶ 6.

80

Id. at 7.

See World Conference on Human Rights, Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World
Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/59 (April 7, 1993).
81

82

Id. at 3.

83

Id. at 4.

84

Id. at 5.
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and religious backgrounds” as a filter on human rights content—was not
without controversy. Many observers, including Asian NGOs, were surprised
by “the bold opposition to universal human rights contained in the Declaration,
made on the grounds that human rights as such do not accord with ‘Asian
values.’”85 These NGOs proffered their own parallel declaration at the regional
meeting that dramatically diverged from the governmental vision. The
Bangkok NGO Declaration, submitted by the Coalition for Peace and
Development “on behalf of all NGO participants in the Asia-Pacific NGO
Forum,”86 asserted that the principle of universality effectively foreclosed the
possibility that human rights advocacy could be deemed as an encroachment
upon state sovereignty. Further, while embracing the notion of pluralism, the
NGO Declaration forcefully rejected the possibility of justifying cultural
practices that derogated from universally accepted human rights. 87
One scholar has observed that the regional declarations from Tunis and
Bangkok “made clear that the [World Conference scheduled for Vienna] would
be filled with tensions and that the universality of human rights would be
challenged.” 88 In raising this challenge, however, the declarations diverged
appreciably in both posture and substance. In the end, despite the Bangkok
Declaration’s controversial content, the OIC enthusiastically adopted its
approach to universality over the more mildly-worded Tunis Declaration.
Meeting shortly after release of the Bangkok Declaration, the OIC’s
Conference of Foreign Ministers issued an unusually long human rights
coordination resolution, boasting an extensive operative section. 89

Joanne Bauer, The Bangkok Declaration Three Years After: Reflections on the State of the AsiaWest
Dialogue
on
Human
Rights,
HUM.
RTS.
DIALOGUE 1,
4
(1996),
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/1_04/articles/518; see also Conor
Gearty, Asian Values, China and Human Rights, RTS.’ FUTURE, 5, http://therightsfuture.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/11/The_Rights_Future_CT5_Asian_Values.pdf (noting that this hostility
included “dismiss[ing] even home-grown [Asian] NGOs as western meddling in disguise.”); see also
Pat Walsh, The Road to Vienna Went Through Bangkok (June 2013), http://home.patwalsh.net/wpcontent/uploads/The-road-to-Vienna.pdf. But see Michael W. Dowdle, How a Liberal Jurist Defends
the Bangkok Declaration, in NEGOTIATING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 126, 144, 152 (Lynda S.
Bell et al., eds., 2001) (arguing that the Bangkok Declaration’s formulation is “wholly consistent
with a conception of rights that enjoys much purchase in the West”, but also conceding, “of course,
the picture I paint of the Bangkok Declaration is not necessarily the one intended by most of its
drafters or its signers.”).
85

U.N. Secretary-General, Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/PC/83 (Apr. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Bangkok Declaration]. A list of the dozens of NGOs
participating in the regional conference, including NGOs from OIC member states, is provided at
pp. 9–10. The fact that such NGOs signed onto the NGO declaration hints at the cracks in the
OIC’s assertion that it serves as the “collective” voice of the Muslim world. See infra text
accompanying notes 144–153, 227–231, and 440–454.
86

World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/PC/83 (Apr. 19, 1993).
87

88

Boerefijn, supra note 71.

Bangkok Declaration, supra note 86. The OIC’s 1993 human rights coordination resolution
boasts 19 operative paragraphs as compared with only five found in similar resolutions from 1991
89
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This unusual burst of engagement demonstrated by the OIC resolution
correlates directly to the Bangkok Declaration’s influence. In certain sections,
the OIC resolution duplicates contentious provisions of the Bangkok
Declaration. For example, it imports nearly verbatim the Bangkok
Declaration’s two most controversial provisions directed at non-interference
and the attenuation of universality. On this latter point, the OIC resolution
only deletes “national and regional particularities” in endorsing the need to
contextualize human rights on the basis of “historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds” (See Table 1 below).
Elsewhere in the resolution, OIC modifications to or omissions of the
Bangkok Declaration’s language serve to further attenuate the legitimacy and
scope of universal human rights. For example, while the OIC’s 1993 human
rights coordination resolution does acknowledge the UDHR, it does so only in
the preamble, and then, only after contextualizing the responsibility to
“promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”
based on the OIC Charter, CDHRI, and Islamic values and teachings. 90
Moreover, unlike the Bangkok Declaration, the resolution’s operative section
deletes endorsements of the UDHR, the full realization of human rights,
women’s full equality, the human rights of vulnerable groups such as
minorities, and recognition that “no violation of human rights can be
justified.”91

and in subsequent years up until 2001. From 1994-2000, the OIC’s human rights coordination
resolution reverts to five operative paragraphs.
90

OIC Res. 41/21, ¶ 1 (Apr. 25–29, 1993).

91

Compare Bangkok Declaration, supra note 86, ¶¶5, 8 with OIC Res. 41/21, supra note 90, ¶¶ 2,

5.
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Table 1: Comparison of Select Provisions of the Bangkok Declaration
(1993) and OIC Resolution on Human Rights Cooperation (1993)
Bangkok Declaration92
Preamble: Emphasizing
the significance of the
World Conference on
Human Rights, which
provides an invaluable
opportunity to review all
aspects of human rights
and ensure a just and
balanced approach
thereto
Preamble: Recognizing
the contribution that can
be made to the World
Conference by Asian
countries with their
diverse and rich cultures
and traditions
Preamble: Reaffirming
their commitment to
principles contained in
the Charter of the United
Nations and the
Universal Declaration on
Human Rights

OIC Resolution on HR
Coordination93
Preamble:
Emphasizing the
significance of the World
Conference on Human
rights, which provides an
invaluable opportunity to
review all aspects of
human rights and ensure
a just and balanced
approach thereto
Preamble: Recognizing the
contribution that can be
made to the World
Conference by Islamic
countries on the basis of
the valuable guidelines
contained in the “Cairo
Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam”
Preamble: Bearing in
mind the objectives of the
Charter of OIC and the
“Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam” to
promote and encourage
respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms
for all in accordance with
Islamic values and
teachings as well as the
Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal
Declaration on Human
Rights

92

Bangkok Declaration, supra note 86.

93

OIC Res. 41/21, supra note 90.

Comment
Verbatim.

OIC resolution
modifies reference
to “Asian
countries” to
account for OIC
specific
contribution based
on CDHRI norms.
OIC resolution
does not “reaffirm”
commitment to
UDHR. Rather
only acknowledges
UDHR after
invocation of OICspecific documents
including CDHRI
and “Islamic
values and
teachings.”
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Bangkok Declaration
Preamble: Reaffirming
the principles of respect
for national sovereignty,
territorial integrity and
non-interference in the
internal affairs of States
Preamble: Recognizing
that the promotion of
human rights should be
encouraged by
cooperation and
consensus, and not
through confrontation
and the imposition of
incompatible values
Preamble: Reiterating
the interdependence and
indivisibility of
economic, social,
cultural, civil and
political rights, and the
inherent
interrelationship
between development,
democracy, universal
enjoyment of all human
rights, and social
justice, which must be
addressed in an
integrated and balanced
manner

OIC Resolution on
HR Coordination
Preamble:
Reaffirming the
principles of respect for
national sovereignty,
territorial integrity and
non-interference in the
internal affairs of states
Preamble:
Recognizing that the
promotion and
protection of human
rights should be
encouraged by
cooperation and
consensus, and not
through confrontation
and the imposition of
incompatible values
Preamble:
Reiterating the
interdependence and
indivisibility of
economic, social,
cultural, civil and
political rights, and the
inherent
interrelationship
between development,
democracy, universal
enjoyment of all human
rights, and social justice
which must be
addressed in an
integrated and balanced
manner

Comment
Verbatim.

Virtually verbatim.

Verbatim.
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Bangkok Declaration
1. Reaffirm their
commitment to the
principles contained in
the Charter of the
United Nations and the
Universal Declaration
on Human Rights as
well as the full
realization of all human
rights throughout the
world;
5. Emphasize the
principles of respect for
national sovereignty and
territorial integrity as
well as non-interference
in the internal affairs of
States, and the non-use
of human rights as an
instrument of political
pressure;
6. Reiterate that all
countries, large and
small, have the right to
determine their political
systems, control and
freely utilize their
resources, and freely
pursue their economic,
social and cultural
development;
7. Stress the
universality, objectivity
and non-selectivity of all
human rights and the
need to avoid the
application of double
standards in the
implementation of
human rights and its
politicization, and that
no violation of human
rights can be justified;

OIC Resolution on
HR Coordination
1. Reaffirms its
commitment to the
principles contained in
the Charter of the OIC
as well as the “Cairo
Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam” as
general guidelines and
the Charter of the
United Nations.
2. Emphasizes the
principles of respect for
national sovereignty and
territorial integrity as
well as non-interference
in the internal affairs of
states, and the non-use
of human rights as an
instrument of political
or economic pressure.
3. Reiterates that all
countries, large and
small, have the right to
determine their political
systems, control and
freely utilize their
resources, and freely
pursue their economic,
social and cultural
development.
4. Stresses the necessity
of achieving
universality, objectivity,
and non-selectivity in
the application of
human rights standards
and instruments.

Comment
OIC resolution omits
affirmation of
commitment to
UDHR and to full
realization of human
rights.

Virtually verbatim.
OIC resolution adds
reference to
economic pressure.

Verbatim.

Similar
construction.
However, OIC
resolution omits
recognition that “no
violation of human
rights can be
justified.”
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Bangkok Declaration
8. Recognize that while
human rights are
universal in nature,
they must be considered
in the context of a
dynamic and evolving
process of international
norm-setting, bearing in
mind the significance of
national and regional
particularities and
various historical,
cultural and religious
backgrounds;
11. Emphasize the
importance of
guaranteeing the
human rights and
fundamental freedoms
of vulnerable groups
such as ethnic, national,
racial, religious and
linguistic minorities,
migrant workers,
disabled persons,
indigenous peoples,
refugees and displaced
persons;
22. Reaffirm their
strong commitment to
the promotion and
protection of the rights
of women through the
guarantee of equal
participation in the
political, social,
economic and cultural
concerns of society;

OIC Resolution on
HR Coordination
5. Recognizes that while
human rights are
universal in nature,
they must be considered
in the context of a
dynamic and evolving
process of international
norm-setting, taking
into account the various
historical, cultural and
religious backgrounds
and the principal legal
systems.

[Vol. 28:89
Comment

Similar
construction. OIC
resolution front-ends
historical, cultural
and religious
backgrounds and
accounts for
different legal
systems.

N/A

OIC resolution omits
reference
guaranteeing the
human rights and
fundamental
freedoms of
vulnerable groups.

15. Reaffirms its strong
commitment, in
accordance with article 6
of the “Cairo Declaration
on Human Rights in
Islam”, to the promotion
and protection of the
rights of women.

OIC resolution
limits guarantee of
equality for women
to “human
dignity.”94

Under the CDHRI, “(a) Woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has rights to enjoy as
well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the right
to retain her name and lineage. (b) The husband is responsible for the support and welfare of the
family.” CDHRI, supra note 16.
94
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Bangkok Declaration
24. Welcome the
important role played by
national institutions in
the genuine and
constructive promotion
of human rights, and
believe that the
conceptualization and
eventual establishment
of such institutions are
best left for the States to
decide;

OIC Resolution on
HR Coordination
N/A

Comment
OIC resolution omits
reference to role for
national human
rights institutions.

The OIC’s 1993 human rights coordination resolution additionally posits
that the CDHRI’s “valuable guidelines” can make a contribution to the World
Conference.95 The resolution closes by directing the OIC Secretary General “to
transmit this resolution along with the ‘Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam’ to the Secretary General of the World Conference on Human Rights as
[the OIC’s] contribution . . . to the Conference.”96 Considered in its entirety, the
OIC’s 1993 resolution purports to do more damage to the promise of universal
human rights than the Bangkok Declaration. Unsatisfied with merely
reiterating problematic sections of the Bangkok Declaration that diminish the
principle of universality and advocate non-intervention, the OIC goes further,
by omitting or limiting other rights, principles, and institutions recognized
elsewhere in the Declaration.
The tensions manifested in the regional declarations discussed above—as
well as in the OIC’s 1993 resolution on human rights coordination—became
fodder for negotiations during the World Conference on Human Rights. 97 Some
elements introduced in the Bangkok Declaration underwent linguistic
transformation before making their way into the final outcome document of
the World Conference on Human Rights, otherwise known as the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action (“VDPA”). 98
These changes, however innocuous in appearance, are significant; they
shift the priority away from national and regional particularities and back to
protecting the universality of human rights. In other words, rather than enable
the Bangkok Declaration’s national and regional “particularities” to undercut

95

OIC Res. 41/21, supra note 90, pmbl.

96

Id. ¶ 19.

Boerefijn, supra note 71, ¶ 5. Boerefijn confirms that “[t]ensions were indeed clearly discernible
in Vienna. States questioned the universality of human rights and the legitimacy of addressing
the human rights situation against the will of the State concerned.” Id.
97

98

VDPA, supra note 62.
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universal human rights, the VDPA flips the formulation to return primacy to
universality, holding states to the unqualified recognition that human rights
are universal. While particularities must be “borne in mind,” states—
irrespective of such peculiarities—share a duty to “promote and protect all
human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 99 As one commentator has
observed, “the Vienna document emphasizes more the universality of human
rights, while the Bangkok declaration stresses the necessity to take into
account national and regional particularities as well . . . [Motivation for the
latter formulation flows from] attempts to justify human rights violations
caused by political, economic or other interests.”100
Table 2: Comparison of Bangkok Declaration,
and Vienna Declaration
Bangkok
OIC HR
Declaration
Coordination
(1993)
Resolution (1993)
8. Recognize that
5. Recognizes that
while human rights
while human rights are
are universal in
universal in nature,
nature, they must be
they must be
considered in the
considered in the
context of a dynamic
context of a dynamic
and evolving process of and evolving process of
international norminternational normsetting, bearing in
setting, taking into
mind the significance
account the various
of national and
historical, cultural and
regional particularities religious backgrounds
and various historical, and the principal legal
cultural and religious
systems.
backgrounds;

99

OIC 1993 Resolution,
Vienna Declaration
& Program of Action
(1993)
5. All human rights are
universal, indivisible
and interdependent
and interrelated. The
international
community must treat
human rights globally
in a fair and equal
manner, on the same
footing, and with the
same emphasis. While
the significance of
national and regional
particularities and
various historical,
cultural and religious
backgrounds must be
borne in mind, it is the
duty of States,
regardless of their
political, economic and
cultural systems, to
promote and protect all
human rights and
fundamental freedoms.

See Table 2.

100

REIN MÜLLERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY 82 (1997).
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Despite the consensus adoption of the VDPA during the 1993 World
Conference, the OIC has renewed its endorsement of the Bangkok
Declaration’s attenuated vision of universality in its annual human rights
resolutions since 1993.101 This consistent position confirms not only the
significant—if subtle—linguistic tweak accomplished under the VDPA, but
also the OIC’s ongoing malaise with clearly acknowledging the primacy of
universality in the context of defining and protecting human rights.
The OIC’s human rights-related resolutions in the years following the 1993
World Conference continue to evidence ambivalence vis-à-vis recognition of
universality. For example, from 1991–96, the OIC’s CDHRI follow up
resolutions contained a preambular paragraph referencing “the objectives of
the Charter of the OIC and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . .
.” 102 But explicit acknowledgement of the UDHR is deleted from the
resolution’s text beginning in 1998 and until 2004, the last year the OIC issued
a standalone resolution dedicated to CDHRI follow up.103
In addition to eliminating mention of the UDHR, a new preambular
provision introduced in 1998 referred to “the universality and comprehensive
nature of the Islamic rules on human rights.” 104 While this language does
invoke the notion of “universality,” its application is limited to the Islamic law
relating to human rights and does not function to endorse the universality of
international human rights law (“IHRL”) itself.105 Beyond these preambular
This operative paragraph is introduced in 1993 but removed from subsequent annual OIC
human rights cooperation resolutions until 2005. The language restored in the 2005 resolution,
although slightly modified, still clings to the Bangkok formulation and fails to mirror the VDPA:
“Asserts that human rights are universal in nature and must be considered in the context of
dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”
OIC Res. 1/32-Leg, ¶ 1 (June 28–30, 2005). This language is maintained verbatim through 2014.
OIC Res. 1/41-Leg, ¶ 1 (June 18–19, 2014). In 2015 and 2016, the OIC introduced slightly revised
language that continued to break from the VDPA consensus: “Affirms that human rights are of a
universal character and must be perceived within the framework of a dynamic non-static process
for the evolvement of international standards with due consideration to national and regional
specificities and to the diverse historic, cultural, and religious backgrounds.” OIC Res. 1/43-Leg, ¶
1 (Oct. 18–19, 2016).
101

OIC Res. 37/20, supra note 24; OIC Res. 41/21, supra note 90; OIC Res. 39/22 (Dec. 10–12, 1994);
OIC Res. 40/23 (Dec. 9–12, 1995); OIC Res. 41/24 (Dec. 9–13, 1996). The OIC does not appear to
have convened a CFM in 1992 or 1997.
102

The preamble from 1998 to 2004 only bears in mind the OIC Charter objectives of promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. See OIC Res. 50/25 (Mar.
15–17, 1998). The OIC stopped passing a resolution specific to the CDHRI after 2004.
Subsequently, much of the substance contained in the CDHRI-specific resolutions is carried over
to the OIC’s annual resolution on human rights coordination. See, e.g., OIC Res. 1/32-Leg, supra
note 101.
103

OIC Res. 50/25, supra note 103, ¶ 2. With some slight variances year to year, the final 2004
resolution recalls “the universality and integral nature of Islamic laws on human rights.” OIC Res.
2/31-LEG (June 14–16, 2004).
104

A similar rationale is invoked elsewhere, including during the 1998 UN-OIC seminar on Islam
and Universal Human Rights discussed infra Part II(D)(2). According to M. Javad Zarif, “Islam in
105
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changes, the 1998 CDHRI follow up resolution, for the first time, directed the
OIC, “pursuant to the principles enshrined in the Cairo Declaration, to start
the formulation and consideration of Islamic covenants on human rights.”106
This operative provision signaled the OIC’s willingness to further detach itself
from the promise of universality, inasmuch as it enshrined the CDHRI’s
relativistic vision as a basis for generating binding human rights treaties.
2. An OIC-Sponsored Seminar on Enriching the Universality of Human
Rights Falls Flat
The OIC’s ambivalence towards unqualified endorsement of universality
and the UDHR is neatly encapsulated in an underreported 1998 UN seminar
entitled “Enriching the Universality of Human Rights: Islamic Perspectives on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Iran initiated the seminar “to
facilitate a process of preparing Islamic commentaries on the Universal
declaration.”107 After some negotiation, it was convened under the auspices of
the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, working
closely with the OIC. 108 The two-day event revolved around three primary
themes:
1. Islam, the principle of non-discrimination and the UDHR;
2. Islam, civil and political rights and the UDHR; and
3. Islam, economic, social and cultural rights and the UDHR. 109
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”)
and the OIC selected 20 expert participants based on the “depth of their
Islamic legal background and knowledge of human rights law,”110 and tasked
them only with providing general “views and opinions on the issue.” By design,
this narrow remit did not call upon participants to “review current practice

itself was of a universal character, therefore, its prescriptions of human rights were universal, and
by that token, human rights were universal.” M. Javad Zarif, Islamic Contribution to Enriching
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, paper submitted to United Nations Seminar
“Enriching the Universality of Human Rights: Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,” at 155, U.N. Doc. HR/IP/SEM/1999/1 (Mar. 15, 1999).
OIC Res. 50/25, supra note 103, ¶ 2. This provision is elaborated in subsequent years, explaining
that each covenant “shall deal with one or several issues in detail based on the provisions of the
[CDHRI], and . . . be considered in special meetings in preparation for recommending their
submission to the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.” See e.g., OIC Res. 55/26, ¶ 2 (June 28–
July 1, 1999); OIC Res. 2/31-Leg, supra note 104, ¶ 2.
106

Remarks of Mary Robinson, United Nations Seminar “Enriching the Universality of Human
Rights: Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” U.N. Doc.
HR/IP/SEM/1999/1 (Part I) (Mar. 15, 1999).
107

Id. ¶ 8. OIC countries reportedly financed the event at a cost of nearly $500,000. David Littman,
Islamism Grows Stronger at the United Nations, 6.3 MIDDLE EAST Q. (June 1, 1999),
http://www.meforum.org/477/islamism-grows-stronger-at-the-united-nations.
108

109

Robinson, supra note 107.

110

Id. Twenty experts “were selected by the High Commissioner, in consultation with OIC.” Id.
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with regard to the protection of human rights” nor enable them “to reach
conclusions or adopt positions.”111
Although the original plan for the seminar initially envisioned a small,
closed meeting, this was later revised to enable “observers” from governments,
NGOs and the public. Despite this opening, in High Commissioner Robinson’s
words, “to preserve the basic scholarly objective, the discussion itself [would]
be limited to the invited experts.” 112 Thus, the seminar’s design also formally
prohibited the audience from asking questions. This curious restriction
prompted at least one observer to note that, “[f]or the first time at a U.N. public
seminar, no questions were allowed from the more than 250 participants from
about 80 states, intergovernmental, and U.N. bodies, as well as 41 NGOs.” 113
In her opening remarks to the seminar, High Commissioner Robinson took
pains to express her particular hope that the “discussions will deepen our
understanding” of UDHR Art. 29(1), providing that “[e]veryone has duties to
the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality
is possible.” 114 Robinson’s peculiar emphasis on individual duties to the
community during a seminar intended to examine Islamic perspectives on the
UDHR represented a frontal betrayal of the Declaration’s rights-driven
purpose. It also appeared at odds with the seminar’s stated themes. Every
“operative” article in the UDHR promulgates an individual right or
government prohibition, with article 29 being the lone exception. In fact, the
term “duties” appears but once in the entire Declaration. Directing the
seminar’s attention away from rights and towards this isolated provision
essentially created a justificatory framework for abandoning a focus on rights
and universalism. Instead, the framing invited deliberations emphasizing the
individual’s obligations to the state. Not coincidentally, this emphasis fit
squarely into the OIC’s relativistic modus vivendi of placing the state’s
religious values ahead of individual rights. As Theo van Boven has aptly
explained elsewhere in regard to the drafting of UDHR article 29:
The issue of duties was duly and thoroughly discussed. But the
view that prevailed was that, while a balance between rights
and duties must be attained, the need to guarantee rights as
an international undertaking was more pressing than the need
for a catalogue of duties. In the relationship between the
individual and the state the balance of power usually tilts
overwhelmingly to the side of the state and international

111

Robinson, supra note 107, ¶ 10.

112

Id. ¶ 12.

David G. Littman, Human Rights and Human Wrongs, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 19, 2003, 7:00 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/205577/human-rights-and-human-wrongs-david-glittman. Littman, supra note 108 (“Observers agreed that this format was unprecedented within
the United Nations system; certainly, it was much deplored, even by some diplomats from OIC
member states.”).
113

114

Robinson, supra note 107, ¶ 13 (internal quotations omitted).
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human rights guarantees are designed precisely to protect the
individual against the abuse of power and to help ensure a life
of dignity for all.115
OIC Secretary General Azeddine Laraki’s opening remarks to the seminar
added another proverbial finger on the scale. Laraki failed to expressly
endorse the UDHR, and instead asserted that the seminar would afford an
“elite of Muslim experts in the field of Sharia and Law”116 the opportunity to
present research “expound[ing] the Islamic perspective as to human rights . .
. on the basis of the . . . sources of Islamic Sharia.” 117 Further on, plainly
alluding to limitations on rights, Laraki stressed the seminar’s role in
“highlighting the message of Islam in terms of human rights and in
underscoring the importance of cultural and religious specificities.” 118
During the two-day seminar, participants posited laudable general
statements to the effect that “sharia was not contrary to the provisions of the
Universal Declaration,”119 and “[e]fforts should be made to put an end to the
myth of the incompatibility of Islamic teachings with the [UDHR].” 120
Nevertheless, even the seminar’s summary record managed to capture the
clearly discernable fault lines. During the first session, Dr. Ahmad Kamal
Aboulmagd, an Egyptian constitutional and Islamic law expert, took a cue from
High Commissioner Robinson and declared the “need for a universal
declaration of human responsibilities.”121 The pronouncement likely alluded to

Theo van Boven, A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities?, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 75 (Barend
van der Heijan & Bahia Tahzib Lie eds., 1998).
115

116

The omission of human rights experts here is noteworthy.

Remarks of Azeddine Laraki, United Nations Seminar “Enriching the Universality of Human
Rights: Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 6, U.N. Doc.
HR/IP/SEM/1999/1(Part I) (Mar. 15, 1999).
117

118

Id.

Summary Record of the 3d Meeting, Seminar on Enriching the Universality of Human Rights:
Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 45, U.N. Doc.
HR/IP/SEM/1998/TR.3 (Nov. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Summary Record of the 3d Meeting].
119

Summary Record of the 2d Meeting, Seminar on Enriching the Universality of Human Rights:
Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 26, U.N. Doc.
HR/IP/SEM/1998/TR.2, (Nov. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Summary Record of the 2d Meeting].
120

Summary Record of the 1st Meeting, Seminar on Enriching the Universality of Human Rights:
Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12, U.N. Doc.
HR/IP/SEM/1998/TR.1, (Nov. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Summary Record of the 1st Meeting].
121
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a problematic document122 previously proposed by the InterAction Council 123
and “hailed as a victory” by supporters of the campaign to amend the UDHR’s
alleged western bias.124 Aboulmagd then proceeded to deride the writings of
certain prominent human rights scholars, “even including Moslem writers
such as Abdullah Al-Naeem [Na’im] or Hassam Taibi [Tibi],” because—though
they advocated in favor of Islam’s compatibility with universal human rights—
“they were futile and useless aberrations because they lacked the basic element
of cultural legitimacy.”125 Later on, Mr. Sahib Ben Cheikh, an Algerian mufti,
went so far as to rewrite history by claiming “that Moslems were virtually
absent from the international scene at the time when the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was elaborated.” 126
Despite its high-profile membership, the InterAction Council’s proposal was not without
criticism. Drawing on the analogy that human rights norms should be protected in a manner
similar to appellation for wine, Fried van Hoof offered the devastating conclusion that the proposed
Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities “tastes like [nothing] other than vinegar.” Fried
van Hoof, A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities: Far-Sighted or Flawed?, in TO
BAEHR IN OUR MINDS: ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE HEART OF THE NETHERLANDS 69
(Mielle Bulterman et al. eds., 1998). Among van Hoof’s primary concerns, the Declaration
purported to achieve balance between freedom and responsibility, despite an existing structure
that already accounted for various competing interests, including rights and responsibilities. Id.
More directly, by omitting mention of certain existing rights and diluting the substance of others,
the Declaration’s content neglected the original impetus for promoting and protecting human
rights, namely protecting individuals from “anti-democratic ideologies and its accomplices.” Id. at
65–67. In a letter to the UN secretary general Kofi Annan, nine global press freedom organizations
labeled InterAction’s declaration “a serious new threat to press freedom” that “undercut[s] existing
human rights,” and “the strength and universality” of the UDHR. Letter from the World Press
Freedom Committee, in A GLOBAL ETHIC AND GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: TWO DECLARATIONS 134–
35 (Hans Kung & Helmut Schmidt eds., 1998). The letter concluded by urging the Secretary
General to reaffirm the UDHR’s universality “and to seek its full implementation,” rather than to
endorse efforts to “amend or rewrite it so that authoritarians may negate the fundamental
freedoms it provides.” Id.
122

A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, INTERACTION COUNCIL (Sept. 1, 1997),
https://www.interactioncouncil.org/index.php/publications/universal-declaration-humanresponsibilities. For a detailed account of the drafting of the declaration, see Johannes Frühbauer,
From the Declaration of the Religions to the Declaration of the Statesmen: Stages in the
Composition of the Declaration on Human Responsibilities, in A GLOBAL ETHIC AND GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITIES: TWO DECLARATIONS 84–103, (Hans Kung & Helmut Schmidt eds., 1998).
123

Hoof, supra note 122, at 62–63 (noting support for the Universal Declaration of Human
Responsibilities from Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s then—and now current—prime minister).
124

125

Summary Record of the 1st Meeting, supra note 121, at 12.

Summary Record of the 2d Meeting, supra note 120, at 26. Susan Waltz disproves Ben Cheikh’s
proposition: “It is often supposed that international human rights standards were negotiated
without active participation by Middle Eastern and Muslim states. That was not the case.” Susan
Waltz, Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 799, 799
(2004). Waltz acknowledges that “many Middle Eastern states were not yet members of the UN”
during drafting of the UDHR. However, “Lebanon and Egypt were represented on the Commission
[responsible for drafting the UDHR] during the first years of the UN, and they made direct
contributions to early drafts” of the Declaration. Furthermore, after the UN Third Committee
received the draft Declaration in 1948, various Muslim-majority states registered interventions,
including Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Id. at 807. The
UNDP’s 2004 Arab Human Development Report similarly repudiates Ben Cheikh’s assertion,
observing that such a view “underestimates the extent of the Arab contribution, whether on the
126
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Despite the general assurances of compatibility between sharia and the
UDHR, other remarks on specific topics signaled the existence of sharia-based
redlines that deviated from universality. For example, Dr. Hossein Mehrpour,
an advisor to Iran’s president, conceded that while the UDHR guarantees
every individual freedoms of opinion, religion and belief, under Islam “defence
or promotion of polytheism and of the right to deny God was not
permissible.” 127 Similarly, while Lebanese scholar Dr. Ridwan El-Sayyid
observed “there was no conflict on equality in human value,” he reminded
participants that “debate continued on the equality between citizens including
the followers of other religions or cultures.” 128 Likewise, the issue of securing
women’s equality “was the most difficult because many of its elements . . . were
directly and fundamentally embedded in religious texts which Moslems
considered beyond any questioning.”129
In contrast with these observations, other experts held out the possibility
of achieving compatibility with universality by developing new consensusbased interpretations of sharia. For example, Ms. Mashuda Shefali, Director
of the Bangladesh-based Center for Women’s Initiatives, identified “the rise of
religious fundamentalism and the politicization of Islam [as responsible for]
restricting women’s mobility and their access to basics such as food,
employment, shelter and education.” 130 According to her, those fighting for
women’s rights “on the grounds that they were basic, inalienable human
rights” exposed themselves to “further marginalization by male-dominated
organizations and authorities: they were accused of being ‘westernized’ or
‘opponents’ of Islam, two charges with great resonance in popular Islamic
tradition and culture.”131
Similarly, Professor Norani Othman, a representative of Malaysia-based
Sisters in Islam,132 noted the larger “problem faced by contemporary Moslems
was . . . ‘the problem of interpretation’ of the foundational texts of Islam.” 133
Othman reasoned that without a clear consensus over interpretation, selective
verses of the Koran might be misused to justify exclusivity or inequality: “The

part of the Arab states that actively and effectively participated in debates on the substantive
elements of human rights standards, or in the persons of distinguished Arab experts who helped
shape international human rights law.” ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: TOWARDS
FREEDOM IN THE ARAB WORLD 75 (2004).
127

Summary Record of the 2d Meeting, supra note 120, at 29–31.

128

Summary Record of the 3d Meeting, supra note 119, at 44.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 40.

131

Id. at 41.

Mission Statement and Objectives, SISTERS IN ISLAM, http://sistersinislam.org.my/page.php?36
(last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
132

Summary Record of the 4th Meeting, Seminar on Enriching the Universality of Human Rights:
Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 49, U.N. Doc.
HR/IP/SEM/1998/TR.4 (Nov. 9–10, 1998).
133
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problem of exclusivity gave rise to the question of the rights which the followers
of one religion might obtain but from which the followers of another religion
might be excluded.”134 Elsewhere, Othman asserted scholars should “not fudge
around [the] realistic and actual problems in modern times” that impact
diverse issues such as “the right to work or the right to education . . . . gender
relations or reproductive rights . . . . guardianship and custody of children.” 135
These latter views—notably of two female experts in attendance—
accentuate the challenge identified previously. Namely, while claims of
compatibility between sharia and universal human rights may suffice on a
general level, any meaningful engagement on the “plane of actual
implementation” necessitates more detailed exposition of sharia-based norms.
Such an exposition, in the view of these experts, may require the “adjusting
and adapting [of sharia sources] to the contemporary needs,” so as to bridge
“the gaps between classical juristic thinking and modern demands in respect
of questions of human rights . . . .” 136 But the effort to delve into the challenge
of actual implementation at the UN seminar quickly hit a wall. At least two
other experts cautioned that “the Seminar was not the right forum to raise
controversial matters . . . because the discussion of such matters required more
time, more specific specializations and more representatives of various
jurisprudential schools . . . .”137
In closing the seminar, High Commissioner Robinson was laudatory: “no
one expressed doubts about the [UDHR] nor denied the legitimacy or
universality of international human rights standards. And we have heard of
the relevance of international standards, including the Universal Declaration,
to promoting and protecting human rights on the national level.”138 Robinson’s
readout of the event, however, was an overly sanguine one. More accurately,
certain experts cautiously posited that sharia had the capacity for consistency
with the UDHR. But still others accepted and endorsed redlines beyond which
sharia could not move. These experts further urged avoiding any type of
engagement to grapple with the implementation problems generated by
certain interpretations of sharia. For example, some experts highlighted the
need to separate religious requirements from practices that were “conditioned

134

Id.

135

Summary Record of the 1st Meeting, supra note 121, at 21.

136

Id.

137

Summary Record of the 3d Meeting, supra note 119, at 36.

Remarks of Mary Robinson, Personal Impressions of the Seminar on Enriching the Universality
of Human Rights: Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 162, U.N.
Doc. HR/IP/SEM/1959 (Nov. 8–9, 1998). During her closing remarks, Robinson expressed her
pleasure at the high number of OIC states that had ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child (UNCRC). Id. The OIC would go on to release its own Covenant on the Rights of the
Child in Islam (CRCI) six years later, a treaty that boasts provisions antithetical to the very
UNCRC norms intended to protect the rights of children. Blitt, supra note 1, at 772–74.
138
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by cultural and social backgrounds.”139 Similarly, they reasoned that Muslims
need to be able to identify “those ideas [that] came from interpretations by
classical juristic thinkers who were conditioned by the historical socioeconomic and cultural conditions of their time.” 140 Dr. Mustafa Ceric, the
Grand Mufti of Bosnia, offered an unvarnished conclusion on this view: “Islam
was not guilty, but it was the attitudes of Moslems that were the cause for their
suffering under illiteracy, poverty, difficult democratic processes and
complaints by women.”141
OIC Secretary General Azeddine Laraki’s concluding remarks further
testify to the High Commissioner’s simplistic assessment. Speaking on behalf
of OIC member states, Laraki bluntly rejected a seminar participant’s proposal
for a follow up “meeting of a group of Moslem scholars, outside of any official
umbrella to handle matters that related to Islam and human rights . . . .
Perhaps . . . [to] be followed by a meeting with scholars from the West.”142 In
doing so, Laraki also dismissed the apparently loaded premise voiced by the
proposal’s sponsor: “of course there would be some differences but that was
acceptable . . . [because] there was [still] so much in common.”143
Judging from this tense wrap up, it would appear the OIC remained
unready to embrace the implications that might flow from the universality of
human rights. More than this, the seminar proceedings themselves betrayed
an ongoing effort by the OIC to tightly control the nature of the dialogue
surrounding Islam and human rights. Indeed, a willingness to quash
discussion of “controversial” matters, ad hominem attacks blasting
internationally recognized scholars of Islam and human rights as “useless
aberrations,” and the glaring shut down of the mere suggestion of engagement
on Islam outside of official OIC control (or with western scholars!) all signal
that the OIC operates as the “collective voice of the Muslim world” only to a
point.
As one scholar has observed, “warts and all, from its glorious nobility to
misogyny, there has always been a spectrum of interpretations in Islam.” 144
Yet despite this history, the OIC has sought to impose artificial constraints on

139

Summary Record of the 1st Meeting, supra note 121, at 16.

Id. at 21. A similar position is reiterated by Mr. Ben Cheikh, who claimed “it was the ArabBerberia-Turkish-Persian-Indian culture, and not Islam, that was the source of such
inconsistency.” Summary Record of the 2d Meeting, supra note 120, at 26–27.
140

141

Laraki, supra note 117 at 52.

142

Id.

143

Id.

Omid Safi, Introduction: The Times They are A-Changin’—A Muslim Quest for Justice, Gender
Equality, and Pluralism, in PROGRESSIVE MUSLIMS: ON JUSTICE, GENDER AND PLURALISM, 1, 6
(Omid Safi ed., 2003). Others have made the same observation. See Kecia Ali, Progressive Muslims
and Islamic Jurisprudence, in PROGRESSIVE MUSLIMS: ON JUSTICE, GENDER AND PLURALISM, 163,
167 (Omid Safi ed., 2003) (“there is not now, nor has there ever been, a single, unitary Islamic
law.”).
144
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this spectrum. To better delineate the OIC’s redlines, consider Dr. An-Na’im’s
“useless” but somehow still menacing proposal:
[H]uman rights advocates in the Muslim world . . . . need not
be confined, however, to the particular historical
interpretations of Islam known as Shari’a . . . . Religious texts,
like all other texts, are open to a variety of interpretations.
Human rights advocates in the Muslim world should struggle
to have their interpretations of the relevant texts adopted as
the new Islamic scriptural imperatives for the contemporary
world.145
An-Na’im’s so-called “futile” voice further reasons that “Authority for this
reinterpretive activity comes from the fact that contemporary majority
perspectives on Shari’a are not necessarily the only valid interpretations of the
scriptural imperatives of Islam, a fact which has been recognized by some
modernist Muslim reformers.” 146 Scholar Ebrahim Moosa has put this
challenge more bluntly: “The success of a modem Islamic human rights theory
depends on the extent to which modem Islamic thought would be open to a
revisionist or reconstructionist approach in philosophy and ethical
orientation.”147 Producing “a credible version of human rights . . . dialogue with
both the tradition and the present” demands Muslim jurists and scholars
“acknowledge that quantum shifts have occurred” in a range of categories,
including human society and “inherited conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’” 148 In
Moosa’s words, facilitating this dialogue will require nothing less than “a
fundamental rethinking.”149
The contemporary difficulty inherent in maintaining and disseminating a
more fully representative spectrum of interpretation should not be
understated. According to Khaled Abou El-Fadl, another leading authority on
Islamic law and human rights:
When it comes to the issue of self-critical appraisals, Muslim
discourses, for the most part . . . . are politicized and polarized
to the extent that a Muslim intellectual who takes a critical
approach to the Islamic tradition often feels that he is
stepping into a minefield. It is difficult for a contemporary
Muslim scholar to take a critical position on such matters as
Islam and . . . women without becoming the subject of

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions
and Scriptural Imperatives—A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 15 (1990).
145

146

Id. at 51 (citation omitted).

Ebrahim Moosa, The Dilemma of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 185, 187 (2000)
(citation omitted).
147

148

Id. at 215

149

Id.
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suspicion, and even accusations as to his or her loyalties . . .
.150
Abdulaziz Sachedina is far more blunt. In his assessment, Muslim
intellectuals espousing alternate or competing interpretations of Islamic
sources put their own lives on the line:
The intolerance exhibited by the religious establishment in
some Muslim countries and more recently in Muslim
communities in Europe and North America, which feels
threatened by the rational assessment of religious texts in
their historical context in the universities, has forced these
scholars to abandon their religious and moral responsibility to
their own community . . . . For Muslims in general, and their
communities in the West in particular, academic study of Islam
is a new phenomenon that causes their deep felt insecurities in
faith to react strongly against anything that appears to
challenge their long-held belief system.151
As demonstrated below, the OIC continues to tamp down and deny these
reformist voices by wielding a formidable influence over the definition of an
Islamic approach to human rights norms. However, its efforts to ostracize AnNa’im, El-Fadl, and other like-minded scholars 152 has not succeeded in
silencing them.153
3.

The OIC and Universality in the 21st Century

The OIC’s official position on universality has remained ambivalent in the
years following the UN-OIC seminar. The organization’s milestone Ten Year
Program of Action, discussed above, made no reference to the centrality of
universality despite calling for the establishment of an OIC human rights
commission. Instead, the document urged expediting development of “The
Covenant on the Rights of Women in Islam” based on content in the CDHRI. 154
The OIC’s annual internal resolutions during this period also confirm an
ongoing aversion to universalism. For example, in 2005, the OIC consolidated
its human rights-related positions into a single resolution, dropping the

Khaled Abou El-Fadl, The Ugly Modern and the Modern Ugly: Reclaiming the Beautiful in
Islam, in PROGRESSIVE MUSLIMS: ON JUSTICE, GENDER AND PLURALISM, supra note 144, at 40.
150

Abdulaziz Sachedina, Guidance or Governance? A Muslim Conception of “Two-Cities,” 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1079, 1082 n.4 (2000).
151

See id. at 1080 (“The fundamental problem, as reflected in the classical formulation of Muslim
political identity, is religious authoritarianism founded upon an exclusive salvific claim, which
runs contrary to the emerging global spirit of democratization through acknowledgment of
religious pluralism.”).
152

It remains fair to ask whether these scholars have, in fact, succeeded in gaining traction over
the OIC’s narrative. Id.
153

154

OIC Ten Year Program, supra note 41, art. 2(VI)(3).
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longstanding separate text focusing on CDHRI follow up. This unified
resolution integrated much of the content found in prior CDHRI resolutions.
At the same time, it further undercut recognition of universalism in several
notable ways. First, it endorsed the freshly drafted Covenant on the Rights of
the Child in Islam (“CRCI”), 155 an OIC treaty that, among other problems,
departs from universal human rights by situating sharia and domestic law
above any international norms.156 Second, like the Ten Year Program of Action,
the OIC’s new unified resolution called for expediting additional “[c]ovenants
on human rights in Islam, in accordance with . . . the principles enshrined in
the Cairo Declaration . . . .” 157 Finally, the resolution also resuscitated an
operative paragraph issued only once before, during the lead up to the 1993
World Conference. This paragraph, based on the Bangkok Declaration,
formally renewed the OIC’s rejection of the consensus language contained in
the Vienna Declaration. It “[a]ssert[ed] that human rights are universal in
nature and must be considered in the context of dynamic and evolving process
of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds.” 158 The OIC has maintained this formulation—alongside an
additional operative paragraph “[r]eaffirm[ing] the right of [S]tates to adhere
to their religious, social, and cultural specificities” 159 —in its resolutions
through 2016.160
New human rights content introduced in the OIC’s 2008 Charter and the
creation of the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (“IPHRC”)
may point to more substantial efforts intended to better position the
organization to weigh in on international human rights. But adopting such
measures also necessitated further clarification of the organization’s position
on universality. The OIC secretary general’s advocacy in favor of setting up the
IPHRC exemplifies this overriding tension. In his words, establishing the
IPHRC would:
earn the OIC increased credibility and uplift its position in the
eyes of the outside world . . . . [I]t would also give the
Organization greater confidence and support in grappling with
155

OIC Res. 1/32-Leg, supra note 101, ¶¶ 14–15.

156

Blitt, supra note 1, at 772–74.

157

OIC Res. 1/32-Leg, supra note 101, ¶ 16.

158

Id. ¶ 1.

Id. ¶ 3. This provision is retained with slight variation through 2016. See OIC Res. 1/43-LEG,
supra note 101, ¶ 4 (“Reaffirm[ing] the right for states to uphold their religious, social and cultural
specificities which represent legacies and intellectual underpinnings that in turn contribute to
enriching common world concepts of human rights.”).
159

See OIC Res. 1/41-LEG, supra note 101, ¶ 1. Resolutions from 2015 and 2016 introduced a slight
revision: “Affirms that human rights are of a universal character and must be perceived within
the framework of a dynamic non-static process for the evolvement of international standards with
due consideration to national and regional specificities and to the diverse historic, cultural, and
religious backgrounds.” OIC Res. No. 1/43-LEG, supra note 101, ¶ 1.
160
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the considerable challenges confronting the Islamic world in
this area, and provide it with a structure that would help
strongly refute outside accusations, and defend the Member
States’ positions in this field.161
Keeping this political calculation in mind, the 2008 Charter attempts to
manifest the OIC’s commitment to “promote human rights and fundamental
freedoms.” But at the same time, it leaves this promise disconnected from
international norms. 162 Similarly, the new Charter anticipates the IPHRC
shall promote rights enshrined in the OIC’s own covenants and declarations,
as well as “in universally agreed human rights instruments . . . .” 163 But this
commitment holds only to the extent such rights are “in conformity with
Islamic values.” 164 The IPHRC’s 2011 statute reiterates this vague
formulation, thus perpetuating the OIC’s inability to endorse or adhere to an
unqualified understanding of universal human rights norms. 165
With the OIC’s 2025 Program of Action, issued in 2015, the organization
offered perhaps its clearest, if still qualified, endorsement of universality.
According to the document, “there is a strong need for . . . renewing the
commitment to promoting and protecting all universally accepted human
rights”; and “[i]t is important that the observance of all human universal rights
and freedoms flow together with Islamic values . . . .”166 To this end, the OIC’s
2025 action plan establishes two related goals:
2.15.1: Enhance OIC’s engagement on promotion and
protection of universal human rights as well as effectively
portraying the OIC’s vision of moderation, tolerance, and
protection of the rights guaranteed in the Islamic faith,
harmony and modernization, in cooperation and dialogue with
Member States.
2.15.4: Update and refine, in consultation with OIC Member
States, the existing OIC human rights instruments vis-à-vis
universal human rights instruments, as and where required. 167

OIC, Report of the Intergovernmental Experts Group Meeting on the Establishment of the OIC
Independent Permanent Human Right Commission, ¶ 5, OIC Doc. OIC/EGGHRC2/2010/REP.FINAL (Feb. 15–17, 2010) (emphasis added).
161

162

2008 OIC Charter, supra note 46, pmbl.

163

Id. art. 15.

164

Id.

IPHRC Statute, supra note 42, pmbl. While the IPHRC envelops itself with the superficial
trappings of an independent supervisory human rights body, among other obvious problems, its
formal mandate demands “support[ing] the OIC’s position on human rights at the international
level . . . .” Id. art. 13. For a more detailed critique of the IPHRC, see Blitt, supra note 1, 777–92.
165

166

OIC, 2025 Programme of Action, ¶ 49, OIC Doc. OIC/SUM-13/2016/POA-Final.

167

Id. 2.15.1, 2.15.4.
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The 2025 Program of Action arguably hints at the alluring possibility of
the OIC finally recognizing and seeking to remedy gaps between its approach
to human rights and the promise of universality. However, other
contemporaneous indicators conveyed by the organization suggest that such
an effort is unlikely to be as far-reaching as necessary to ensure that existing
equality and non-discrimination norms and other related rights are fully
implemented. Former OIC Secretary General Madani has summarized the
organization’s dilemma candidly: “there are a number of issues that go beyond
the normal scope of human rights and clash with Islamic teachings.” 168 From
this, Madani confirms fundamental discrepancies persist between universal
human rights vested on the international level and what the OIC’s framing of
sharia is prepared to embrace.
The issues flagged by the Secretary General as clashing with sharia—
freedom of expression, gender equality, and domestic application and
enforcement of human rights norms—are not peripheral or trivial in nature.
Rather, they engage a cross-section of fundamental human rights that are
interconnected and critical to the exercise of other key rights.169 In Madani’s
words, “[o]ne of the main issues relating to [the] gender equality debate is the
very definition of [the] term gender. While OIC countries prefer to use the
notion of equality between men and women, Western countries push for the
term Gender, which goes beyond the normal definition of men and woman into
the direction of how one perceives him/herself rather than his/her actual
physical appearance.”170
Taking a cue from this perspective, any purported OIC allowance for
universality—including equality and nondiscrimination principles—is
necessarily constricted in the context of these contested areas. Stated
differently, where the OIC’s particular (indeterminate) understanding of
Islamic norms fails to endorse or tolerate a claimed right, the only permissible
explanation for the OIC is that the claimed right falls outside what Madani
labels the “normal scope” of universal human rights. The possibility that the
organization’s understanding of Islamic law is outmoded, a misinterpretation,
or otherwise at odds with universal norms is simply not an option. To say that
such an approach unduly restricts the promise of universal human rights to
the OIC’s vision of sharia-permissible rights would be to state the obvious.
Plainly, such an approach front-ends the protection of religious belief at the
expense of individual rights. But, more than this, by purporting to situate
“abnormal” rights beyond the pale, the OIC’s approach effectively removes the

168

Statement of Iyad Ameen Madani, supra note 40.

Id. Puzzlingly, the Secretary General omits reference to the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion or belief as an area where the OIC arguably diverges from the “normal
scope” of IHRL. Id.; see Blitt, supra note 64 (“A closer look at the OIC’s advocacy favoring a ban on
defamation of religion reveals an approach that embodies not one but several anti-constitutional
ideas that operate to foreclose the principles of nondiscrimination and equality and undercut
universal rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.”).
169

170

Statement of Iyad Ameen Madani, supra note 40.
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obligation on governments to justify policies and practices that violate or
otherwise limit rights. In essence, these “abnormal” rights are not universal
and therefore do not trigger any state obligation that would purport to limit
what governments might do.
Ultimately, as the following section confirms, the OIC’s contemporary
effort to narrowly confine universality operates accordingly: if the right in
question is authorized under the OIC’s view of sharia, then it can be
acknowledged as a universally recognized human right. On the other hand, in
the event a given right contradicts the OIC’s understanding of sharia, the
organization proffers an elaborate multi-stage position to justify denying any
obligation to respect that right. In the first instance, such a right is not truly
universal and therefore need not be respected; in Madani’s words, it is “beyond
the normal scope.” Second, where the balance of evidence nevertheless favors
identifying the right as universally-recognized, the OIC falls back on its
relativistic argument that “religious, social, and cultural idiosyncrasies” 171
take precedence over universal rights. 172 To further bulwark this latter
position, the OIC routinely asserts that states must refrain “from using the
universality of human rights as a pretext to interfere in the states’ internal
affairs . . . .”173
THE OIC’S CONTEMPORARY ENGAGEMENT WITH EQUALITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION: DENIAL OF PROTECTION ON BASIS OF SOGI
To further understand the deleterious impact of the OIC’s approach to
universality, it is useful to consider how the organization engages the
international human rights framework in actual practice, particularly in the
context of foundational norms such as equality and nondiscrimination. The
previous article in this series demonstrated that the OIC’s longstanding
defense of different roles and responsibilities for men and women in the context
of “gender equality” undercuts women’s rights across a range of issues from
personal status to sexual and reproductive health.174 As that article concluded,
the OIC’s justification for this break with universal human rights norms

171

OIC Res. 1/41-LEG, supra note 101, ¶ 4.

172

See El-Fadl supra note 150, at 40.
[I]t has become a rather powerful rhetorical device to contend that the West is
perpetuating false universalisms…because the user of such a device is
positioning himself . . . as the guardian of integrity and authenticity, while
positioning his . . . opponents as gullible and even simple-minded. In addition,
as an extension of the relativism argument, it is often argued that it is
immaterial whether the West . . . is offended or shocked by the legal and social
practices of Muslims. Islam, it is argued, has its own set of standards for justice
and righteousness, and it is of no consequence if those standards happen to be
inconsistent with the moral sensitivities of non-Muslims.

173

See OIC Res. 1/41-LEG, supra note 101, ¶ 5; OIC Res. 1/40-LEG, ¶ 5 (Dec. 9–11, 2013).

174

Blitt, supra note 1.
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ultimately rest on the organization’s particular—though never fully
elaborated—understanding of Islamic religious imperatives. 175
This section expands and confirms the previous article’s conclusion by
examining the OIC’s approach to sexual orientation and gender identity.
Although express international recognition of SOGI rights is a relatively new
phenomenon, the OIC has responded with strident opposition in the form of
organizational resolutions, block voting at the UN, and other efforts elsewhere
aimed at rejecting even the application of equality and nondiscrimination
principles. Notably, the foundation for this rejection relies on the same
relativistic rationale proffered in the context of women’s equality. 176
To demonstrate this, the following section will begin by exploring the OIC’s
recent advocacy efforts around “protection of the family.” This OIC campaign
is particularly instructive because it is premised on a religiously-justified
insular vision of family that condones inequality and discrimination against
women as well as on the basis of SOGI. In this way, OIC efforts to protect what
it calls “Islamic family values” serve as a nexus for discrimination against
various classes. But similar to the denial of women’s equality, the OIC has not
relied solely on protection of the family to justify its opposition to extending
equality and nondiscrimination protections on the basis of SOGI. Therefore,
the section will also examine the OIC’s response to SOGI rights arising outside
of the family context. Among other things, this additional analysis will
demonstrate that OIC opposition to recognition of SOGI rights predates its
active engagement on protection of the family. Further, it will show OIC
opposition is sourced in alternate justifications that either advocate a narrow
reading of universality to preclude protection for SOGI or distort the VDPA to
create an exemption from international norms on the basis of religious
specificities.
A. Protection of the Family: Nexus for Perpetuating Discrimination
Against Women and on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity
The OIC’s blossoming concern for preserving its vision of “Islamic family
values” 177 is colored by the same religious imperatives that inform the
organization’s longstanding defense of different roles and responsibilities for

175

Id.

176

For example, the OIC’s 2008 Plan of Action for the Advancement of Women (“OPAAW”):
premises women’s rights on a grant from Islam, qualifies any state party
adherence to CEDAW provisions ‘in line with Islamic values of justice and
equality,’ and reiterates support for drafting the [OIC Convention on the
Rights of Women in Islam] ‘in accordance with . . . the Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam.

Id. at 796 (internal citations omitted) (omission in original).
2008 OIC Charter, supra note 46, art. 1, ¶ 14; see also 2025 Programme of Action, supra note
166, ¶ 48.
177
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men and women.178 But the push to protect Islamic family values implicates
far more than women’s equality and nondiscrimination alone. If left
unchallenged, the OIC’s efforts in this realm would justify a surge of
discriminatory practices that would leave the rights of children, refugees, 179
and LGBTI individuals at equal or greater risk. As it stands, because of its
campaign to combat perceived “ethical and intellectual challenges threatening
[the Islamic family’s] identity and existence,”180 the OIC has emerged as one of
the staunchest opponents of extending equality and nondiscrimination
protections to SOGI. Notably, this effort to defend a specific vision of “family”
against encroaching individual human rights norms stands in stark
contradiction to international norms. The OHCHR has expressly recognized
that “States’ responsibility to protect individuals from discrimination extends
to the family sphere, where rejection and discriminatory treatment of and
violence against LGBT and intersex family members [including children] can
have serious, negative consequences for the enjoyment of human rights.” 181
1. The OIC’s Active Emphasis on Family Values is a Recent
Phenomenon
The OIC’s 2005 Ten Year Program of Action identified the need to “[a]ccord
necessary attention to the family as the principal nucleus of the Muslim
society, [and to] exert all possible efforts . . . to face up to the contemporary
social challenges confronting the Muslim family and affecting its cohesion, on
the basis of Islamic values.”182 To this end, the Program called for establishing

The foundation for this vision, traced back to the CDHRI, already signals a departure from the
UDHR. Among other things, the CDHRI makes the formation of family contingent on marriage
and authorizes states to restrict the right to marriage based on religion: “The family is the
foundation of society, and marriage is the basis of its formation. Men and women have the right to
marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race, color or nationality shall prevent them from
enjoying this right.” CDHRI, supra note 16, art. 5(a). In contrast, the UDHR states: “Men and
women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to
marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage
and at its dissolution.” UDHR, supra note 2, art. 16(1). Certain interpretations of Islam take a
particularly rigid view of family. According to Farhat Haq, one of the obstacles preventing “fruitful
dialogue on the issue of women’s equality is the cultural centrality of the family in the Muslim
world. For Islamic fundamentalists, the adoption of the Western model of the family is to commit
cultural suicide.” Farhat Haq, Jihad Over Human Rights, Human Rights as Jihad: Clash of
Universals, in NEGOTIATING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 242, 253 (Lynda S. Bell et al., 2001).
Given that Islam’s conception of the family represents “a microcosm of the desired moral order,”
any challenge or critique of its structure and role “provokes deep anxieties.” Id.
178

A detailed treatment of the deleterious impact the OIC’s version of Islamic family values may
have on the rights of the child and refugee must be reserved for another occasion.
179

180

OIC Res. 4/42-C, pmbl. (May 27–28, 2015).

Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’n for Human Rights, Discrimination and Violence Against
Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/23
(May 4, 2015).
181

182

OIC Ten Year Program, supra note 41, art. 2(VI)(9).
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a Family Affairs division within the OIC’s General Secretariat. 183 The OIC
formally approved this objective four years later.184 In 2011, the organization
reaffirmed its new family-rights oriented focus, modifying the title of its
annual resolution on “Cultural and Social Affairs” to “Cultural, Social and
Family Affairs.”185
The OIC’s emphasis on family values gained concrete expression in 2015.
For the first time, its annual resolution on Social and Family Affairs
introduced a provocative new section entitled “Safeguarding the values of the
marriage and family institutions.” 186 The resolution rejected a 2014 UN
Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”) resolution on SOGI rights as being “in total
contradiction with the teachings and values of Islam and other divine religions
and with the human common sense.” 187 It further invited the OIC Secretary
General and IPHRC to “take necessary measures” to repeal the resolution.188
The OIC’s first “Ministerial Conference on Strengthening Marriage and
Family Institution and Preserving its Values in Member States,” held in 2017,
reinforced the positions staked out in 2015. 189 The significance of both these
events is discussed in greater detail below,190 but their substance has set the
stage for open-ended conflict at the UN over the issue of protection of the
family, and more broadly, the recognition of SOGI-related rights.
2. Protecting an “Ideal Family” Demands Conformity with OIC
Religious Views Rather than International Reality
The OIC’s structural efforts to orient itself more robustly towards a defense
of “Islamic family values” into the late 2010s are reinforced by the IPHRC’s
work, OIC Secretary General statements, and by OIC advocacy efforts at the
UN. In 2015, the IPHRC held its 7th session, organized around the theme of
“protection of family values.” The session concluded that “the growing trend of
confusing the definition of family with new and controversial notions of LGBT
families . . . that were neither universal nor recognized by international human

183

Id. art. 2(VI)(10).

OIC Res. 8/36 (May 23–25, 2009) (recognizing “the need for the Muslim family to have a
comprehensive mechanism to help it counter the challenges it faces amid the current international
changes, and for strengthening the capacity of Member States to keep pace with issues related to
the various segments of the family.”).
184

Prior to 2011, the OIC generally passed an annual resolution “On Social Issues.” Beginning in
2011, this resolution’s title changed to “On Social and Family Issues.” Compare OIC Res. 3/37-C
(May 18–20, 2010) with OIC Res. 4/38-C (June 28–30, 2011).
185

186

OIC Res. 4/42-C, supra note 180, ¶ A.

187

Id. pmbl.

188

Id. ¶ 2–3.

Ministerial Conference on Strengthening Marriage and Family Institution,
https://www.oic-oci.org/confdetail/?cID=5&lan=en (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
189

190

See infra Parts III(C)(2) and III(D)(3).
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rights standards”191 was diametrically opposed to the Koran’s “good society.”
In the IPHRC’s words, this “good society” could “only be achieved through the
marriage between man and woman as husband and wife . . . . Any practice that
potentially threathen [sic] the integrity of the family should not be seen as part
of ‘freedom of choice.’”192
While the IPHRC arguably may have demonstrated some willingness to
recognize certain “non-traditional” family arrangements that break from its
“[i]deal family consist[ing] of husband and wife,” 193 it rejected outright the
possibility that a family could be made up of two men or two women who love
each other, or that such a familial unit could be entitled to the same protection
afforded to “a long-term consensual relationship between a man and a woman
who are bound by the reciprocal rights and responsibilities enshrined in
Islamic teachings.”194
As part of his remarks to this IPHRC gathering, then Secretary General
Madani asserted that protection of family values is of “utmost importance” to
the OIC and that the organization’s institutions must work to incorporate an
“Islamic perspective on the interrelated subjects and project[] unified views
and positions.”195 To this end, the OIC continued to take measures at the UN
to advance the organization’s particular vision of family. Most notably as part
of this effort, the OIC pushed two contentious resolutions on “Protection of the
Family” through the UNHRC between 2014–15.196 The first resolution, passed

Press Release, OIC, OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC)
Concludes its 7th Session in Jeddah Held From 19–23 April 2015 (Apr. 23, 2015) (“[F]uture plans
and projects that the Commission intends to deliberate upon, [include] . . . strengthening research
and writing reports / position papers on the . . . issue of sexual orientation. . . .”).
191

Press Release, OIC, IPHRC Reaffirmed the Importance of Family as the Natural and
Fundamental Unit of Society that is Entitled to Protection by State and Society, During its
Thematic Debate on “Protection of Family Values” (Apr. 21, 2015) [hereinafter IPHRC Thematic
Debate on “Protection of Family Values”].
192

Id. For example, the IPHRC acknowledged that a “single-parent family, especially womanheaded family” might be accommodated—though not legitimated—“as the consequence of divorce
and other factors.” Id.
193

194

Id.

OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) concludes its 7th Regular
Session in Jeddah held from April 19–23, 2015. The IPHRC’s chairperson previously affirmed the
Commission would work closely with the OIC’s Fiqh Academy “to correct the misperceptions
regarding the rights of women and children in Islam, as well as the protection of the family.” Press
Statement, M.K. Ibrahim, IPHHRC Chairperson, Concluding Statement at the Sixth Session of
IPHRC (Nov. 6, 2014). The International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) is a subsidiary organ of the
OIC created in 1981 and based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is tasked with studying “contemporary
problems from the Sharia point of view and [trying] to find the solutions in conformity with the
Sharia through an authentic interpretation of its content.” Subsidiary Organs, OIC,
https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=64&p_ref=33&lan=en#FIQH (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
195

See generally Human Rights Council Res. 26/11 (July 16, 2014); Human Rights Council Res.
29/22 (July 22, 2015).
196
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in 2014 with all fourteen OIC UNHRC members voting in favor, 197 was mainly
procedural in nature. It called for holding a panel discussion on protection of
the family as well as preparing a report on that discussion.198 At the time, those
states opposed to the resolution expressed concern over its substance because
it “did not refer to family diversity and the individual rights of family
members.”199
The following year, shortly after conclusion of the IPHRC’s 7th session,
Egypt introduced a second “Protection of the Family” draft resolution cosponsored by over 80 UN member states including the African Group and 55
OIC states.200 In the Egyptian ambassador’s words, UNHRC Resolution 29/22
represented a “comprehensive substantive omnibus draft resolution on
protection of the family . . . building on . . . 2014’s procedural resolution.” 201 It
also represented a significant push to entrench a narrow view of what
constitutes family. On this basis, it established which families merit protection
of the state. For example, in urging States to provide the family “with effective
protection and assistance”202 in the face of “increasing vulnerabilities,” 203 the
resolution recognized only “single-headed households, child-headed
households and intergenerational households” as being “particularly
vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion.” 204
To fully capture the OIC’s effort to protect only selective forms of family
that comport with its idealized “good society,” consider the content of UNHRC
Resolution 29/22. This resolution excluded from recognition (or particular
vulnerability), among others, “families comprising (LGBTI) persons; extended
families; self-created and self-defined families; families without children;
families of divorced persons . . . and non-traditional families resulting from
interreligious, intercommunity or inter-caste marriages.” 205 Other UNHRC

Including the fourteen OIC states, twenty-six states in total voted in favor of the resolution,
fourteen voted against, and six abstained.
197

198

H.R.C. Res. 26/11, supra note 196, ¶¶ 1–2.

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Summary of the Human Rights Council Panel
Discussion on the Protection of the Family, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/40 (Dec. 22, 2014).
199

Human Rights Council Res. 29/22, (July 1, 2015). Albania did not co-sponsor the resolution and
was the only OIC state to vote against it. Palestine had no vote. All members of the Arab Group
are OIC member states. Id.
200

H.E. Ambassador Amr Ramadan, Introduction of Draft Resolution L.25 “Protection of the
Family,” ¶ 3 (July 2, 2015) (on file with the author).
201

202

H.R.C. Res. 29/22, supra note 196, ¶ 20.

203

Id. ¶ 8.

204

Id. ¶ 16.

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on the Issue of
Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/40 (Apr. 2, 2015).
The Working Group observed that while “several international forums recognize family diversity,
including ‘in different cultural, political and social systems’, many . . . non-traditional forms of
family are not recognized by all States.” Id. ¶ 24.
205
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members took note of the challenge posed to the international human rights
regime by the OIC’s narrow approach. For example, while acknowledging that
families can make a valuable contribution to strengthening society, the
European Union (EU) members opposed the resolution because it “fail[ed] to
recognize a basic and undeniable matter of fact—that in different cultural,
political and social systems, various forms of the family exist. The recognition
of the diversity of family forms is an essential element that this text lacks.” 206
In addition to favoring only certain “traditional” families, UNHRC
Resolution 29/22 also purported to connect “policies and measures to protect
the family” to the existing regime designed to protect and promote the human
rights of its individual members.207 Thus, not unlike the OIC’s effort to place
protection for religion ahead of individual rights,208 the resolution would install
a narrow definition of family and prioritize it ahead of other families as well as
at the expense of protecting existing individual rights. Endorsing such an
approach is problematic for two reasons. First, it provides states with cover for
pursuing general policies that downgrade or discount individual human rights
and other family models in the name of protecting an idealized family unit.
Second, it exposes those individuals subject to human rights abuses generated
in the context of family to the risk of greater harm 209 while signaling a grant
of impunity to those who would perpetrate such violations. 210
Protection of the Family: European Union Explanation of Vote (Jun. 22, 2017) (on file with the
author).
206

207

H.R.C. Res. 29/22, supra note 196, ¶ 17.

208

See Blitt, supra note 63.

For example, “[w]omen and girls worldwide continue to experience violence most frequently in
family contexts. Child abuse, including sexual abuse, is most commonly perpetrated by family
members. Persons with disabilities also experience coercion and abuse in the family.” Protection
of
the
Family:
A
Human
Rights
Response,
AWID
(Mar.
24,
2015),
https://www.awid.org/publications/protection-family-human-rights-response.
This
reality
underscores the difficulty with attempting to ascribe rights to the family itself as against the
individual rights-holders—namely children, women, etc.—who comprise it. Id.
209

For example, LGBTI youth reported higher rates of abuse within family structures and
associated familial rejection behavior had negative consequences on their health. Sabra L. KatzWise et al., Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth and Family Acceptance, 63 PEDIATRIC
CLINIC NORTH AM. 1011, 1014 (2016) (finding “relative to heterosexual peers, sexual minorities
report . . .increased rates of parental abuse, and homelessness. Transgender youth also report
elevated rates of child abuse compared to cisgender peers.”) (internal notes omitted); see Caitlin
Ryan et al., Family Rejection as a Predictor of Negative Health Outcomes in White and Latino
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Young Adults, 123 PEDIATRICS 346 (2009) (finding a “clear link between
specific parental and caregiver rejecting behaviors and negative health problems in young lesbian,
gay, and bisexual adults”, including higher rates of suicide, depression, illegal drug use, and
unprotected sexual intercourse, when compared “with peers from families that reported no or low
levels of family rejection.”); see also Jennifer S. Hirsch, A Scientific Look at the Damage Parents
Do
When
They
Bully
Their
Gay
Kids,
WASH. POST.
(Apr.
14,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/14/a-scientific-look-at-the-damageparents-do-when-they-bully-their-gay-kids/?utm_term=.db7f87488a39 (“Kids lacking parental
support for their sexual orientation are at higher risk for mental health problems, drug use, and
unprotected sex.”); Jessica Valenti, Homophobic, Transphobic Parents Make Abusive Homes. Let’s
Help
LGBT
Kids
Get
Out,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
5,
2015),
210

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312845

Winter 2018]

THE OIC’S RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION

133

Finally, Resolution 29/22 also tasked the OHCHR with preparing a report
on state obligations to protect the family. Ironically, the substance of this
report is likely to engender strong OIC opposition 211 since its chief finding
refutes the application of any narrow, “traditional” definition for family.
According to the OHCHR, the international community must:
recognize the diverse and changing forms of the family
institution, in accordance with the different social, cultural
and economic characteristics of every society; the promotion of
equality between men and women; and the effective
protection and promotion of the rights of women, children,
persons with disabilities, older persons and all family
members, without distinction. Moreover, ensuring universal
access to sexual and reproductive health services, including
family planning, should be an integral part of development
efforts.212
Ultimately, the OHCHR report observed that while states preserve “some
leeway” to define the concept of family under national law that may consider
various “religions, customs or traditions within their society,” international
law establishes “at least two minimum conditions for the recognition and
protection of families at the national level.” 213 These two conditions are:
“respect for the principle of equality and non-discrimination…[and] the
effective guarantee of the best interest of the child.” 214 Alongside these
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/05/homophobic-transphobic-parentsabusive-homes-lgbt-kids (“For a young LGBT person, living with a rampantly homophobic or
transphobic guardian . . . means enduring child abuse.”).
For a baseline, consider the reaction of C-Fam, a self-described “pro-family” NGO, to the
OHCHR report. The organization criticized the report for its “progressive, and aggressive, attempt
to expand the meaning of family in international law and policy to include same-sex relationships.”
Stefano Gennarini, UN Report: “There Is No Definition of the Family,” CTR. FOR FAM. & HUM. RTS.
(Jan. 29, 2016), https://c-fam.org/friday_fax/un-report-no-definition-family/. C-Fam previously
labeled Resolution 29/22 a “big win” and “monumental development for the pro-family movement.”
Rebecca Oas, Big Win for Traditional Family at UN Human Rights Council, CTR. FOR FAM. & HUM.
RTS. (July 9, 2015), https://c-fam.org/friday_fax/big-win-for-traditional-family-at-un-humanrights-council/. C-Fam is the type of NGO IPHRC refers to when it recommends “undertaking
advocacy activities at relevant forums, including working with pro-family NGOs for holding
conferences and seminars with the view to promoting and advancing family values.” IPHRC
Thematic Debate on “Protection of Family Values,” supra note 192.
211

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Protection of the Family: Contribution of the
Family to the Realization of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living for its Members,
Particularly Through its Role in Poverty Eradication and Achieving Sustainable Development, ¶
76,
U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/31/37
(Jan.
29,
2016),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session29/Pages/ResDecStat.aspx
[hereinafter Protection of the Family].
212

213

Id. ¶ 26.

Id. (internal citations omitted). For example, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child “has
called upon States to protect children from discrimination based on their own or their parents’ or
legal guardian’s sexual orientation or gender identity.” Further, the UNCRC prohibits all forms of
abuse of children, including “based on their gender, sexual orientation or disability.” Id. ¶¶ 42, 44.
214
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minimum requirements, international treaty bodies have elaborated
supplemental state obligations, such as the need to protect specific forms of
the family—including same-sex couples and de facto unions—because of “the
vulnerability of their members” to potential human rights abuses. 215 In light of
these findings, the OHCHR report concluded that any implementation of
protection measures for family at the national level “should be guided by basic
human rights principles, including equality and non-discrimination, and by
respect for the rights of individual family members, notably those who might
find themselves in a situation of vulnerability.” 216
The OHCHR report reflects precisely the kind of balanced, inclusive, and
individual rights-respecting policy for family protection that the OIC—by
prioritizing religious and traditional norms—is attempting to short-circuit.
And while this OIC campaign may have secured the support of a UNHRC
majority, it is so antithetical to existing international human rights norms that
it engendered an unexpected opponent: a UNHRC-established expert working
group. Confronted with Resolution 29/22, the UN Working Group on
Discrimination Against Women unequivocally concluded that its content
“threaten[s] to undermine international achievements in the field of human
rights in the name of cultural and religious diversity.”217

Id. ¶ 27. While IHRL may not require states to permit same-sex couples to marry, “the
obligation to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation extends to
ensuring that unmarried same-sex couples are treated in the same way and entitled to the same
benefits as unmarried opposite-sex couples.” U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against Individuals Based on their Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011). Likewise, the UN
Working Group on Discrimination Against Women has concluded “that the understanding and
legal definition of the family in national legislation should be extended to recognize different forms
of family”, including “recognition of same-sex couples, for both women and men.” Report of the
Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice, supra note
205, ¶ 25.
215

216

Protection of the Family, supra note 212, ¶ 50.

Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination Against Women in Law and in
Practice, supra note 205, ¶ 19. For its part, the OIC regretted the Working Group’s “attempts to
redefine the universally established notion of family which is firmly rooted in International
Human Rights Law. We believe that it is beyond the mandate of the Working Group to criticize
[sic] resolution on family which was the outcome of inter-governmental negotiations and was
adopted by [the] Human Rights Council.” Press Statement, Statement by Pakistan on Behalf of
OIC During the Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions and Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination Against Women in Law
and in Practice (June 19, 2015) (on file with the author). The Working Group also was highly
critical of UNHRC Resolution 16/3 on promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through
a better understanding of traditional values of humankind. This contentious resolution can be
traced back to 2009. At the time, it faced stiff opposition by the EU and others who argued
incorporating the “concept of traditional values…could render human rights more
vulnerable...[and] could be used to weaken human rights, as enshrined in international
instruments.” Human Rights Council Adopts Six Resolutions and One Decision on Discrimination
Against Women and Freedom of Expression, Among Others, RELIEFWEB (Oct. 2, 2009),
http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/human-rights-council-adopts-six-resolutions-and-onedecision-discrimination-against. This risk is genuine. For example, the government of Iran “has
actively sought to justify paternalism and gender-inequality under the guise of traditional values
217
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Despite the OHCHR report and vocal opposition from UN working groups,
the OIC has pressed forward as the primary engine advocating “protection of
the family” resolutions at the UNHRC. In 2016 and 2017, two additional
contentious resolutions sought to perpetuate a narrow definition of the types
of families worthy of protection. 218 These resolutions retain problematic
language validating support for the narrow list of families previously identified
as being “particularly vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion.” 219 Further,
they urge states to provide these specific types of families “with effective
protection, support and assistance.”220 Like Resolution 29/22, the subsequent
resolutions similarly reiterate recognition that the family “plays a crucial role
in the preservation of cultural identity, traditions, morals, heritage and the
values system of society,” 221 and that the “family unit is facing increasing
vulnerabilities and pressures.”222
States opposed to the OIC’s most recent protection of the family resolutions
have continued to argue they fail to “support all families, in all their diverse
forms,” and similarly fail to place “sufficient emphasis on the protection of the
rights of individuals within families.”223 During negotiations over the proposed
2017 resolution text, the European Union sponsored an amendment that would
have added a provision “[r]ecogniz[ing] that, in different cultural, political and
social systems, various forms of the family exist.” 224 The proposal—seeking
only to restate the OHCHR’s conclusion—failed by a recorded vote 19 to 22,
with five abstentions. In explaining its vote against the final 2017 resolution,
the EU called out the main sponsors as refusing “to accommodate key concerns,
particularly around the importance of recognising that various forms of the

and cultural relativism.” Letter by Women’s Rights Activists to Members of the United Nation’s
Economic and Social Council, UNPO (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.unpo.org/content/view/11047/89/.
Over 200 Iranian human rights activists and seven women’s rights organizations endorsed the
letter. For more on Russia’s role in advancing the original “traditional values” resolution and its
impact at the UN, see generally Robert C. Blitt, Russia’s ‘Orthodox’ Foreign Policy: The Growing
Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 363 (2012).
Human Rights Council Res. 35/13 (July 6, 2017); see also Human Rights Council Res. 32/23
(July 18, 2016).
218

Compare H.R.C. Res. 35/13, supra note 218, ¶ 14 with H.R.C. Res. 32/23, supra note 218, ¶ 9.
However, both resolutions do add “families with members with disabilities” to the enumerated list
introduced under H.R.C. Res. 29/22. See id.; H.R.C. Res. 35/13, supra note 218; H.R.C. Res. 32/23,
supra note 218.
219

220

H.R.C. Res. 35/13, supra note 218, ¶ 26; H.R.C. Res. 32/23, supra note 218, ¶ 20.

221

H.R.C. Res. 35/13, supra note 218, ¶ 12; H.R.C. Res. 32/23, supra note 218, ¶ 7.

222

H.R.C. Res. 35/13, supra note 218, ¶ 14; H.R.C. Res. 32/23, supra note 218, ¶ 9.

U.N. Human Rights Council, Slovenia: Explanation of Vote on L.35—Protection of the Family,
and Amendments Thereto (L.82, L.83, L.84, L.89) (on file with the author).
223

Rep. of the U.N. Human Rights Council, Amendment to Human Rights Council Draft
Resolution A/HRC/35/L.21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/L.45 (Jun. 20, 2017) (voted at 35th meeting, Jun.
22, 2017).
224
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family exist.”225 From the EU’s perspective, the resolution’s overall approach
“place[d] emphasis on the protection of the family rather than on the
international legal obligations of states to promote and protect the human
rights of individual family members, who are the rights holders.” Furthermore,
the final text risked allowing “traditional values or customs [to] undermine the
fundamental, universal nature of human rights or indeed hinder progress to
address harmful practices such as child, early and forced marriage or female
genital mutilation.”226
In addition to opposing the views of western states, the OHCHR, and the
UN Working Group on Discrimination Against Women, the OIC’s lobbying on
protection of the family also clashes with the positions staked out by various
Muslim activists and scholars. For example, Musawah, “a global movement for
equality and justice in the Muslim family,” 227 believes that “[s]pecific
attributes and roles should not be assigned on the basis of gender, but on what
is good for the family as a whole, and on dignity and respect for every member.”
The organization maintains that this position is “possible from within Muslim
legal tradition.”228 Kecia Ali has likewise challenged the basis for the OIC’s
“traditional” family, positing that such a framing is premised not on religious
necessity but rather on “cultural assumptions shared by the [Muslim] jurists
as a result of their social location in a particular and . . . particularly
patriarchal environment.”229 She concludes:
[A] thorough exploration and analysis of traditional jurisprudence
[reveals] the extent to which its rules are seriously flawed; they
cannot be Divine . . . This system is the result of an interpretation,
indeed of numerous acts of interpretation, by particular men living
and thinking at a specific time. Their jurisprudence is shaped . . . by
the assumptions and constraints of the time in which it was
formulated.230
Writing on the issue of family nearly thirty years ago, An-Na’im observed
that the:
Protection of the Family: European Union Explanation of Vote (Jun. 22, 2017) (on file with the
author).
225

226

Id.

About Musawah, MUSAWAH, http://www.musawah.org/about-musawah (last visited Nov. 21,
2018).
227

Vision
for
the
Family,
MUSAWAH,
12–13,
http://www.musawah.org/sites/default/files/MusawahVisionFortheFamily.pdf (last visited Nov.
21, 2018) (failing to reference or explicitly address equality for families with same-sex partners or
protection for LGBTI individuals within the family context).
228

Ali, supra note 144, at 169. Aligned with this, progressive Muslim scholars maintain “that there
can be no long-lasting and sustainable gains in women’s rights unless patriarchal notions of family
and gender relations are debated, challenged, and redressed within an Islamic framework.” Adis
Duderija, Progressive Islam: Reawakening Authenticity, 33 TIKKUN 66, 70 (2018).
229

230

Ali, supra note 144, at 183.
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[C]ontrol which Shari’a exercises over the private realm of
home and family is so entrenched, and its violation of human
rights so clear, that it may explain in part why some Muslim
countries refuse to ratify the relevant human rights
instruments or at least entered reservations on their
obligations under certain human rights treaties. 231
As demonstrated below, the clash over sexual orientation is not reserved
to the debate over family protection. Rather, it spills over into more sweeping
and general areas that impact basic questions of individual equality and
nondiscrimination.
B. OIC Denial of SOGI Equality and Nondiscrimination Transcends
Protection of the Family
While the specter of same sex marriage may be a central motivating factor
for the OIC’s campaign to preserve traditional family values, the organization’s
opposition to SOGI-related rights predates its relatively recent foray into
protection of the family. An examination of OIC positions on a wide range of
human rights issues unrelated to family protection illustrates that its rejection
of SOGI rights is not merely a byproduct of a desire to protect the family, but
rather embodies a core component of the organization’s wider advocacy efforts.
1. Multiple OIC Justifications for Rejecting SOGI Recognition Combine
to Deplete Right to Highest Attainable Standard of Health
The OIC’s rejectionist approach to the full basket of freedoms and
entitlements associated with the right to the highest attainable standard of
health, coupled with its rejection of SOGI-related vulnerabilities in the context
of combatting HIV/AIDS, confirms that the organization’s opposition to SOGI
cannot be explained based on protection of the family alone. Universal
recognition of the right to the highest attainable standard of health flows from
a variety of international sources, including the UDHR 232 and ICESCR, with
the latter expressly “recogniz[ing] the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 233 Sexual and
reproductive health (“SRH”) is recognized as an “essential” or “integral”
component of this universal right. 234 According to the Committee on Economic,

231

An-Na’im, supra, note 145, at 41.

“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family.” UDHR, supra note 2, art. 25(1).
232

233

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 12(1) (Dec. 12, 1966).

U.N., Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 22 (2016) on the Right to Sexual and
Reproductive Health, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (May 2, 2016) [hereinafter Comment No. 22].
For a good summary detailing how IHRL protects reproductive rights, see UNITED NATIONS
POPULATION FUND ET AL., REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
NATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS
21–22,
72–74
(2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/NHRIHandbook.pdf (a joint publication of United
234
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Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), the right to SRH includes the freedom
“to make free and responsible decisions and choices, free of violence, coercion
and discrimination, regarding matters concerning one’s body and sexual and
reproductive health,” as well as the entitlement to “unhindered access to a
whole range of health facilities, goods, services and information.” 235
In the context of OIC efforts to protect a traditional vision of the family
governed by patriarchal concepts and other narrow values, SRH rights are
rendered particularly vulnerable. This vulnerability is exacerbated because
the family itself is harnessed as a forum and instrument for such violations.236
As one commentator has observed:
Often sexism and homophobia combine to restrict sexual
rights. For many conservative, “religious right,” or
“fundamentalist” actors, affording women the rights to bodily
integrity, to autonomy, and to the ability to make their own
decisions about reproduction all risk the downfall of “the
family,” the community, and even the state. 237
As is the case with other rights, “[t]he right to [SRH] is also indivisible
from and interdependent with other human rights” enshrined elsewhere under
international law.238 Already as early as 2000, the CESCR explicitly recognized
that the ICESCR:
[P]roscribe[d] any discrimination in access to health care and
underlying determinants of health, as well as to means and

Nations Population Fund, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and
Danish Institute for Human Rights).
235

Comment No. 22, supra note 234, ¶ 5.

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WRGS/Pages/HealthRights.aspx (last visited Nov. 21,
2018). Prioritizing the family degrades the individual right to SRH in a variety of ways. See, e.g.,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., SEXUAL HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW 35 (2015) (noting that it may
facilitate “[s]exual and sexuality-related violence . . . as a form of punishment and control” and
facilitate so-called “honor crimes” or “honor killings”); Carmel Shalev, Expert Member, Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Rights to Sexual and
Reproductive Health—the ICPD and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination
Against
Women,
UNITED
NATIONS
(Mar.
18,
1998),
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/shalev.htm (noting it may impose spousal authorization
for certain reproductive health procedures); Protection of the Family: A Human Rights Response,
supra note 209 (noting it may facilitate forced marriages or child marriages).
236

237

Susana T. Fried, Sexuality and Human Rights, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 273, 274 (2004).

Comment No. 22, supra note 234, ¶ 10 (elaborating a principle previously expressed regarding
the encompassing right to the highest attainable standard of health); see also U.N., Econ., Soc., &
Cultural Rts., Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 14 on the Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter
Comment No. 14] (“[t]he right to health is closely related to and dependent upon the realization of
other human rights”).
238

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312845

Winter 2018]

THE OIC’S RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION

139

entitlements for their procurement, on the grounds of race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth, physical or mental
disability, health status (including HIV/AIDS), sexual
orientation and civil, political, social or other status, which has
the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal
enjoyment or exercise of the right to health.239
By extension, respect for non-discrimination in the context of the right to
SRH similarly “encompasses the right of all persons, including lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, to be fully respected for their
sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status.” 240 State parties to the
ICESCR therefore “have an obligation to combat homophobia and transphobia,
which lead to discrimination, including violation of the right to sexual and
reproductive health.”241 This interdependence operates equally in the context
of other rights. For example, combining SRH and nondiscrimination with the
right to education generates a right to seek, receive and disseminate
information and ideas on all aspects of SRH “that is comprehensive, nondiscriminatory, evidence-based, scientifically accurate and age appropriate.”242
It further establishes a government obligation to provide such information “in
a manner consistent with the needs of the individual and the community,
taking into consideration, for example, age, gender . . . sexual orientation,
gender identity and intersex status.”243
Beyond formal legal equality, fulfilling the right to non-discrimination and
equality in the context of SRH also requires substantive equality. This entails
addressing “the distinct sexual and reproductive health needs of particular
groups, as well as any barriers that particular groups may face.” 244 In
undertaking this obligation, states should provide “tailored attention” and care
“in a respectful and dignified manner that does not exacerbate
marginalization.” 245 The CESCR cautions that LGBTI and other vulnerable
groups risk “be[ing] disproportionately affected by intersectional
discrimination in the context of sexual and reproductive health.” 246
Consequently, states maintain an obligation to ensure that laws and policies
effectively “prevent and eliminate discrimination, stigmatization and negative
stereotyping that hinder[s] access to sexual and reproductive health.” 247 As
239

Comment No. 14, supra note 238, ¶ 18.

240

Comment No. 22, supra note 234, ¶ 23.

241

Id.

242

Id. ¶ 9.

243

Id. ¶ 19.

244

Id. ¶ 24.

245

Comment No. 22, supra note 234, ¶24.

246

Id. ¶ 30.

247

Id. ¶ 31.
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part of this obligation, states are expected to design measures intended “to
overcome the often exacerbated impact that intersectional discrimination has
on the realization of the right to sexual and reproductive health.” 248
The UN’s 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) 249 reiterate many
of the SRH standards elaborated above. For example, under Goal 3, states
undertake by 2030 to “ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive
health-care services, including for family planning, information and education,
and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and
programmes.”250 The SDGs also recognize that vulnerable groups, including
people living with HIV/AIDS, “must be empowered.” 251 To this end, states
commit themselves to “accelerat[ing] the pace of progress made in fighting”
communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and by 2030, ending the epidemic.252
The SDG’s High Level Political Forums have also reinforced the urgent
need for comprehensive education to combat HIV/AIDS based on the right to
SRH:
1800 young people are newly infected with HIV every day. This
underscores the importance of ensuring that young people can
fully exercise their rights to access sexual and reproductive
health and HIV information . . . including . . . comprehensive
sexuality education free from discrimination, coercion and
violence. At the same time, key populations, including sex
workers, people who inject drugs, transgender people and men
who have sex with men remain at much higher risk of HIV
infection and require access to comprehensive prevention
services, including harm reduction.253
248

Id. ¶ 30.

As part of this global effort, states adopted a set of 17 goals to end poverty, protect the planet,
and ensure prosperity for all. G.A. Res. 70/1 (Sept. 25, 2015). A video by Japanese entertainer
Pikotaro (AKA Daimaou Kosaka) highlights a few of the SDGs succinctly. Mofachannel, Pikotaro
& Ministry of Foreign Affairs [of Japan] (SDGs) ~ PPAP, YOUTUBE (July, 12, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5l9RHeATl0 (singing, among other things, “I have an apple.
I have a pineapple . . .no poverty!”); Japanese YouTube Star Piko Taro Makes First UN Appearance,
Promotes
Global
Goals,
UN
NEWS
CENTER
(July
18,
2017),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57199#.WXDh7MaZMUE.
249

G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 249, at 16 (“Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promotes well-being for
all at all ages.”). SRH is reinforced under Goal 5 (“Achieve gender equality and empower all women
and girls.”), which inter alia calls for “[e]nsur[ing] universal access to sexual and reproductive
health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the
International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and
the outcome documents of their review conferences.” Id. at 18. The IPHRC appears to question the
legitimacy of these outcome documents. See infra text accompanying note 259.
250

251

G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 249, at 23.

For the UN’s position on the HIV/AIDS epidemic, see Goal 3.3. in G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note
249, at 26.
252

2017 HLPF Thematic Review of SDG3: Ensure Healthy Lives and Promote Well-Being for All at
All
Ages,
DEP’T
ECON.
&
SOC.
AFFAIRS
4,
(2017),
253
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Despite the abundance of recognized international norms elaborating on
SRH rights, the OIC’s IPHRC has seen fit to use its platform to elaborate on a
contrary position that promotes the organization’s parochial vision of an ideal
family. Among other things, the IPHRC has promulgated the view “that a
healthy and stable family [can] only be accomplished when husband and wife
are considered equal in dignity and fundamental human rights both in the
family and society” and that “Islamic values [are] the basis to carry out equal
responsibilities and to enjoy basic rights within the families.” 254 Elaborating
on this vision, IPHRC member Mostafa Alaei characterized SRH rights as “a
pure individualist, self-centered and egoistic vision” from which Muslim
women must be emancipated.255 Rather than pursue the right to make free and
responsible decisions concerning one’s body and sexual and reproductive
health, Alaei posits women should instead embrace the “different
responsibilities” bestowed upon them under Islam and accept their obligation
to “collaborate with men for the common and collective interest.” 256
The IPRHC’s reaction to the right to access comprehensive, nondiscriminatory, evidence-based, and scientifically accurate SRH information
perfectly encapsulates the OIC’s willingness to set aside individual rights in
the name of protecting the traditional family. The IPHRC has attacked
existing international norms relating to universal access to SRH, 257 branding
such efforts a threat to the Islamic conception of human rights. 258 During a
2015 debate on the “Protection of Family Values,” the IPHRC condemned what
it labeled “the practice of promoting divisive and non-universal rights of
comprehensive sexuality education to children, which include morally
unacceptable concepts, behaviours and practices.” 259 Further, it rejected UNdisseminated publications “that elaborate on the so-called notion of sexual
orientation and comprehensive sexuality education for children,” branding
them “disturbing and morally unacceptable . . . as well as potentially harmful
to the very institution of family . . . . [and] undermining the spirit of the

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/14367SDG3format-rev_MD_OD.pdf
[hereinafter 2017 HLPF Thematic Review of SDG3].
254

IPHRC Thematic Debate on “Protection of Family Values,” supra note 192.

Mostafa Alaei, The Role of Muslim Modern Women, IPHRC, 4, http://www.oiciphrc.org/en/data/docs/articles/184501.pdf. Alaei’s nine-page document appears to hold a place of
pride for the IPHRC. It is the only article hosted on the IPHRC’s website. Articles, IPHRC,
http://www.oic-iphrc.org/en/articles (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
255

Compare ALAEI, supra note 255, at 5 (Alaei appears to question the validity of certain SRH
rights outlined in paragraphs 94–96 of the Beijing Platform for Action), with UN WOMEN, BEIJING
DECLARATION
AND
PLATFORM
FOR
ACTION,
¶¶
94–96,
(Sept.
4–15,
1995),
http://beijing20.unwomen.org/~/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/pfa_e_final_web.p
df.
256

257

See discussion supra notes 235 and 250 and accompanying text.

See IPHRC Thematic Debate on “Protection of Family Values,” supra note 192 and
accompanying text.
258

259

IPHRC Thematic Debate on “Protection of Family Values,” supra note 192.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312845

142

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 28:89

universally accepted human rights values, norms and instruments.” 260 In
dismissing these materials—along with the state obligation to ensure
comprehensive sexuality education—the “IPHRC called on all stakeholders,
including UN mechanisms, NGOs and national human rights institutions to
put the family at the core of their agendas as well as avoid the misconceptions
and controversies, which contradict the universal family values.” 261
This problematic position corresponds with the OIC’s approach to
HIV/AIDS. For example, during a 2016 UN panel discussion on addressing
human rights issues in the context of HIV/AIDS, Pakistan, on behalf of the
OIC, failed to acknowledge any role for education in combatting this epidemic
or fulfilling SRH-related human rights obligations. 262 Instead, Pakistan
invoked the UNGA’s 2011 Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS to stress that
“the sovereign rights of Member States” should dictate how HIV/AIDS policy
plays out on the national level. 263 Remarks made by Egypt are helpful in
understanding Pakistan’s prioritizing of the 2011 Political Declaration as a
touchstone. 264 In addition to reaffirming state sovereignty, the 2011
declaration also emphasized “the importance of cultural, ethical and religious
values . . . in sustaining national HIV and AIDS responses” and “the central
role of the family . . . in reducing vulnerability to HIV.” 265 In the Egyptian
representative’s view, neglecting these values “to promote controversial social
norms and issues such as sexual orientation . . . [risked] weaken[ing] the global
partnership to accomplish our common objective.”266
The IPHRC’s rejection of universal, comprehensive SRH education as
undermining its conception of the ideal family confirms that the OIC’s
advocacy in this arena goes beyond imposing restrictions on women’s equality.
More exactly, the quest to safeguard Islamic family values also entails a

260

Id.

261

Id.

Press Statement, Comments by Ambassador of Pakistan on Behalf of OIC, Panel Discussion on
the Progress in and Challenges of Addressing Human Rights Issues in the Context of Efforts to
End
the
HIV/AIDS
Epidemic
by
2030,
(Mar.
21,
2016),
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/31stSession/OralStatements/2
_Pakistan_OIC_HIV_mtg_30.pdf. The statement focused exclusively on reducing costs associated
with antiviral medicines and treatment. Id.
262

263

Id.

264

G.A. Res. 65/277 (July 8, 2011).

265

Id. ¶¶ 38, 43.

Press Statement, Comments by the Representative from Egypt, Panel Discussion on the
Progress in and Challenges of Addressing Human Rights Issues in the Context of Efforts to End
the
HIV/AIDS
Epidemic
by
2030,
(Mar.
11,
2016),
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/31stSession/OralStatements/8
_Egypt_HIV_mtg_30.pdf. Though it reaffirmed the 2001 Declaration, the 2016 Political
Declaration on HIV and AIDS, endorsed three months after this UN panel discussion, eliminated
references to the family and religion alluded to by the Egyptian representative. See G.A. Res.
70/266, at 2 (June 22, 2016).
266
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wholesale rejection of what the Commission derisively terms “so-called” sexual
orientation, as well as undercutting the rights of children. 267 In essence, the
denial of equality and nondiscrimination protections for the LGBTI community
is a sine qua non of OIC advocacy to protect the family.
At the same time, the OIC’s posture on other issues still relating to SRH
indicate that its contempt for SOGI rights comes with supplemental
justifications beyond the narrow emphasis on protection of the family. For
example, the OIC’s 2016 letter to the UN General Assembly President
expressed its displeasure at the possibility that eleven select NGOs, which
“focus on gay, lesbian or transgender rights,” 268 might participate in the UNsponsored 2016 High-Level Meeting on Ending AIDS.269 Without any reference
to protection of the family—or for that matter providing any explicit
justification for opposing their presence—the OIC requested that these groups,
including organizations “from far-flung countries that are not part of the
Islamic bloc,”270 be barred from attending the conference.271
Organizers of the High-Level Meeting billed the event as a gathering of
“world leaders, government representatives, HIV programme implementers
and civil society organizations from across the world,” intended to advance the
UN’s SDGs and “to chart the way forward to ending AIDS as a public health
threat by 2030.”272 At the very least, to imply LGBTI-affiliated NGOs lacked a
legitimate interest in participating in this event is deeply worrisome. More
disconcertedly, the OIC’s action ran afoul of the Greater Involvement of People

267

IPHRC Thematic Debate on “Protection of Family Values”, supra note 192.

Michael Astor & Edith M. Lederer, Muslim Nations Block Gay Groups from UN AIDS
Conference,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
18,
2016),
https://apnews.com/865ff6ccc7f048de8244225948101557. The NGOs were based in “Egypt,
Estonia, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Peru, Thailand, Ukraine, Africa and the United States.” Id.
268

Among other goals, the meeting intended to “focus the world’s attention on the importance of a
Fast-Track approach to the AIDS response over the next five years” to eliminate HIV-related
discrimination. U.N.G.A., 2016 HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON ENDING AIDS, 5 (June 8–10, 2016),
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/2016HighLevelMeeting_en.pdf.
269

Somini Sengupta, U.N. AIDS Meeting Faces Dispute Over 22 Barred Groups, N.Y. TIMES (May
18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/world/aids-un-gay-transgender.html?_r=1.
270

James Rothwell, Muslim Countries Ban Gay and Transgender Reps from United Nations
Meeting
on
AIDS,
TELEGRAPH
(May
18,
2016),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/18/muslim-countries-ban-gay-and-transgender-repsfrom-united-nation/. The OIC and other states had taken similar action in the past, including
opposing UN stamps promoting LGBT equality and the extension of benefits to the same sex
partners of UN employees. Muslim States Block 11 LGBT Groups from Attending UN AIDS
Meeting, GUARDIAN (May 17, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/17/muslimstates-united-nations-lgbt-groups-aids-meeting [hereinafter Muslim States Block 11 LGBT
Groups].
271

Press Statement, UNAIDS, UNAIDS Calls for Inclusion and Full Participation of Civil Society
Organizations at the 2016 United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Ending AIDS
(May
18,
2016),
http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/pressreleaseandstatementarchive/2016/may/201
60518_PS_inclusion_HLM.
272
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Living with HIV Principle (“GIPA”) 273 and underscored the reality that
“human rights defenders, including those living with HIV/AIDS, working to
advance social justice and secure rights in the AIDS response across the world
still face stigma, discrimination and violence.” 274
Nevertheless, due to organizational rules surrounding the meeting, the
General Assembly president complied with the OIC demand and barred the
NGOs from participating directly in the meeting.275 A response letter filed by
the United States objected to the decision: “Given that transgender people are
49 times more likely to be living with HIV than the general population, their
exclusion from the high level meeting will only impede global progress in
combatting the HIV/AIDS pandemic and achieving the goal of an AIDS-free
generation.”276
The OIC’s seemingly petty high-level intervention to exclude LGBTI
groups from a conference aimed at defeating a deadly pandemic is emblematic
of far graver discriminatory policies being perpetuated in OIC states. Notably,
these policies—fueled by unchecked stigma—are detached from any rationale
related to protection the family. They operate to deter LGBTI people from
seeking health care with consequent “devastating effects.” 277 They deny
“recognition of the rights of the groups most affected [by HIV], including LGBT
persons.” 278 But perhaps more damning, they endorse actions that are
antithetical to human rights, including “the use of pathologizing classifications
for persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity,” that results

See UNAIDS, Policy Brief: The Greater Involvement of People Living with HIV (GIPA) 1 (Mar.
2007), http://data.unaids.org/pub/briefingnote/2007/jc1299_policy_brief_gipa.pdf. Under GIPA,
governments must “involve people living with HIV in developing funding priorities and in the
choice, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of HIV programmes from their
inception.” Id. at 3.
273

Press Statement, U.N. High Comm’r For Hum. Rts., Joint Statement by UN Human Rights
Experts on the Occasion of the High-Level Meeting on Ending AIDS by 2030, 7
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20053&LangID=E%2
(last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
274

Letter from the Office of the President of the General Assembly, to Permanent Mission of the
Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations (Apr. 26, 2016) (on file with author).
275

See Astor & Lederer, supra note 268. UN officials also reported the EU and Canada wrote letters
protesting the OIC request; see Muslim States Block 11 LGBT Groups, supra note 271.
276

Dainius Pūras (Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health), Report on his Visit to Malaysia
(19 November–2 December 2014), Addendum, ¶ 87, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/33/Add.1 (May 1, 2015)
[hereinafter Report on his Visit to Malaysia]; see also Dainius Pūras (Special Rapporteur on the
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health), Country Visit to Indonesia, 22 March to 3 April 2017, Preliminary Observations (Apr. 3,
2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21472&LangID=E
(“discriminatory attitudes contribute to increased vulnerabilities to ill health, including HIV
infection, and to increased stigma and harassment in healthcare settings while seeking treatment
and services for sexual health, including refusal of admission or services”).
277

278

Report on his Visit to Malaysia, supra note 277, ¶ 94.
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in “abusive forced treatment . . . and procedures to change the sexual
orientation of people, so-called ‘corrective therapies.’”279
Experience indicates that promulgating such policies breeds an
environment of “discrimination, stigmatization and disrespect for human
rights” that exacerbates the exposure of vulnerable groups to HIV/AIDS. 280
Ultimately, such policies “only add to the continuation and further spread of
HIV/AIDS.”281 The World Health Organization (“WHO”), the UN Development
Program (“UNDP”), the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (“UNAIDS”), and the
UN treaty bodies have “widely acknowledged” the negative health fallout that
flows from these types of discriminatory practices and associated laws
criminalizing homosexuality.282 Beyond signaling a rejection of international
norms, the troubling consequences that flow from the OIC’s commitment to
perpetuating such practices is confirmed by associated data. Only two of 57
OIC states achieved Millennium Development Goal 6 targets regarding efforts
to combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases. 283 Coupled with this, OIC
states also “lag behind other developing countries in the number of adult
population who receive HIV/AIDS testing and counselling,” providing such
services at “less than half the average rate” of other reporting developing
countries.284 Finally, OIC states continue to account for a disproportionately
high percentage of global AIDS-related deaths.285
Though unsettling, one IPHRC Commissioner’s blunt attitude may help
shed some light on the rationale motivating OIC state practices and the
organization’s concerted push to exclude NGOs such as the Jamaica Forum of
Lesbians from participating in the High Level Meeting. 286 According to
Commissioner Alaei, it has precious little to do with protection of the family:
“Pervert practices such as LGBT’s can in no way be accepted under the rubric
of freedom and the so called ownership of the [sic] one’s body as a right. These

See id. The IPHRC endorsed this discredited treatment in its 2017 report on SOGI. See infra
Part III(C)(2).
279

280

See Report on his Visit to Malaysia, supra note 277, ¶ 95.

281

See id.

Discrimination and Violence Against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity, supra note 181, ¶ 51.
282

OIC Strategic Health Programme of Action 2014–2023, STAT., ECON. & SOC. RES. & TRAINING
CTR. ISLAMIC COUNTRIES 11 (2014), http://www.sesric.org/files/article/480.pdf.
283

284

Id. at 31.

See id. at 30–31 (explaining that “people receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) within the total
estimated number of people living with HIV/AIDS in 41 reporting OIC countries was on average
only 14% - as compared to 24% in other 68 developing countries and 59% in 13 developed countries
with reported data.”).
285

The Jamaica Forum of Lesbians was one of the eleven NGOs targeted by the OIC for exclusion
from the High Level Meeting on Ending AIDS. Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt,
Letter From a Group of 51 OIC States to UNGA President (Apr. 26, 2016) (on file with the author).
286
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devastative and abhorrent practices cannot be accepted as manifestation of a
modern society.”287
Many OIC states reveal sentiments that in practice promise the same
effect as Mr. Alaei’s views, though they are couched in more diplomatic terms.
For example, in setting out their reservations to the 2016 Political Declaration
on HIV and AIDS—the consensus-based outcome document of the high-level
meeting—OIC states opted to reject:
Recognition that “many national HIV prevention, testing and
treatment programmes provide insufficient access to services
for . . . key populations that epidemiological evidence shows are
globally at higher risk of HIV [including] men who have sex
with men, who are 24 times more likely to acquire HIV [and]
transgender people, who are 49 times more likely to be living
with HIV”;288
“The need to promote the development of and access to tailored
comprehensive HIV prevention services for all . . . key
populations”;289 and
Recognition of vulnerable groups.290
The motivation for these sweeping reservations gravitated around a
common relativistic rationale. For example, Djibouti emphasized the need of
every country to implement the Declaration’s commitments “in strict
compliance with the different cultural, ethical and religious values that
underpin each society”; 291 Indonesia stressed that use of the term “key
populations” would not limit its “authority to define key populations or
populations at greater risk of HIV infection according to its national
circumstances”;292 and Egypt called attention to “controversial points that do
not enjoy consensus among all States on account of social, cultural and
religious diversity and different values across countries,” 293 asserting further
that use of the terms “populations at high-risk,” “vulnerable populations,” “key
populations” and “populations that epidemiological evidence shows are at

287

Alaei, supra note 255, at 5.

288

G.A. Res. 70/266, supra note 266, ¶ 42.

289

Id. ¶ 62(e).

290

See id. ¶¶ 62(g)–(h).

U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess., 97th plen. mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. A/70/PV.97 (June 8, 2016) (Among
other OIC states, Sudan, Egypt, and Iran raised similar specific objections to ¶¶ 42 and 62(e)).
291

Id. at 16. (Indonesia further objected to omission of language in the declaration endorsing riskavoidance measures, “including abstinence and fidelity,” which were, in its view, “the most
effective measures for preventing the spread and bringing about the end of HIV…and also in line
with our cultural, religious and moral values.”).
292

293

Id.
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higher risk of infection” was “not in line with [Egypt’s] values and culture.” 294
Libya expressed similar reservations “on all contentious formulations that
embody the difficulties identified [by other OIC states] as these formulations
run counter to Islamic culture and our national legislation.” 295 Finally,
Bangladesh regretted that the 2016 Political Declaration failed to carry over
the recognition extended to “social, cultural, religious norms and values” in the
2011 declaration.296
Along with these individual reservations, the Group of African States,
which includes fifty percent of the OIC’s members, reaffirmed state sovereignty
and the need to implement commitments, “consistent with national law,
national development priorities, full respect for the various religious and
ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its people and in conformity with
universally recognized human rights.” 297 At the same time, the Group asserted
that for the purposes of its member states, any undertakings owed to “key
populations” would be interpreted to apply to “women and adolescent girls”
only.298 Thus, it flatly rejected the SDG High Level Political Forum’s findings
acknowledging the need to extend access to comprehensive prevention services
to specific key populations including sex workers, people who inject drugs,
transgender people, and men who have sex with men. 299
The OIC’s emphasis on protecting religious and cultural beliefs over the
promotion of SRH and equal and nondiscriminatory provision of services to
vulnerable groups grounded in scientific evidence did not go without criticism.
Perhaps most forcefully, the Netherlands, speaking on behalf of EU member
states called on all governments:
to place women above cultural belief, recognize their rights,
deal with their disadvantaged positions, recognize the rights of
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, allow sex
education, give the poorest of the poor access to care and
therapy, and do not give in to religious objections to condoms.
The God we share celebrates life, and AIDS is death. “Leave no
one behind”—that is what we all promised to do when we

Id. at 17 (Saudi Arabia, representing the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (all OIC
states), reiterated Egypt’s views).
294

Id. at 18. (noting that Yemen similarly concluded “the Declaration includes formulations that
give rise to the reservations expressed by the representatives of Libya, the Sudan, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, given that they run counter to our national legislation. As a result, we ask that these
reservations be placed on record.”).
295

296

U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess., 101st plen. mtg., at 9, U.N. Doc. A/70/PV.101 (June 10, 2016).

297

U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess., 98th plen. mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/70/PV.98 (June 8, 2016).

298

Id.

299

See 2017 HLPF Thematic Review of SDG3, supra note 253.
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pledged our support for the global goals last year. Let us
practice what we preach.300
2. Rejection of SOGI Recognition: Extrajudicial Killings
Like its rejection of universal and comprehensive HIV/AIDS education and
services in the context of SRH, the OIC’s denial of SOGI rights elsewhere
comes with similarly life-threatening consequences that transcend clinical
questions of equality and nondiscrimination. Human rights bodies have longrecognized the potential fallout associated with government authorization or
toleration of unequal or discriminatory treatment. For example, the UN
Committee Against Torture has observed that laws criminalizing consensual
same-sex conduct “violate the rights to privacy and non-discrimination . . . [but
also] exacerbate the risk of other violations and impede the elimination of
impunity in relation to torture and ill-treatment.” 301 The UN’s Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions reached a similar conclusion nearly two
decades earlier, in 1999:
criminalizing matters of sexual orientation increases the social
stigmatization of members of sexual minorities, which in turn
makes them more vulnerable to violence and human rights
abuses, including violations of the right to life. Because of this
stigmatization, violent acts directed against persons belonging
to sexual minorities are also more likely to be committed in a
climate of impunity.302
This dramatic finding represented the Special Rapporteur’s first
attempt303 to raise the issue of SOGI discrimination in the context of the right
to life and call attention to “numerous and continuing reports of persons having
been killed or sentenced to death because of their sexual orientation.” 304
U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess., 99th plen. mtg., at 3–4 U.N. Doc. A/70/PV.99 (June 9, 2016). Not to be
outdone, France expressed its “regret[] that the Political Declaration . . . was unable to fully take
key populations into account. To believe that we could eradicate AIDS without specifically
targeting men having sex with men, inmates, immigrants, drug-users is deceptive.” Id. at 15.
300

Comm. Against Torture, Ninth Annual Report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/57/4 (Mar. 22,
2016). In a similar manner, the CESCR concluded that the initial action of denying the right to an
abortion “often leads to maternal mortality and morbidity, which in turn constitutes a violation of
the right to life or security, and in certain circumstances can amount to torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment.” Comment No. 22, supra note 234, ¶10.
301

Asma Jahangir (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions), Civil and Political Rights,
Including Questions of: Disappearances and Summary Executions, ¶ 77, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/39
(Jan. 6, 1999).
302

Bacre Waly Ndiaye (Special Rapporteur), Question of the Violation of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other
Defendant Countries and Territories, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68 (Dec. 23, 1997). The Special
Rapporteur’s prior report from 1997 omitted consideration of SOGI. See id.
303

Ninth Annual Report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 301, ¶ 76.
304
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Rather than take action on the finding, however, the ensuing UN Commission
on Human Rights’ (“UNCHR”) resolution addressing extrajudicial executions
opted to merely take note of the Special Rapporteur’s report.305
This changed the following year. The Special Rapporteur’s follow up report
provided a similar if slightly expanded assessment of SOGI discrimination
(doubling from two to four paragraphs) under the heading “Violations of the
right to life of members of sexual minorities.”306 But in contrast to its 1999
response, the UNCHR’s follow up resolution on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions for the first time expressly “[n]ote[d] with concern the
large number of cases in various parts of the world . . .[where] persons [were]
killed because of their sexual orientation.” Faced with this finding, the UNCHR
“call[ed] upon Governments concerned to investigate such killings promptly
and thoroughly, to bring those responsible to justice and to ensure that such
killings are neither condoned nor sanctioned by government officials or
personnel.”307
Since the apparently uneventful milestone passage of Resolution 2000/31,
however, the OIC has mounted an ongoing effort to strike any reference to
sexual orientation from similar UN resolutions on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions. In an effort to ensure renewal of the Special Rapporteur’s
mandate, negotiated changes308 to the final 2001 resolution on extrajudicial
executions deleted the words “killings of persons because of sexual
orientation.” 309 The Commission restored the omitted wording in its 2002
resolution, but not without resorting to a contentious vote. 310 Following the
Swedish delegate’s expression of regret that consensus language could not
garner OIC approval of a resolution affirming the obligation of states to protect
all citizens irrespective of sexual orientation, 311 an OIC-initiated vote to again

305

Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1999/35, ¶ 8 (Mar. 22–Apr. 30, 1990).

Asma Jahangir (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions), Civil and Political Rights,
Including Questions of: Disappearances and Summary Executions, ¶ 54 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/3
(Jan. 25, 2000).
306

[The report reiterated] “serious reports of persons having been subjected to
death threats or extrajudicially killed because of their sexual orientation” and
concluded that “continuing prejudice against members of sexual minorities and
especially the criminalization of matters of sexual orientation…makes them
more vulnerable to violence and human rights abuses, including death threats
and violations of the right to life, which are often committed in a climate of
impunity.
307

Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/31, ¶ 6 (Apr. 20, 2000).

308

See Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2001/45 (Apr. 24, 2001).

Summary Record of the 72d Meeting, Commission on Human Rights, 3d sess., ¶¶ 69–74, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/SR.72 (Apr. 27, 2001).
309

310

See Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 2002/36 (Apr. 20, 2002).

311

U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 50th mtg., ¶ 80, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/SR.50 (July 20, 2002).
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strike references to “sexual orientation” from the text failed to muster a
majority.312
OIC efforts to delete references to “sexual orientation” in the context of
extrajudicial killings carried over from the UNCHR to the General
Assembly.313 For example, in 2006, Azerbaijan on behalf of the OIC submitted
a failed amendment to delete reference to sexual orientation from the General
Assembly resolution on extrajudicial execution. 314 In 2010, however, the OIC
witnessed a short-lived success. During a Social, Humanitarian and Cultural
Affairs Committee (Third Committee) meeting over a draft resolution on
extrajudicial execution, member states voted 79-70 315 to pass an OICsponsored amendment to delete language alluding to sexual orientation. 316 In
advance of the vote, the OIC argued that the “concept of sexual orientation had
no basis in, and should not be linked to, existing international human
rights.”317 The organization further warned that the “international community
must avoid selectivity in the field of human rights, which would set a
dangerous precedent and promote the interests of particular groups over
others.”318
Deletion of the draft resolution’s original wording triggered significant
NGO and media attention. 319 In turn, a concerted push in the General
Assembly sought to amend the resolution once more to restore the specific
reference to “sexual orientation.” Again, the OIC opposed the effort, positing
that sexual orientation amounted to an “undefined notion[] [with] no legal
foundation in any international human rights instrument.” 320 It also warned

312

Id. ¶¶ 84–90.

See U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 77th plen. mtg., at 21–22, U.N. Doc. A/57/PV.77 (Dec. 18, 2002);
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 59th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/57/SR.59 (Dec. 13, 2003); G.A. Res. 57/214, ¶
6 (Feb. 25, 2003).
313

Azerbaijan: Amendment to Draft Res. A/C.3/61/L.45/Rev.1, Third Comm. on Its Sixty-First
Session, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/61/L.59 (Nov. 15, 2006); G.A. Res. 61/173, ¶ 5(b) (Mar. 1, 2007).
314

See Recorded Vote from the 46th Meeting, Third Comm., (Nov. 16, 2010). States opposed to the
OIC’s substitute language lamented the “unfriendly amendment” and the Third Committee’s
inability “to bring itself to condemn killings targeting individuals because of their sexual
orientation.” U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 46th mtg., ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/65/SR.46 (Jan. 18, 2011).
315

Mali and Morocco: Amendment to Draft Resolution A/C.3/65/L.29/Rev.1, Third Comm. on Its
Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/65/L.65 (Nov. 12, 2010) (on behalf of the members of the Group
of Arab States and members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference).
316

317

U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., supra note 315, ¶ 29.

318

Id.

See Jessica Stern, Civil Society Pressures Governments to Successfully Reverse Discriminatory
Vote
at
UN,
OUTRIGHT
ACTION
INT’L
(Dec.
21,
2010),
https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/civil-society-pressures-governments-successfullyreverse-discriminatory-vote-un; Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Panel Cuts Gay Reference from Violence
Measure,
REUTERS
(Nov.
16,
2010),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-un-gaysidUSTRE6AG0BB20101117.
319

320

U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 71st plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/65/PV.71 (Dec. 21, 2010).
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that “focus on certain persons on the grounds of their sexual interests and
behaviours” could only come at the expense of combatting the general scourge
of intolerance and discrimination. 321 In addition, the OIC incoherently
reasoned that individuals are only “made vulnerable due to the socio-economic
setting in which they live,” 322 thus obviating any possibility that cultural,
religious, or political factors (among others) might bear equal responsibility for
facilitating or condoning the types of discrimination and violence addressed in
the resolution. Ultimately, the General Assembly adopted the revised
resolution on extrajudicial executions, inclusive of the reference to sexual
orientation, 109-41, with 35 abstentions.323
At the end of 2016, an OIC-sponsored amendment to the annual resolution
on extrajudicial execution sought once again to delete a specific reference to
vulnerable groups, including on the basis of SOGI. The amendment proposed
to have the resolution apply more generally for “discriminatory reasons on any
basis whatsoever.”324 The sense of déjà vu in the Third Committee must have
been palpable when the Uzbek delegate, in presenting the OIC amendment for
a vote, rehashed verbatim the Saudi delegate’s 2014 view that the “OIC
believed that people were not inherently vulnerable but some individuals were
made vulnerable by their socioeconomic setting.” 325 Since it would be
impossible to list all vulnerable groups (again, despite specific Special
Rapporteur findings to the contrary and the fact that framing the term
“vulnerable” in this way would void it of any practical meaning), the Uzbek
delegate posited (still using the previous Saudi script) that it would be “more
prudent to alter the language” by deleting these specific references. 326 Based
on this reasoning, the OIC’s representative urged Member States to support
the amendment on the absurd grounds (again verbatim) that they “should
refrain from attempting to give priority to the rights of certain individuals, as

321

Id.

322

Id. The Tajik delegate for the OIC concluded his statement on an ominous note:
[I]n the future, [the OIC] will carefully assess its position on specific issues
based on the flexibility shown and political stand taken by partners on issues
of importance to the OIC. There will be no more unilateral concessions, as
clapping requires the use of both hands. We hope that this message will be
taken positively and lead to genuine and constructive engagement that results
in consensus-building on all issues of importance.

Id.
323

Id. at 19; see G.A. Res. 65/208 (Dec. 21, 2010).

Uzbekistan: Amendment to Draft Resolution A/C.3/71/L.38, Third Comm., U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/71/L.53 (Nov. 11, 2016) (mirroring an identical amendment proffered by Egypt on behalf of
the OIC in 2014); Egypt: Amendment to Draft Resolution A/C.3/69/L.47/Rev.1, Third Comm., U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/69/L.64 (Nov. 17, 2014).
324

Compare U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., 52d mtg., ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/71/SR.52 (Jan. 12, 2017), with
U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., supra note 325.
325

U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., supra note 325 (parroting Saudi Arabia’s remarks from the 2014
debate); U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., supra note 325.
326
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doing so could result in positive discrimination at the expense of the rights of
others, in contravention of the principles of non-discrimination and
equality.”327
Reviewing the summary record, one wonders whether the Uzbek delegate
blushed for cribbing his colleague’s two-year-old oral statement, for mustering
the temerity to urge other member states to support the OIC’s dodgy
amendment, or both. But setting aside the intriguing—though admittedly
tangential question—of personal dignity, the substance of the OIC’s proffered
justification rightfully demands unpacking for its cynical attempt to turn
human rights principles on their head.
On a foundational level, the OIC’s justification ignores several essential
characteristics associated with equality and non-discrimination norms
identified by the UN Human Rights Committee. First, “enjoyment of rights
and freedoms on an equal footing” does not necessarily entail “identical
treatment in every instance.”328 Second, positive discrimination or “affirmative
action” sometimes may be necessary and permissible “to diminish or eliminate
conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination.”329 Finally, not all
differential treatment will constitute discrimination “if the criteria for such
differentiation are reasonable and objective” and the aim supports a legitimate
purpose. 330 More practically, actual implementation of the OIC’s faulty
approach would suggest state inaction is somehow an appropriate response to
confronting specific human rights violations impacting recognized vulnerable
individuals. Denying protection to these individuals because others not
identified as vulnerable might suffer discrimination distorts the intent of
nondiscrimination and equality norms and is antithetical to the purpose of the
international human rights regime.
Ultimately, the Third Committee rejected the OIC-proposed amendment
eighty-four votes to sixty, with twenty-seven abstentions.331 The final General
U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., supra note 325 (parroting Saudi Arabia’s remarks from the 2014
debate); U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., supra note 325. This line of reasoning is directly at odds with the
OIC’s parallel attempt to secure a UN resolution focused exclusively on “defamation of Islam,”
inasmuch as that effort would similarly prioritize a certain religion and result in “positive
discrimination at the expense of the rights of others.” See generally Robert C. Blitt, Should New
Bills of Rights Address Emerging International Human Rights Norms? The Challenge of
“Defamation of Religion”, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1 (2010).
327

Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (Nov. 10, 1989)
328

Id. ¶ 10. (requiring “preferential treatment” in order “to correct discrimination in fact, it is a
case of legitimate differentiation under the Covenant”).
329

330

Id. ¶ 13.

U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., supra note 325, ¶¶ 56–57 (showing that forty-two OIC states voted in
favor, two against (Albania and Turkey), and five abstained and the voting pattern closely
mirrored the Third Committee’s rejection of the OIC’s identical amendment in 2014 (eighty-two in
favor, fifty-three opposed, with twenty-four abstentions)); U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., supra note 325,
¶¶ 30–31. Likewise, in 2014, Albania and Turkey were the only OIC states to vote against the
OIC-sponsored amendment. Id. ¶ 30.
331
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Assembly resolution, (adopted by 125 votes to 2, with 56 abstentions, with OIC
states accounting for over 60% of abstaining states), 332 urged all states
[t]o ensure the effective protection of the right to life of all
persons, to conduct, when required by obligations under
international law, prompt, exhaustive and impartial
investigations into all killings, including . . . of persons
belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities or because of their sexual orientation or gender
identity . . . and killings committed for discriminatory reasons
on any basis, to bring those responsible to justice before a
competent, independent and impartial judiciary . . . and to
ensure that such killings . . . are neither condoned nor
sanctioned by State officials or personnel. 333
The OIC’s explanation before voting on the final 2016 extrajudicial
executions resolution appeared to move beyond its previous poorly designed
and executed verbal gymnastics. Rather than claim SOGI recognition would
amount to unlawful “positive discrimination,” the organization fell back to its
first principles. In doing so, it offered a far more sweeping claim that SOGI
recognition fell altogether outside the scope of international human rights:
[The] OIC strongly rejected any attempt to undermine the
international human rights system by imposing concepts
pertaining to social issues that were not part of the
internationally agreed human rights legal framework. Such
attempts disregarded the universality of human rights and
disrespected cultural and social specificities, norms and
diversities that existed between societies and communities.
The group was alarmed, in particular, at systematic efforts to
reinterpret the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
other international treaties in the light of notions never
articulated or agreed by the general membership of the
United Nations and to impose those notions through United
Nations resolutions.334

The 2017 vote mirrors the 2014 UNGA vote to pass the resolution on extrajudicial executions—
122–0 with 66 abstentions (with OIC states accounting for over 60 percent of abstaining states).
U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess.,73d plen. mtg. at 16–17, U.N. Doc. A/69/PV.73 (Dec. 18, 2014); Id. at 6
(demonstrating that the voting outcome arguably diminishes the claim that no international
consensus exists for recognizing SOGI-based protection).
332

G.A. Res. 71/198, ¶ 6(b) (Jan. 25, 2017) (showing that the language is identical to the prior 2014
UNGA resolution on extrajudicial executions); G.A. Res. 69/182, ¶ 6(b) (Jan. 30, 2015).
333

U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., supra note 325, ¶ 59. The Egyptian delegate hinted at these reasons in
2014, expressing alarm over the “systematic attempts to include in the resolution notions that had
not been agreed upon by the general membership of the United Nations.” During the same debate,
the representative of Iran similarly rejected reference to “notions that did not have internationally
agreed definitions, including ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity.’” U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess.,
supra note 325, ¶¶ 37, 42.
334
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Taken at face value, this straightforward position drains any meaningful
substance from simultaneous OIC assurances that its “member States
deplore[] all forms of stereotyping, exclusion, stigmatization, prejudice,
intolerance, discrimination and violence directed against peoples, communities
and individuals, on any grounds.”335 It also affirms the conclusion that OIC
opposition to SOGI recognition cuts across different human rights issues that
pre-date and are unrelated to protection of the family. Moreover, it confirms
that the organization’s opposition is rooted in something deeper, and is more
sweeping than narrow, issue-specific quibbles such as who may or may not be
“vulnerable,” what constitutes unlawful “positive” discrimination in the
context of extrajudicial executions, or even protection of the family.
At its core therefore, the OIC’s justification for opposing SOGI rights
appears to rest on two faulty pillars. The first is a facile understanding of
foundational international human rights law (“IHRL”) norms that posits in the
absence of express universal recognition of SOGI as a vulnerable class, such
recognition must necessarily be denied. The second is a steadfast prioritization
of an indeterminate religious dogma over individual rights. This faulty
prioritization is embodied in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam
(“CDHRI”) and the Bangkok Declaration, and is intended to short-circuit the
clear directive contained in the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action
(“VDPA”) that states owe a duty to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms, regardless of localized particularities. Stated
differently, from the OIC’s perspective, universal human rights norms cannot
protect a class without express reference to a defining characteristic, such as
race or religion. Alternatively, even if such protection were to apply under
international law, relativism (manifested, for example, in a particularized
definition of “family” or a claim of disrespect for cultural and social
specificities) operates to shield states from any obligation that might attach.
Invoking either of these justifications serves the OIC’s underlying
objective, namely securing its religious beliefs and cultural practices from
human rights scrutiny. However, a clear distinction exists between them.
Arguably, a relativist approach might acknowledge the substance of a human
right but seek dispensation from its application based on a specific religious,
cultural or other localized practice that conflicts with the right. In contrast, the
OIC’s
revisionist
approach—namely
restricting
equality
and
nondiscrimination protections only to those groups and characteristics
expressly referenced under the UDHR—is premised on rewriting the
substance of universal human rights. This approach denies, among other
things, ongoing developments at the UN, longstanding and authoritative
interpretations of the foundational norms governing the international human
rights system, and indeed even the UDHR grundnorm that “[a]ll human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 336

335

U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., supra note 325, ¶ 48.

336

UDHR, supra note 2, art. 1.
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The pervasiveness of the OIC’s opposition to SOGI and the associated
shortcomings of its reliance on relativist and revisionist justifications are
readily confirmed by reviewing the organization’s efforts surrounding the
milestone 2011 UNHRC SOGI resolution and its aftereffects. But before
turning to this assessment, two additional manifestations of opposition to
SOGI recognition merit consideration. These brief examples elaborate the
existing international guidance on SOGI rights. Furthermore, they confirm
that the OIC’s multiple justifications for rejecting SOGI are poor cover for a
hardened campaign committed to denying equality and perpetuating
discrimination against individuals who fall outside of the organization’s selfproclaimed religious strictures, even if it comes at the cost of human life.
3. Rejection of SOGI Recognition: Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment
The UN Special Rapporteur on torture’s 2016 report recognized that the
“purpose and intent elements of the definition of torture . . . are always fulfilled
if an act is gender-specific or perpetrated against persons on the basis of their
sex, gender identity, real or perceived sexual orientation or non-adherence to
social norms around gender and sexuality.” 337 Further, the report reiterated
that “[a] clear link exists between the criminalization of [LGBT] persons and
homophobic and transphobic hate crimes, police abuse, community and family
violence and stigmatization.” 338 Based on these findings, the rapporteur
concluded that “[s]tates have a heightened obligation to prevent and combat
gender-based violence and discrimination against women, girls, and [LGBT]
and intersex persons that amount to torture and ill-treatment, committed in a
variety of contexts by both State and [non-state] actors.”339 Additionally, states
“must decriminalize same-sex relationships between consenting adults and
repeal all laws that criminalize persons on the basis of their actual or perceived
sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.” 340 Faced with these
decisive conclusions, the OIC offered the vague response that it had
reservations “over the introduction of controversial issues in the report that
are not agreed in any international, UN Human Rights instruments.” 341
Supporting the Special Rapporteur’s findings, the 2016 annual report of
the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture reiterated the obligation of states
to extend basic human rights protections to all individuals, including
nondiscrimination based on SOGI. According to the Subcommittee, “[t]here is
abundant evidence to conclude that torture and ill-treatment of [LGBT] and
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/57 (Jan. 5, 2016).
337

338

Id. ¶ 15.

339

Id. ¶ 68.

340

Id. ¶ 69.

Press Statement, Mariam Saeed, Comments on Behalf of OIC during the Interactive Dialogue
with the Special Rapporteur on Sale of Children and Special Rapporteur on Torture (Mar. 8, 2016).
341
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intersex persons are endemic concerns . . . .” 342 Accordingly, under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), states have an obligation to “design and
implement legislative, administrative and judicial measures to prevent” such
treatment.343 This includes a duty to consult LGBT and intersex persons “in
the design, implementation and evaluation of measures adopted to prevent
torture and ill-treatment against them.”344
To understand how at least one OIC member state interprets its nondiscrimination obligation in the context of torture and inhuman treatment, a
recent example from Egypt is instructive. In 2015, multiple UNHRC mandate
holders communicated an urgent appeal to the government of Egypt
concerning its alleged arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and public
stigmatization of twenty-six men arrested on charges related to their alleged
sexual orientation. Among other things, the mandate holders requested Egypt
provide information related to:
“allegations indicating that the 26 men were subjected to
forensic anal examinations upon the request of the prosecutor,
and explain how this complies with Egypt’s obligations under
international human rights law and standards;” and
“the measures taken by the authorities to protect lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender persons in Egypt from arbitrary
arrest and detention, violence and discrimination on the
grounds of their sexual orientation and/or gender identity.” 345
The Egyptian government’s one-page response to the detailed allegations
set out in the urgent appeal stated that the accused had been acquitted and
offered a blanket denial of any human rights violations: “There is no truth in
the claim that before or during the trial the accused suffered torture or illtreatment. They were arrested and detained in accordance with the procedures
laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which are all compatible with
relevant international human rights obligations and standards.” 346 Relaying
this exchange to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on torture
took note of Egypt’s failure to provide details as to how its investigation was
conducted or to “address the larger question of whether persons in Egypt are
Ninth Annual Report of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 301, ¶ 49.
342

343

Id. ¶ 50.

344

Id. ¶ 71. This approach embodies the GIPA principle discussed above at supra note 273.

Mandates of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: the Special Rapporteur on the Right
of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health;
the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers; and the Special Rapporteur
on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UA EGY 1/2015,
at 5–6 (2015) [hereinafter Mandates of the Working Group].
345

Press Statement, Reply of the Egyptian Government to the Allegations Contained in the Urgent
Appeal, ¶ 6, UA EGY 1/2015 (Feb. 20, 2015).
346
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treated in [a] humiliating manner when detained and investigated about their
real or alleged homosexuality. . . .”347 In this context, the rapporteur reminded
the Egyptian government of the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of
torture and other ill-treatment codified under CAT art. 1. Lacking specific
information refuting the allegations, the rapporteur concluded that the
government had violated its CAT obligations “by failing to protect the physical
and psychological integrity of the . . . men arrested and tried . . . [for] their
alleged sexual orientation.”348
4. Rejection of SOGI Recognition: Freedom of Assembly
The UDHR provides that “everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly and association.”349 The ICCPR further requires that state parties
secure these rights “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.”350 When the UNHRC created the mandate for a Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, it
reaffirmed that “everyone has the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
of association.”351
The Special Rapporteur’s first thematic report, issued in 2012, recalled
that the right to free assembly requires respect for ICCPR art. 26, 352 which
guarantees “to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground . . . .” 353 As such, the right to free assembly
applies “inter alia to . . . persons belonging to minority groups or other groups
at risk, including those victims of discrimination because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity . . . .” 354 Other than invoking permissible
limitations authorized under the framework of the ICCPR, the OIC appeared
to receive the 2012 report with little objection over the need to apply
nondiscrimination and equality principles in the context of SOGI. 355

Juan E. Méndez, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 118, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/57/Add.1 (Feb. 24, 2016).
347

348

Id. ¶ 120.

349

UDHR, supra note 2, art. 20.

350

ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2; see also id. arts. 21–22.

351

Human Rights Council Res. 15/21 (Oct. 6, 2010).

Maina Kiai, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
and of Association, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (May 21, 2012).
352

353

ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 26.

354

Kiai, supra note 352, ¶ 13.

Press Statement, U.N. Human Rights Council, Draft Statement by Pakistan on Behalf of the
OIC Member States During and ID with a) Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights While Countering Terrorism and b) Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Peace
Assembly and Association (June 20, 2012).
355
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The OIC’s muted response, however, changed in 2014 with release of the
rapporteur’s second report. This second report focused on threats to the rights
to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association for groups most at risk.
Specifically, it sought to address “the challenges facing” groups that “are often
relegated to the margins of society, both in their daily lives and in the exercise
of their rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.” 356 The
Special Rapporteur expressly included LGBTI people as one of these
marginalized groups and proceeded to explore how discrimination and unequal
treatment impacted their rights to free assembly and association. 357 During
the ensuing interactive debate at the UNHRC, the OIC again reaffirmed the
limitations built into ICCPR art. 21. But this time, its representative went on
to express specific disappointment with the rapporteur’s “reference to
controversial notions which are not universally agreed rights such as LGBTI
in the context of marginalized groups.” 358 The OIC’s representative further
asserted “[t]here is no such specific classification of rights in international
human rights law or UN Charter and we should not create new category of
rights.”359 He then injected a curious addition:
In compliance with international human rights law including
ICERD [the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination], the OIC considers the
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms including the right to peaceful assembly and
association of all peoples without any discrimination on the
basis of gender, race, religion, colour or socio-economic
status.360
The OIC’s decision to specifically namecheck the ICERD in the context of
a discussion on free assembly rights is self-serving and misleading. The
UNHRC derived the Special Rapporteur’s mandate first and foremost from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and ICESCR, as well as “other relevant
human rights instruments.” 361 It did this for the simple reason that these
primary treaties establish the fundamental right to assembly in its most wideranging context. Singling out the ICERD—with its targeted objective of

Maina Kiai, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
and of Association, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/29 (Apr. 14, 2014).
356

357

Id. ¶¶ 27–31.

Press Statement, U.N. Human Rights Council, Statement by Pakistan on Behalf of the OIC in
the Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the Special
Rapporteur on Peaceful Assembly and Association, ¶ 10 (June 10, 2014).
358

359

Id.

360

Id. ¶ 9.

361

Human Rights Council Res. 24/5 (Oct. 8, 2013).
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“eliminat[ing] racial discrimination in all its forms” 362 —as the basis for
interpreting the right to free assembly diminishes the right’s broad
applicability and relevance beyond the confines of racial discrimination.
For example, unlike the ICCPR’s more open-ended framing of
nondiscrimination, the specialized nature of the ICERD necessitated a more
focused and targeted list of protected classes. Accordingly, the ICERD
narrowly limited its definition of “racial discrimination” to “any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national
or ethnic origin . . . .”363 As a consequence of this specificity, ICERD remained
silent with respect to other recognized statuses including religion, disability,
age, or sexual orientation. This specificity also explains why the ICERD’s only
reference to free assembly does not establish the general obligation of states to
respect the right, but rather merely reiterates that it should be guaranteed to
everyone “without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin . .
. .” 364 Approaching the right to assembly in the OIC’s narrow manner
insinuates that states can achieve compliance with international
nondiscrimination norms on an à la carte basis, whereby they pick and choose
which groups or statuses merit protection. But based on the UDHR, ICCPR,
and related international norms and developments365 this is plainly not the
case.
Conflict over inclusion of SOGI recognition in the context of freedom of
assembly has not abated. A joint UN Special Rapporteur report on the proper
management of public assemblies released in 2016 significantly scaled back
content relating to at risk groups. Nevertheless, the rapporteurs still reiterated
the need “to ensure equal and effective protection of the rights of groups or
individuals who have historically experienced discrimination [including]
individuals who have been discriminated against on the basis of their sexual
orientation or gender identity.” 366 The rapporteurs further concluded that
“[t]his duty may require that authorities take additional measures to protect
and facilitate the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly by such
groups.”367
The joint report did not prompt a formal OIC response. However, during a
related interactive dialogue, at least one OIC state charged that the single
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 [hereinafter ICERD].
362

363

Id. art. 1(1).

364

Id. art. 5.

The Special Rapporteur outlines some of the relevant law in his report. Kiai, supra note 356,
¶¶ 16–20.
365

U.N. Human Rights Council, Joint Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly and of Association and the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions on the Proper Management of Assemblies, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/66 (Feb.
4, 2016).
366

367

Id.
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reference (in an eleven-page document) to what he termed “the non-universally
recognized controversial issue of LGBTs…under the pretext of right to peaceful
assembly” had the effect of “undermin[ing] the credibility and practical
recommendations of the report as a whole.” 368 In response, the rapporteur on
freedom of assembly stated: “There had to be clarity that the people who
needed the right to demonstrate the most were the people who were the most
marginalized . . . .Whether countries agreed with [LGBT] rights or not, that
community needed to be protected like any other community. ‘A right is
something you have because you are’ . . . if the State had to authorise rights,
they turned into privileges.”369
C. Epicenter of the Clash: Formal UN Human Rights Council
Recognition of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
1. UNHRC Resolution 17/19 on SOGI (2011)
The above sections have provided a snapshot of OIC opposition to even
tangential recognition of SOGI-based human rights protections. Yet the
UNHRC’s decision to begin adopting standalone resolutions dedicated to SOGI
has triggered the OIC’s most vociferous opposition to SOGI to date. The
maelstrom surrounding these resolutions serves to pull together the OIC’s
various justifications proffered over the years to suppress the formal
entrenchment of human rights protections for the LGBTI community.
In June 2011, the UNHRC voted to adopt an historic resolution explicitly
addressing sexual orientation and gender identity. The first of its kind,
Resolution 17/19 expressed “grave concern at acts of violence and
discrimination . . . committed against individuals because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.” 370 It also requested a UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) report on the issue, as well as a
panel discussion to be held at the UNHRC’s 19th session.371 Despite its mild
procedural content, the resolution’s unprecedented subject matter sparked
determined opposition and betrayed the gravity of SOGI as a human rights
fault line for the OIC. Of the nineteen states voting against the UNHRC
resolution, fifteen were OIC members.372
The subsequent OHCHR report on “discriminatory laws and practices and
acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and
Press Statement, Islamic Republic of Iran on Clustered ID with SR on Peaceful Assembly and
SR on Summary Executions, 31st Session of Human Rights Council (Mar. 9, 2016).
368

U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Holds Interactive Dialogue on Peaceful
Assembly
and
Association
(Mar.
9,
2016),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23232&LangID=E.
369

370

Human Rights Council Res. 17/19 (July 14, 2011).

371

Id.

Id. The other states voting against Resolution 17/19 were: Angola, Ghana, Moldova and Russia.
One OIC state, Burkina Faso, abstained.
372

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312845

Winter 2018]

THE OIC’S RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION

161

gender identity,” released in late 2011, began by observing that throughout the
world:
people experience violence and discrimination because of their
sexual orientation or gender identity. In many cases, even the
perception of homosexuality or transgender identity puts
people at risk. Violations include—but are not limited to—
killings, rape and physical attacks, torture, arbitrary
detention, the denial of rights to assembly, expression and
information, and discrimination in employment, health and
education.373
The report offered a review of applicable international standards and
obligations relating to universality, equality and non-discrimination. Using the
UDHR’s article 1 guarantee that “all human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights”374 as a departure point, the OHCHR observed that “[a]ll
people, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons, are
entitled to enjoy the protections provided for by international human rights
law, including in respect of rights to life, security of person and privacy, the
right to be free from torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to be free
from discrimination and the right to freedom of expression, association and
peaceful assembly.” 375 Further, based on legal developments within the UN
treaty bodies, the report confirmed “that States have an obligation to protect
everyone from discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender
identity. The fact that someone is lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender does
not limit their entitlement to enjoy the full range of human rights.” 376 In light
of these findings, the report recommended that states:
Enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that
includes discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and
gender identity among prohibited grounds and recognizes
intersecting forms of discrimination; [and] ensure that
combating discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and
gender identity is included in the mandates of national human
rights institutions.377
The intervening year between passage of Resolution 17/19 and the
convening of the requested panel discussion on SOGI did little to dissipate the
tension. An official UN summary of the meeting notes that opponents “voiced
their opposition on cultural or religious grounds, or argued that sexual
Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against Individuals Based on their
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, supra note 215, ¶ 1.
373

374

UDHR, supra note 2, art. 1.

Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against Individuals Based on their
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, supra note 215, ¶ 5.
375

376

Id. ¶ 16.

377

Id. ¶ 84(e).
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orientation and gender identity were new concepts that lay outside of the
framework of international human rights law.” 378 Further, a “number of
States” opted to express their opposition to any discussion of SOGI by staging
a walkout from Room XX of the Palais des Nations at the beginning of the
meeting. 379 Perhaps more revealing of the depth of this friction, certain
unnamed meeting participants gave ominous notice that any effort to draft
“new documents or agreements that focus specifically on the rights of LGBT
persons . . . could lead to a splintering of human rights into groups and subgroups.”380
Although the UN’s official summary did not attribute actions or comments
to specific states, media outlets widely reported that primarily OIC members
participated in the walk-out.381 The move should not have come as a surprise.
The OIC had made its position plain in advance, in a letter intended “to place
on record” its opposition and to reject a priori any “considerations and
recommendations” that might ensue from the discussion. 382 Writing to the
UNHRC president and High Commissioner for Human Rights, the OIC
explained that its member states were “deeply concerned by the introduction .
. .of controversial notions like ‘sexual orientation and gender identity,’” and
“seriously concerned at the attempt to introduce . . . concepts that have no legal
foundation in any international human rights instrument.” 383 From the OIC’s
perspective, any UN recognition of “controversial ‘new notions’ or ‘new
standards’” affording human rights protections on the basis of “abnormal
sexual behaviour” would amount to a misinterpretation of the UDHR and other

U.N. Human Rights Council Panel on Ending Violence and Discrimination Against Individuals
Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: Summary of Discussion, UNITED NATIONS
HUM.
RTS.
OFF.
HIGH
COMMISSIONER
(Mar.
7,
2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Discrimination/LGBT/SummaryHRC19Panel.pdf.
A
notably junior member of Pakistan’s delegation delivered the remarks on behalf of the OIC during
the panel discussion. Panel Discussion Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 22nd Meeting,
U.N. WEB TV (Mar. 7, 2012), http://webtv.un.org/search/panel-discussion-sexual-orientation-andgender-identity-22ndmeeting/5294863512001/?term=sexual%20orientation&lan=English&sort=date&page=2
[hereinafter SOGI Panel] (statement begins at approximately 00:53:10).
378

SOGI Panel, supra note 378. (The U.N. webcast of the panel discussion captures the walkout at
approximately at 0:00:45-0:01:30).
379

380Id.

¶ 22.

See Historic UN Session on Gay Rights Marked by Arab Walkout, RADIOFREEEUROPE RADIO
LIBERTY,
Mar.
7,
2012,
http://www.rferl.org/content/arab_states_leave_un_gayrights_debate/24508579.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2018); Robert Evans, Islamic states, Africans
Walk Out on UN Gay Panel, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ungays-idAFJOE82702T20120308.
381

Letter to H.E. Ms. Laura Dupuy Lasserre, President of the Human Rights Council, to Zamir
Akram (Feb. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from OIC Group].
382

Id. The letter reiterates arguments previously delivered in the UNHRC at the time of the vote
on Resolution 17/19. See Explanation of Vote by Pakistan, on Behalf of the OIC Member States,
on Resolution Entitled “Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,” During the 17th
Session of [sic] Human Rights Council, Geneva, 16/17 June 2011.
383
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international treaties. Such a move would, according to the letter, “undermine
not only the intent of the drafters and signatories to these human rights
instruments, but also seriously jeopardize the entire international human
rights framework.”384
The OIC’s revisionist justifications for denying SOGI recognition
previously noted above—namely, that protection under IHRL requires express
recognition or that any evolving interpretation is necessarily a
misinterpretation—is flawed for several reasons. First, it has been
longstanding practice among all key international human rights instruments
to “include lists of prohibited grounds of discrimination in their nondiscrimination guarantees . . .[that] all conclude with the words ‘other
status.’” 385 This purposeful phrasing demonstrates “that the lists were
intended to be open-ended and illustrative,” 386 rather than confined and
impractical. More generally to this point, the law of treaties supports the view
that where “a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the
other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the
objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation
should be adopted.”387
The approach taken by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) in the context of disability rights is illustrative.
Although the CESCR acknowledged the absence of an internationally accepted
definition of the term “disability” as well as the absence of specific reference to
persons with disabilities under the ICESCR, 388 it nevertheless concluded that
“persons with disabilities are clearly entitled to the full range of rights
recognized” under the treaty. This conclusion flowed from the fact that
disability corresponded to “other status” and the drafters’ intent was to have
the treaty “apply fully to all members of society.” 389
384

Letter from OIC Group, supra note 382.

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Born Free and Equal: Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law, at 40 (2012).
385

386

Id.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Commission to the General Assembly in Its Eighteenth Session:
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 219 (1966). In the view of the
International Law Commission, when properly limited and applied, this approach “does not call
for an ‘extensive’ or ‘liberal’ interpretation in the sense of an interpretation going beyond what is
expressed or necessarily to be implied in the terms of the treaty.” Id.
387

Comm. Econ. Soc. Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 5: Persons with Disabilities, ¶¶ 3, 5,
U.N. Doc. E/1995/22, (Dec. 9, 1994).
388

Id. ¶ 5. The Committee attributed the “absence of an explicit, disability related provision in the
[ICCPR] . . . to the lack of awareness of the importance of addressing this issue explicitly, rather
than only by implication, at the time of the drafting of the Covenant.” Id. ¶ 6. The Committee has
taken a similar approach concerning the omission of age as a prohibited ground: “this omission is
probably best explained by the fact that, when these instruments were adopted, the problem of
demographic ageing was not as evident or as pressing as it is now.” Comm. Econ. Soc. Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 6: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons, ¶
11, U.N. Doc. E/1996/22 (Dec. 8, 1995). The Committee on the Rights of the Child has likewise
389
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Perhaps even more revealingly, the OIC has adopted the same approach
for interpreting its own instruments. One of the organization’s recent
invocations of the CDHRI is particularly illuminating of this practice. During
a discussion with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities in 2016, the OIC effectively “read in” recognition for disability
rights under the CDHRI, based on the term “everyone.” According to the OIC
representative: “OIC Member States attach great importance to the
participation of persons with disabilities in all aspects of life. We consider this
not only an obligation but also a religious duty . . . article 23 (b) of the CDHRI
insists that ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to participate, directly or indirectly
in the public affairs of his country.’ This includes individuals with
disabilities.” 390 To be clear, the CDHRI makes no reference to people with
disabilities. But applying a purposive interpretation to “everyone” operates to
secure rights protections for all members of society. Here, it is worth recalling
that like the CESCR’s inclusion of “other status”, the CDHRI’s provision on
discrimination also opens the possibility of extending protection on the basis of
“other considerations.”391
Second, the OIC’s denial that IHRL tips towards inclusivity of SOGI
protection is inconsistent with its own stance in the context of other
international instruments and rights. For example, the OIC’s own resolutions
have endorsed the notion that international norm-setting is a “dynamic and
evolving process.” 392 Likewise, these resolutions have reaffirmed that
international instruments maintain status as “living document[s] to be
updated.”393 Perhaps most obviously though, the OIC continues to claim that
religious sensitivities justify an international prohibition on defamation of
religion and a coincident limitation on freedom of expression and freedom of
religion or belief. This position surely constitutes a controversial ‘new notion,’
given strong international opposition and the reality that religions are not even
contemplated as rights holders under IHRL. 394 Yet, on this matter, the OIC
has consistently claimed that the “new standard” of defamation of religion is a
interpreted “other status” to include HIV/AIDS status of children and parents, as well as mental
health and sexual orientation. U.N. Comm. Rights Child, General Comment No. 3 (2003):
HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/3, Mar. 17, 2003; U.N. Comm.
Rights Child, General Comment No. 4 (2003): Adolescent Health and Development in the Context
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/4 (Jul. 1, 2003).
Tehmina Janjua, Interactive Dialogue with Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 31st Session of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 4, 2016). The invocation of the
CDHRI here reinforces the point made previously in Parts II(B) II(C) concerning the Cairo
Declaration’s ongoing validity and its embodiment of norms the OIC aspires to transform into
binding obligations.
390

391

CDHRI, supra note 16, art. 1.

392

OIC Res. 1/41-LEG, supra note 101, ¶ 1.

OIC, Final Communique of the Annual Coordination Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of the OIC Member States, ¶ 87, OIC Doc. OIC/ACM-2013/FC (Sept. 27, 2013) (referring to the U.N.
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy).
393

394

Blitt, supra note 327.
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valid and binding international norm despite never having attained universal
or near universal support. In the OIC’s words, “the consistent pattern of safe
passage of the [Combating Defamation of Religions] resolution [at the UN], by
a majority vote beyond OIC membership, lends recognition and international
legitimacy to the urgent need to combat defamation of religions.” 395
Returning to the OIC’s letter to the UNHRC president and High
Commissioner, it closed by reasserting that a focus on SOGI would detract from
other “glaring instances of intolerance and discrimination,” 396 and that any
such focus represented nothing less than an infringement of the VDPA.
According to the OIC:
It must also be recognized that the international community
agreed during the [1993 UN] World Conference on Human
Rights…that while considering the issue of human rights,
national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind.
From this perspective, the issue of sexual orientation is
unacceptable to the OIC.397
The framing of this final claim again exemplifies the OIC’s penchant for
distorting the substance of the VDPA and clinging instead to the Bangkok
Declaration.398 Although the VDPA calls for bearing in mind the significance
of religious and other particularities, the OIC ignores the fact that the
Declaration does so only in the context of prioritizing “the duty of States,
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”399 In other words, while

OIC Res. No. 35/38, pmbl. (June 28–30, 2011). For a detailed account of the OIC’s advocacy of
defamation of religion as a valid international norm despite its discriminatory fallout, see Robert
C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 62 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 347 (2011); Blitt, supra note 64. In arguing against recognition of SOGI rights, Egypt
turned the OIC’s rationale justifying a prohibition against defamation of religion on its head:
“We can not . . . accept the argument that reports submitted to a certain forum, even if it is the
United Nations, or an adopted resolution, can be considered as an international human rights
law instrument, thus paving the way for the creation of a new human right.” Press Statement,
Statement by Egypt During Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression and the Special Rapporteur on Peaceful Assembly and Association, 26th Session of
Human Rights Council (2014).
395

Akram, supra note 382. The OIC letter repeats on a more sweeping scale the dubious
argument addressed above in the specific context of extrajudicial executions—that focusing on
one vulnerable group detracts attention from other instances of discrimination.
396

397

Id.

398

See supra Part II(D)(1).

VDPA, supra note 62, ¶ I(5) (emphasis added). The IPHRC has eagerly adopted the OIC’s
disjointed interpretation, discarding the Vienna Declaration’s recognition that states have a duty
to protect all human rights regardless of state particularities. IPHRC Thematic Debate on
“Protection of Family Values,” supra note 192. According to the IPHRC, the VDPA “amply
highlights the principle of due recognition and respect for cultural and religious diversity in the
field and application of human rights.”
399

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312845

166

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 28:89

bearing in mind various particularities, the VDPA recognizes that states have
a duty not merely to “consider” human rights, but actually to “promote and
protect” them. During the UNHRC’s first SOGI panel discussion—and not
without some irony—the chair of Pakistan’s Human Rights Commission (and
former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on human rights
defenders) Hila Jilani took pains to reiterate how little credibility the OIC’s
arguments carry: “Invoking culture or tradition as a shield for failure to protect
individuals from human rights violations [is] unconvincing. States [are] not
entitled to uphold human rights selectively or to exclude certain people from
protection.”400
2. UNHRC Resolution 27/32 on SOGI (2014)
The UNHRC followed up on its SOGI-focused report and panel discussion
with another contentious resolution in 2014. Resolution 27/32 reiterated the
Council’s grave concern over acts of violence and discrimination, and directed
the OHCHR to update its 2012 report on discriminatory laws and practices
targeting SOGI.401 In the lead up to the vote, OIC member states advocated
amendments402 to the text that would have stripped all references to SOGI.
The justifications for these changes were grounded in reasons identical to those
outlined in the organization’s 2012 letter to the UNHRC president. 403 OIC
states also expressed the conviction “that inviting individuals to identify
themselves, or seek to be identified, in accordance with their private sexual
conduct has no relationship with combating discrimination or violence, but on
the contrary might result in further setbacks, create more resistance to States’
efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and might even subject
individuals to more risks including violence and discrimination.” 404 Setting
aside this abhorrent rationale (if the Baha’i didn’t identify themselves or seek
to be identified as Baha’i, they would be subject to less discrimination!), OIC
member states also intimated that states supporting Resolution 27/32
attempted to coerce others into voting in favor of the measure: “many
delegations members and non-members of the Council, were subjected to
economic and political coercion . . . to depart their national convictions and
positions. This pattern of using reprisal techniques against States . . . need[s]

400

SOGI Panel, supra note 378, ¶ 28.

401

Human Rights Council Res. 27/32 (Oct. 2, 2014).

See Rep. of the Human Rights Council at the 27th Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/L.45A/HRC/27/L.51 (Dec. 22, 2014).
402

See e.g., Press Statement, Amr Ramadan, Statement on Introduction of Amendments on Draft
Resolution L.27 [hereinafter Statement of Ambassador Amr Ramadan] (“Continuous attempts to
parachute concepts and notions that lack universal consensus and definition or any basis in
international human rights law, are not productive to the work of the Council, especially when
they carry significant social, cultural, ethical, and religious sensitivities.”).
403

404

Id.
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to stop immediately.” 405 Supporters of the SOGI resolution rejected these
allegations as “false” and “misleading.”406
As with the previous 2011 UNHRC resolution, OIC members in 2014 again
represented the vast majority of UNHRC members—ten of 14—voting to
oppose recognition of SOGI as a protected status. 407 This acute isolation from
the rest of the international community undermines the OIC’s argument
regarding the lack of consensus surrounding the issue. 408 Such a position is
rendered even less tenable in light of the findings contained in the OHCHR’s
updated SOGI report, released in May 2015. In addition to reiterating the
protections affirmed by various international human rights treaty bodies, the
OHCHR’s report identified a parallel trend of recognition and endorsement
across regional organizations in Africa, the Americas, and Europe:
In 2014, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights passed a resolution in which it condemned violence and
other human rights violations based on real or imputed sexual
orientation and gender identity; the Organization of American
States approved its seventh resolution on human rights, sexual
orientation and gender identity . . .; the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of
Rapporteur on the rights of LGBT and intersex persons . . .; the
European Union adopted guidelines on the promotion and
protection of human rights of LGBT and intersex persons, and
both the European Parliament and the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted resolutions on the
subject; and the European Court of Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued several

Press Statement, Arab Republic of Egypt, General Comments, 27th Session of Human Rights
Council Section. The Egyptian delegation first voiced this claim upon submission of amendments
to the draft resolution: “Irrespective of the pressures and threats exerted in relation to this draft
resolution against developing and least developed countries, including mine, to be coerced and
walk the line . . . Many States remain solidly proud of representing their societies and peoples.”
Statement of Ambassador Amr Ramadan, supra note 403. The delegate from Nigeria reiterated
this sentiment, arguing that “Unlike the delegations that were exerting pressure on Nigeria
because of its opposition to the use of the terms ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’, his
delegation was not seeking to impose its values on any other.” U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., 53d
meeting, ¶45, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/69/SR.53 (Jan. 16, 2015).
405

See infra Table 3. SOGI resolution sponsors responding to an amendment purporting to
“[d]eplore the use of external pressures and coercive measures against States with the aim of
influencing domestic debates.” Id.
406

See, H.R.C. Res. 27/32, supra note 401. Three other OIC states, Burkina Faso, Kazakhstan, and
Sierra Leone, abstained. Id.
407

See e.g., U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., supra note 405, ¶¶ 53–55 (noting the statements from Iran,
Bangladesh, Libya, and Sudan regarding UNHRC Resolution 27/32).
408
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judgements affirming the rights of LGBT persons to equal
treatment and protection under the law.409
Despite this preponderance of recognition, the OHCHR grimly reported
that “the overall picture remains one of continuing, pervasive, violent abuse,
harassment and discrimination affecting LGBT and intersex persons in all
regions. These constitute serious human rights violations, often perpetrated
with impunity, indicating that current arrangements to protect the human
rights of LGBT and intersex persons are inadequate.”410
Faced with these findings, the OHCHR report concluded:
States have well-established obligations to respect, protect and
fulfil the human rights of all persons . . . including LGBT and
intersex persons. These obligations extend to refraining from
interference in the enjoyment of rights, preventing abuses by
third parties and proactively tackling barriers to the enjoyment
of human rights, including . . . discriminatory attitudes and
practices.411
But it is precisely these minimum obligations—of equality and
nondiscrimination—that the OIC continues to reject out of hand.
Frustrated with its inability to derail SOGI protection efforts at the UN,
the OIC moved to double down by way of issuing organizational resolutions
aimed at deepening member state consensus with an eye to the future. OIC
Resolution No. 4/42-C On Social and Family Issues saluted those states that
voted against the UNHRC’s second SOGI resolution, asserting that its content
promoted “many issues which cannot be accepted as they are in total
contradiction with the teachings and values of Islam and other divine religions
and with the human common sense.”412 Resolution No. 4/42-C then spelled out
the OIC’s decisions to:
1. Reject the entire content of HRC Resolution [27/32] and to
endeavor to take a unified Islamic and human position to
repeal it.
2. Invite the . . . (IPHRC) to take necessary measures
towards the cancellation of the Resolution.
3. Invite the Secretary General to take necessary measures
to repeal the Resolution.
4. Call on the [OIC] and its relevant institutions to provide
the needed support to Member States undergoing
pressure in this regard.
Discrimination and Violence Against Individuels Based on Their Sexual Orientation and
Gender Orientation, supra note 181, ¶ 8.
409

410

Id. ¶ 76.

411

Id. ¶ 10.

412

OIC Res. 4/42-C, supra note 180, ¶ A.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312845

Winter 2018]

THE OIC’S RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION

169

5. Invite Member States to hold a specialized conference on
the marriage and family institution and the preservation
of their Islamic values.413
This move set the stage for open-ended conflict over the issues of SOGIbased rights and protection of the family at the UN. Putting aside the
incongruous “human common sense” argument, Resolution 4/42-C drove home
that underlying the multiple justifications proffered by the OIC, the overriding
basis for denying recognition of SOGI lies in religious imperative.
Predictably, the IPHRC backed the OIC’s position. IPHRC Commissioner
Mostafa Alaei summarized the Commission’s view on the possibility of SOGI
rights thusly: “human rights [are] a way to protect the rights of Muslims,
especially Muslims in Europe, not LGBT groups . . . . LGBT groups do not have
human rights.”414 More formally, the IPHRC betrayed its view that SOGI is
unsuitable for rights protection from the outset when it established a working
group tasked with examining—in its words—“the issue of human rights and
that of the so-called ‘sexual orientation’ and any link between them.”415 This a
priori confession should leave observers with the justifiable impression that
any conclusions emanating from the IPHRC are likely to be pre-determined
and utterly disconnected from IHRL. 416
3. UNHRC Resolution 32/2 on SOGI (2016)
A third SOGI resolution introduced at the 32d session of the UNHRC
generated some of the fiercest debate to date over recognition of SOGI rights.
ARC International, an NGO working to advance LGBT issues, produced a
lengthy report compiling the OIC’s numerous diplomatic maneuvers within the
Council to thwart the resolution. Among these efforts, the OIC: attempted to
outright preempt the resolution under UNGA procedural rule 116; proffered
eleven separate amendments intended to void the resolution of SOGI-specific
content; advanced a “last-ditch attempt” to oppose key parts of the text; and
lastly, marshalled member states to vote against the final resolution itself. 417

413

Id.

ANTHONY TIRADO CHASE, THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION: A CASE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS’ IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (Marie Juul Petersen & Stephanie
Larrick eds., 2015) (omission in original).
414

OIC, Report of the 7th Session of the OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission
(IPHRC) 28 (Apr. 21, 2015) (noting the statement of Secretary General Ilham Ibrahim) (emphasis
added). The IPHRC chairperson reiterated this framing later in the same address: “Our agenda
items also include exploring the philosophical aspects of the concepts propounded by certain circles
such as the so-called ‘sexual orientation.’” Id. at 30.
415

See infra note 463 and accompanying text. The IPHRC published a formal study on SOGI rights
in May 2017.
416

Allied Rainbow Cmtys., Int’l & Int’l Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Ass’n,
Compilation of the Adoption of the 2016 SOGI Resolution 3 (2016), [hereinafter Compilation of the
Adoption of the 2016 SOGI Resolution]. The amendment efforts are also summarized in the Report
417
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The substance of the OIC’s amendments, reaction from the sponsors of the
SOGI resolution, and voting outcomes are summarized in the table below.
Table 3: OIC-sponsored Amendments to the 2016 UNHRC SOGI
Resolution, Objections & Voting Outcomes
Amendment # / Purpose
Primary Objection Raised by SOGI Resolution Sponsors
L.71: Change resolution title to delete reference to SOGI.
“All that is intended by modifying the title is to hide the specificity and the very nature of the
draft resolution . . . . Approv[al]. . . will amount to erasing the word ‘racism’ in a resolution
on racism . . . .”418
L.72: Delete references to prior UNHRC SOGI resolutions (17/19 and 27/32).
“[A] vote in favor [of] this amendment is a vote against the need to enhance the protection
against violence and discrimination directed at the people who are solely targeted for their
sexual orientation and gender identity.”419
L.73: Call for joint ownership of the international human rights agenda.
“[C]ompletely unacceptable . . . . because . . . . [it] implies that the resolution as drafted is
non-objective and it is confrontational when it is totally the opposite.”420
L.74: Undertake to support broad and balanced agenda, and to strengthen the mechanisms
addressing issues of importance.
“[B]ring[s] confusion into the discussion and deviate[s] from the focus of [the SOGI]
initiative. . . . [T]he concerns that motivate these amendments were not shared in a
transparent manner during formal consultations. We could have found a way to
accommodate these concerns if the proponents would have been open to a dialogue.” 421
L.75: Reiterate the importance of respecting regional, cultural and religious value systems.
“The proposed amendment is a misquotation of Article 5 of the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action.”422
L.76: Underline fundamental importance of respecting relevant domestic debates at the
national level on matters associated with historical, cultural, social and religious
sensitivities.
Proposed amendment is an “attempt to reinterpret the [VDPA]” and introduces “language
which would restrict the universality of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 423
L.77: Deplore the use of external pressures and coercive measures against States with the
aim of influencing domestic debates.

of the Human Rights Council on its thirty-second session. Rep. of the Human Rights Council on
its Thirty-Second Session, ¶¶ 169–226, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/2 (Nov. 14, 2016).
418

Compilation of the Adoption of the 2016 SOGI Resolution, supra note 417, at 28.

419

Id. at 32.

420

Id. at 34.

421

Id. at 38.

422

Id. at 40.

423

Compilation of the Adoption of the 2016 SOGI Resolution, supra note 417, at 44–45.
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Amendment # / Purpose
Primary Objection Raised by SOGI Resolution Sponsors
“[I]ntroduce[s] the false idea that the draft resolution tries to use economic sanctions and
coercive measures to undermine the authority of States to determine and influence their own
decision-making process. This is totally misleading.”424
L.78: Express concern at any attempt to undermine the international human rights system
by seeking to impose concepts or notions pertaining to social matters, including private
individual conduct, that fall outside the internationally agreed human rights legal
framework.
“The amendment pretends to affirm that the sponsors of the resolution are trying to impose
concepts or notions pertaining to social matters. We firmly reject this affirmation. The
objective of this initiative is the opposite.”425
L.79: Underline resolution should be implemented while ensuring respect for the sovereign
right of each country as well as its national laws, development priorities, the various
religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its people.
“[P]laces national sovereignty and cultural relativism over the universality of human rights.
Human rights are universal, and allegations of national sovereignty should not, and cannot,
be invoked to perpetrate human rights violations.”426
L.80: Modify second operative paragraph to delete specific reference to sexual orientation
and gender identity and instead deplore acts of violence and discrimination in all regions of
the world generally.
“[T]he proposed amendment . . . seeks to transform [operative paragraph 2] into a statement
of such generality that [it] loses the original focus and purpose.” 427
L.81: Substitute operative paragraphs creating mandate for independent expert on SOGI
with request for an OHCHR report on the protection of all individuals against violence and
discrimination.
This amendment “is an attack to the heart of this draft resolution. This amendment
completely rewrites the resolution–deleting six paragraphs, stripping all references to sexual
orientation and gender identity, and eliminating the creation of [an independent expert]
mechanism.”428
As can be seen from the table above, several of the OIC’s amendments—
including provisions distorting the substance of the VDPA and universality of
human rights—made their way into the final 2016 SOGI resolution. However,
the organization’s concerted effort to strip the resolution’s references to SOGI
and dismantle the creation of a new independent expert mandate on SOGI
failed. Even before voting, the OIC informed UNHRC members that it would
“not be able to support an Independent Expert for a concept that has not yet

424

Id. at 46.

425

Id. at 50.

426

Id. at 54.

427

Id. at 58.

428

Compilation of the Adoption of the 2016 SOGI Resolution, supra note 417, at 63.
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been adopted by any universal intergovernmental negotiated treaty or
convention.”429
Individual OIC member states also invoked a variety of the now familiar
justifications to explain their respective positions. Saudi Arabia claimed “a
mismatch between the behaviors of individuals on one hand and our sacred
values consecrated by religion on the other hand.” 430 Nigeria “seriously
object[ed] to LGBT rights as human rights . . . because it offend[ed] their
culture, religion and natural laws.” 431 Indonesia expressed concern the
resolution “link[ed] the discussion on discrimination and violence with a
concept that is divisive and lacks of recognition to the different norms, cultures
and views of other societies.”432 Morocco touched on protection of the family
and religious primacy, claiming the resolution would “create an ambiguity for
the youth,” and—appearing to speak for all Muslims—run “against the values
and the beliefs of at least 1.5 billion that belong to one civilization.” 433 The
representative further raised the specter that the resolution would usher in
“the beginning of a very dark period in the life of the Council,” and augured “a
war between civilizations and religions.”434
The final 2016 UNHRC resolution as amended passed the Council 23 to 18,
with OIC states representing 15 of the dissenting votes. 435 Two days later, an
OIC communiqué invoked the organization’s revisionist and relativist
justifications for “strongly reject[ing] the resolution,” claiming “the notion of
sexual orientation is alien to the international human rights norms and
standards as well as against the fundamental precepts of not only Islamic but
many other religious and cultural societies.” 436 Again distorting the VDPA—
and despite the amendments successfully inserted in the resolution’s
preamble—the OIC insisted that the resolution “amounts to imposing one set
of values and preferences on the rest of the world and counteracts the

429

Id. at 17 (emphasis removed).

430

Id. at 87–88.

431

Id. at 91.

Press Statement, Representative from Indonesia to the 32d Session of the United Nations
Human Rights Council, Explanation of Vote: The Delegation of Indonesia on Adoption of the Draft
Resolution L.2 On Protection Against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity (SOGI), ¶ 2 (June 30, 2016) (on file with author).
432

433

Compilation of the Adoption of the 2016 SOGI Resolution, supra note 417, at 96.

434

Id.

Human Rights Council Res. 32/2 (July 15, 2016); Compilation of the Adoption of the 2016 SOGI
Resolution, supra note 417, at 93–94. Albania, the only OIC state that voted in favor, reasoned
that the resolution did not “seek to create any new rights but simply affirms the application of
existing human rights standards to those who are discriminated and abused because of who they
are.” Albania’s comments failed to address the religious arguments voiced by other OIC states.
435

OIC, OIC Strongly Rejects HRC Resolution on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (July 2,
2016), http://www.oic-oci.org//topic/ampg.asp?t_id=11338&t_ref=4456&lan=en.
436
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fundamentals of universal human rights that call for respecting diversity,
national and regional particularities.”437
Apparently unsatisfied with the communiqué alone, OIC Member States
in Geneva subsequently issued an additional declaration condemning
Resolution 32/2 that went even further. Purporting to speak on behalf of all
Muslims, the declaration asserted that the “highly divisive” resolution “aims
to impose a set of values on the world, which . . . contradicts . . . the beliefs of
at least more than 1.5 billion Muslims.”438 Furthermore, it tied OIC opposition
to SOGI back to protection of the family, “reaffirm[ing] that the natural
family—consisting of a man and a woman—is the main part of the society with
a unique role in ensuring healthy live [sic] and well-being of all its members
especially children.”439
The OIC’s assertion that Resolution 32/2 “contradicts” and is “against the
values and the beliefs” of all Muslims everywhere is shocking as much for its
inaccuracy as it is for its arrogance. It bears pausing here to reaffirm the reality
that the OIC—despite claiming and wanting it to be so—does not represent the
sole or final word on the interpretation of Islamic law. In fact, a variety of
Muslim NGOs advocate for a progressive interpretation of Islam or on behalf
of LGBT Muslims globally. For example, Muslims for Progressive Values, a
U.S.-based NGO with consultative status at the U.N., “endorse[s] the human
and civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex
(LGBTQI) individuals” and is “committed to ending discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity.” 440 Similarly, the Alliance of Inclusive
Muslims (“AIM”), “a collective of progressive Muslims across all nationality,
race and sectarian affiliation[s] . . . seeks to challenge theological justifications
for hate and supremacism” with what it describes as “progressive values . . .
inherent in Islam.”441 Among its priorities, AIM advocates for human rights
and dignity, including “[r]ecognizing each individual’s equal worth in society
and right to equal protection under the law.”442

437

Id.

OIC, Declaration by the Group of the OIC Member States in Geneva on Condemning the Human
Rights Council Resolution “Protection Against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity,” at 68, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM-43/2016/CS/RES/FINAL Annex 1,
(Oct. 18–19, 2016).
438

439

Id. at 69.

MPV Principles, MUSLIMS FOR PROGRESSIVE VALUES, http://www.mpvusa.org/mpv-principles/
(last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
440

About AIM, ALLIANCE OF INCLUSIVE MUSLIMS, https://aim.ngo/about/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2018).
441

Id. These organizations are part of a larger network of related groups supporting LGBTI
communities and issues globally, as well as in OIC member states. See generally SCOTT SIRAJ ALHAQQ KUGLE, LIVING OUT ISLAM: VOICES OF GAY, LESBIAN, AND TRANSGENDER MUSLIMS (2014),
(documenting numerous support groups and other organizations working within Muslim LGBT
circles); Munir Shaikh, Contemporary Developments within Muslim Societies and Communities
regarding LGBT Identity and Rights, in MUSLIM LGBT INCLUSION PROJECT (2011) (on file with
442
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Likewise, certain Muslim academics have continued to advance
interpretations of Islam that contradict the OIC’s take on SOGI. Much of this
scholarship is premised on affirmations like El-Fadl’s that “the commitment to
human rights does not signify a lack of commitment to God, or a lack of
willingness to obey God. Rather, human rights become a necessary part of
celebrating human diversity, honoring the vicegerents of God, achieving
mercy, and pursuing the ultimate goal of justice.” 443 More specifically, this
body of work engages SOGI-related issues using Islamic sources, and thus
represents a distinctively Muslim counter-narrative to the OIC and its
asserted claim to represent the “collective” voice of the Muslim world.
Self-described “progressive Muslim” scholars such as Omid Safi, assert a
“determination to hold Muslim societies accountable for justice and pluralism
. . . exposing the violations of human rights . . . and the right to dissent in
Muslim countries . . . [and] embracing and implementing a different vision of
Islam than that offered by Wahhabi and neo-Wahhabi groups.”444 As explained
by Adis Duderija, this approach “seek[s] to weave the ethos and the culture of
human rights discourse into the social and cultural fabric of Muslim-majority
societies in order for those rights to be more effectively realized in the political
and legal realms of these societies.”445
Similarly, Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle calls for a “revived ‘Islamic
humanism’” to “encourage reform of Islamic law as a framework for ethical
living in creative engagement with modern conditions.” 446 In Kugle’s

the author) (summarizing numerous LGBT rights organizations in Muslim-majority nations and
elsewhere); Brian Whitaker, Everything You Need to Know About Being Gay in Muslim Countries,
GUARDIAN (June 21, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/gay-lgbtmuslim-countries-middle-east (noting gay rights groups in various OIC states as well as “a handful
of gay-friendly mosques and a few openly gay imams” based outside of OIC states).
Khaled Abou El-Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 4, 52–53
443

[I]it is not the pre-modern juristic tradition that poses the greatest barrier to
the development of individual rights in Islam. Rather, the most serious
obstacle comes from modern Muslims themselves. Especially in the last half of
the past century, a considerable number of Muslims have made the unfounded
assumption that Islamic law is concerned primarily with duties, and not rights,
and that the Islamic conception of rights is collectivist, not individualistic. Both
assumptions, however, are not based on anything other than cultural
assumptions about the non-Western ‘other.’ It is as if the various interpreters
decided on what they believe is the Judeo-Christian, or perhaps Western,
conception of rights, and then assumed that Islam must necessarily be
different. (internal citations omitted).
Safi, supra note 144, at 2. Safi’s volume also contains a bibliography of “alternative” reading
suggestions for developing a “deeper, more challenging, and nuanced understanding of Islam.” Id.
at 333.
444

Duderija, supra note 229, at 69; see generally ADIS DUDERIJA, THE IMPERATIVES OF
PROGRESSIVE ISLAM (2017).
445

SCOTT SIRAJ AL-HAQQ KUGLE, HOMOSEXUALITY IN ISLAM: CRITICAL REFLECTION ON GAY,
LESBIAN, AND TRANSGENDER MUSLIMS 271 (2009).
446
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assessment, “[a]n honest and subtle examination” of Islamic religious beliefs
on sexuality and its diversity “reveals more ambiguities than the defenders of
‘orthodoxy’ care to admit.”447 Such an approach, however, is frustrated by a
“potent combination of patriarchal custom and theological belief” that prevents
“many Muslims from seeing their lesbian, gay and transgender fellow citizens
as fully human and therefore deserving compassion and demanding justice.” 448
For Kugle, correcting this lacuna demands “a deep reform of Islamic belief and
action”449 that can be derived from “[a] ‘sexually-sensitive’ interpretation of the
Koran” able to account for the reality of sexuality and sexual orientation among
Muslims:
[This] interpretation would be explicitly non-patriarchal. It
would not presume patriarchal values of male supremacy; it
would not assume that all readers of Qur’an are (or should be)
heterosexual in orientation. It would avoid imposing ideas of
human nature that are obsolete (such as medieval Muslim
assumptions . . . ). In this sense, sexuality-sensitive
interpretation of the Qur’an would complement and support
gender-sensitive interpretation of the scripture . . . as well as
race-sensitive and class-sensitive interpretations.450
Utilizing this interpretive approach to Islamic sources generates outcomes
diametrically opposed to the OIC view, including validating the recognition of
same-sex marriage under Islamic law. A recent study by Junaid Jahangir and
Hussein Abdullatif argues that the predominant Muslim “position on same-sex
unions is not based on express texts but derived on the basis of analogy and
alleged consensus, both of which are contested branches of Islamic

Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle, Sexuality, Diversity, and Ethics in the Agenda of Progressive
Muslims, in PROGRESSIVE MUSLIMS, supra note 144, at 190, 194. According to Kugle, given “the
Qur’an’s vivid portrayal of diversity at so many levels of the natural and human world, it would
be logical to assume that this diversity of creation plays out on the level of sexuality as well.” Id.
at 196.
447

KUGLE, supra note 442, at 232. Among other things, Kugle rejects the claim that marriage is
grounded in procreation and therefore rightly limited to heterosexual couples only: “This argument
does not arise from within the Islamic tradition itself, because most Muslims in the past did not
limit the purpose of sexual pleasure to procreation even if they valued procreation very highly.”
Id. at 200. Further stating that:
448

adjustments to the nikah [standard marriage] contract envisioned by [LGBT]
Muslims are analogous to those envisioned by feminists who focus more
exclusively on women’s rights . . . . The underlying obstacle to the full
participation of gay and lesbian believers in marriage is the inequality in
gender roles that patriarchy enforces, rather than specifically the issue of
sexual orientation.
Id. at 211; see also id. at 221 (discussing the lives of LGBT Muslims living in secular democratic
states and their efforts to reclaim their faith: “activists believe that the ideals of Islam can be
distilled from the traditional forms of the religion and reworked into a new form that accepts more
social pluralism and individual rights, including diversity in sexual orientation and gender
identity”).
449

Id. at 232.

450

KUGLE, supra note 446, at 41.
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knowledge.”451 Instead, Jahangir and Abdullatif posit these same sources “can
be marshaled to affirm gender and sexual diversity,” and that an
interpretation rejecting the possibility of same-sex marriage as clearly
prohibited is “fallacious . . . especially when such a view is not based on express
texts but derived from a story of exploitation and coercion.” 452 The authors
conclude that because Islamic tradition offers “no express position on same-sex
unions . . . the case for Muslim same-sex unions can be justified on the basis of
[the] juristic principle of repelling harm and also by extending from the
precedent of the marriage of the khuntha mushkil (indeterminate gender) to
the non-binary case where sexual orientation traverses anatomy.” 453 According
to their final assessment, “Muslim scholars can delve freshly, sensitively and
widely into their rich heritage to affirm Muslim same-sex unions.”454
D. OIC Efforts to Rollback the 2016 UNHRC SOGI Resolution
Not satisfied with its own protest statements, the OIC sponsored a variety
of additional efforts intended to stymie the UNHRC vote and derail the SOGI
independent expert mandate. The Egyptian delegate to the UNHRC’s
Consultative Group, the body responsible for developing candidate pools for
filling various mandates, wrote to inform the UNHRC President of his decision
to withdraw from “the work of the Consultative Group relevant to its upcoming
recommendation on the selection of [the SOGI] mandate-holder.” 455 In
withdrawing, Ambassador Ramadan offered the circular assertion that “the
creation of this mandate is in Ulta [sic] Vires to international human rights
law and is beyond universally recognized human rights and fundamental
freedoms in a manner that amounts to utter disregard to the principle of
universality of internationally agreed human rights.”456
At the end of September 2016, the UNHRC closed its 33d session by
endorsing new mandate holders, including Mr. Vitit Muntarbhorn from
Junaid Jahangir & Hussein Abdullatif, Same-Sex Unions in Islam, 24 THEOLOGY & SEXUALITY
157, 158 (2018).
451

452

Id.

453

Id.

454

Id. at 168.

Letter from Ambassador Amr Ramadan, Permanent Representative of Egypt, to President of
the Human Rights Council (July 29, 2016).
455

Id. One might ask whether a parallel exists between the ambassador’s expressed sense of dread
“engag[ing] in an exercise which is contrary to [his] convictions and the values [he] stands for,”
and the actual humiliation and inhuman treatment meted out by the ambassador’s government in
subjecting its citizens to forced anal examinations in the course of prosecuting them on charges
relating to their alleged sexual orientation. Compare id., with Mandates of the Working Group,
supra note 345; Dignity Debased: Forced Anal Examinations in Homosexuality Prosecutions, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Jul. 12, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/12/dignity-debased/forced-analexaminations-homosexuality-prosecutions (reporting on eight countries, including Egypt, where
“law enforcement officials working in tandem with medical personnel subject men and transgender
women who are arrested on homosexuality-related charges to forced anal examinations, with the
purported objective of finding ‘proof’ of homosexual conduct.”).
456
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Thailand as the first Independent Expert on protection against violence and
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 457 Saudi
Arabia, speaking on behalf of the OIC (except Albania), again reiterated the
organization’s opposition to the mandate, expressing concern “over the
introduction of topics that were not universally agreed on, and which impinged
on religious sensitivities.” Further to this, the Saudi representative formally
asserted the OIC would “not recognize the establishment of the mandateholder and would boycott the Independent Expert.” 458 Still, the OIC was not
finished with the matter.
1. Reaction of the 43d OIC Conference of Foreign Ministers
The OIC used its 2016 resolution on “Social and Family Issues” to build out
its operative rejection of the UNHRC’s SOGI-related efforts. This resolution
reaffirmed the OIC’s view “that issues related to sexual orientation etc. have
no link to human rights” 459 and its position “of non-recognition of and noncooperation” with the UN’s new SOGI independent expert.460 The resolution
also renewed the demand that the OIC Secretary General “take necessary
measures to repeal” the UNHRC’s SOGI resolution. 461 Further, it called on
Member States “to make all efforts to oppose the adoption of a resolution on
sexual orientation” at the UNGA’s 71st Session.462
In addition to these measures, the 2016 resolution on social and family
issues also requested the IPHRC study the issue of SOGI “in the light of
Islamic and human rights framework and present its recommendations to the
CFM on how to address the issue.”463 Lastly, the OIC linked for the first time
its efforts to deny SOGI recognition in the context of protection of the family

See Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Human Rights Council Adopts Six
Resolutions, Appoints Special Procedures Mandate Holders and Closes Its Thirty-Third Regular
Session
(Sept.
30,
2016),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20627&LangID=E
(describing that the UNHRC president presented the candidate recommended and ranked first by
the Consultative Group).
457

458

Id.

459

OIC Res. 4/43-C, ¶ A(4) (Oct. 18–19, 2016).

460

Id. ¶ A(5).

461

Id. ¶ A(6).

462

Id. ¶ A(4).

Id. ¶ A(8). The IPHRC published a 10-page report elaborating its views on sexual orientation
in May 2017. Indep. Permanent Hum. Rts. Commission [IPHRC], OIC-IPHRC Study on Gender
Identity in the Light of Islamic Interpretations and International Human Rights Framework (May
2017), https://docplayer.net/72150384-Oic-iphrc-study-on-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identityin-the-light-of-islamic-interpretations-and-international-human-rights-framework.html.
The
author provides a critical assessment of the IPHRC’s analysis and conclusions elsewhere. See
generally Robert C. Blitt, Leveraging Regional Human Rights Mechanisms Against Universal
Human Rights: The OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission Study on Sexual
Orientation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2018).
463
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with its larger opposition campaign, by formally welcoming and taking credit
for the UNHRC’s protection of the family resolutions.464
2. An Eleventh-Hour Effort to Derail the SOGI Resolution at the UN
General Assembly
Several weeks after the OIC’s Conference of Foreign Ministers, the
normally routine adoption of a formulaic UN General Assembly resolution
acknowledging the UNHRC’s annual report morphed into an eleventh-hour
effort to cancel Resolution 32/2. The Group of African States introduced a
resolution calling for deferral of action on the SOGI resolution, contending
“further consultations” were necessary to determine the legal basis for the
special procedure’s mandate. 465 The Russian Federation joined OIC states
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen in
sponsoring the draft resolution.466 If accepted, the deferral would effectively
thwart operation of the newly appointed independent expert and signal the
first time the UNGA elected to override a validly passed UNHRC measure.
The statement accompanying the African Group’s proposal to torpedo the
SOGI Independent Expert rehashed many of the same justifications the OIC
proffered previously: that recognition of SOGI would “impose new notions and
concepts that are not internationally agreed upon”; that focusing on SOGI
would ignore “intolerance and discrimination” that exists on the basis of colour,
race, sex or religion; and that such recognition “could result in negative
discrimination at the expense of other internationally agreed rights.” Like the
OIC, the African Group claimed that SOGI issues amounted to a domestic
concern and therefore ran counter “to the commitment in the United Nations
Charter to respect the sovereignty of States and the principle of nonintervention.”467
Reaction from supporters of Resolution 32/2 was predictably swift. During
a debate in the Third Committee, the representative of Ireland called the
African Group’s effort “an unwarranted attempt to subvert a legitimate
decision of the Council and created an unnecessary and dangerous precedent,
allowing for Council resolutions to be questioned or reopened by the General
Assembly.”468 The United States similarly decried the “unprecedented attempt

OIC Res. 4/43-C, supra note 459, ¶ A(10) (noting the protection of the family resolutions were
“adopted over the last three years at the initiative of Egypt and . . . supported by the overwhelming
majority of the OIC Member States.”).
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Rep. of the Human Rights Council, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/71/L.46 (Nov. 3, 2016).

Rep. of the Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. A/71/479 (Dec. 5, 2016). These sponsors
are in addition to the 27 OIC states that make up half of the Group of African States at the UN.
Id.
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Rep. of the Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 4–5 (2016) (on file with the author).

U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 45th mtg. ¶ 25, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/71/SR.45 (Nov. 4, 2016). The EU representative warned the measure threatened “the
delicate institutional relationship” between the UNHRC and the General Assembly: “The creation
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to reopen a Human Rights Council mandate” as “inconsistent with respect for
the Council’s ability to function” and “a dangerous precedent.” 469
The UNHRC’s Coordination Committee of Special Procedures likewise
warned that if successful, the deferral resolution would place the SOGI
Independent Expert mandate “in a legal and political vacuum,” “undermine[] .
. . the Council’s credibility and authority, and weaken[] . . . the human rights
system as a whole.”470 The Committee underscored that “the creation of special
procedures mandates falls squarely within the mandate of the Human Rights
Council” rather than the UNGA. Accordingly, states should “recognize their
responsibility to preserve the human rights system and ensure that the
Independent Expert is able to continue fulfilling his mandate without
hindrance and with the full cooperation of all States and other stakeholders.” 471
In an open letter to UN member states on behalf of nearly 800 NGOs, the
International Service for Human Rights (“ISHR”) summarized the dynamic
triggered by the last ditch effort to terminate the nascent SOGI Independent
Expert mandate:
If the Third Committee were able to reopen the Council’s
annual report and select which resolutions it supports and
which it seeks to block, even through the pretext of deferment,
it would fundamentally undermine the authority granted to
the Council by the General Assembly. In effect, this would open
all Council resolutions up to renegotiation and debate at Third
Committee every year, and have far-reaching implications well
beyond the specific resolution currently under consideration. 472
Within days, over fifty states sponsored an amendment to the African
Group’s resolution, proposing to “Delete operative paragraph 2” and thereby
effectively erase the attempt to defer approval of the UNHRC’s SOGI
resolution.473 During the final heated debate preceding the vote, the African
Group sought to dismiss the claim that deferral of an UNHRC resolution was
of special procedures was well within the Council’s purview and should not be reopened by the
General Assembly, lest the functioning of the Council and the work of its member States be
seriously called into question.” Id. ¶ 28.
469

Id. ¶ 73.

“Deep Concern” at Bid to Block UN Human Rights Expert, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.
(Nov.
21,
2016),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20902&LangID=E.
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Id.

Defend the Independence of the UN Human Rights Council, INT’L SERV. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.ishr.ch/news/defend-independence-un-human-rights-council; see also
List of Signatories: Overview, INT’L SERVICE FOR HUM. RTS. (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/documents/nov21_2016_finallist_signatoriesunga3committ
ee.pdf (setting out the list of 799 signatory organizations and noting that NGOs from Latin
America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region accounted for nearly 500 of these organizations).
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2016).
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unprecedented. To do so, it relied on the assertion that the UNGA previously
had deferred consideration of UNHRC Resolution 1/2 on the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 474
These two situations are readily distinguishable on several grounds. In the
first instance, UNHRC Resolution 1/2 recommended that the General
Assembly adopt a resolution endorsing UNDRIP, 475 a declaration intended to
set out an international “standard of achievement to be pursued” in the context
of indigenous rights.476
The General Assembly’s decision to defer consideration of UNDRIP fell
squarely within its ambit. Under the terms of Resolution 1/2, the UNHRC
merely transmitted a recommendation to the Assembly, rather than a duly
authorized institutional decision to establish a new human rights special
procedure. Moreover, approval of the UNDRIP resolution—signaling
endorsement of an international declaration with the potential for impacting
international law—falls squarely within the UNGA’s remit under the UN
Charter. Article 13 of the UN Charter establishes that the General Assembly
maintains authority to make recommendations for: “promoting international
co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development
of international law and its codification.”477
Beyond these differences, the nature of deferral sought in each instance is
also dissimilar. In 2006, when the UNGA approved its deferral of consideration
of UNHRC Resolution 1/2, it required that any additional consultations
conclude before the close of the same 61st session of the General Assembly. 478
In contrast, the African Group’s proposal contained no parallel expiration or
deadline but instead was formulated as an open-ended deferral of the SOGI
mandate.
The Egyptian representative, speaking on behalf of the OIC (with the
exception of Albania), repeated the organization’s revisionist and relativist
arguments, asserting that extending protection on the basis of SOGI had “no
foundation in international human rights law” and “directly impinged on the
social, cultural and religious sensitivities of a large number of countries . . .
.”479 The delegate concluded by asserting that the failure to vote in favor of
deferral “would ensure that OIC would continue to boycott the Independent
Expert and would not be in a position to cooperate with that expert.” 480
Appearing to forget that for a decade the OIC regularly advanced resolutions
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U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., 53rd mtg. ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/71/SR.53 (Nov. 21, 2016).
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condemning “defamation of religion” in the UNHRC and UNGA without
providing any legal definition for the far more mercurial term,481 Yemen and
Libya (among others) added that the SOGI resolution could not be allowed to
proceed without “a legal definition of sexual orientation or gender identity . . .
.”482
The amendment deleting the operative paragraph from the African
Group’s resolution passed by “84 votes to 77, with 17 abstentions.” 483 Following
the vote, the OIC again “unequivocally rejected the establishment of a mandate
for the Independent Expert” and again declared it “would not be in a position
to cooperate or engage with the mandate-holder.”484
3. OIC Ministerial Conference on Strengthening Marriage and Family
Institution and Preserving its Values in Member States
The OIC’s first “Ministerial Conference on Strengthening Marriage and
Family Institution and Preserving its Values in Member States” convened in
Jeddah in February 2017, only months after the prickly General Assembly vote
and nearly ten years after the OIC first established its Department of Family
Affairs. 485 Several resolutions that emerged from the conference merit
attention here. The first urgently called for the need to develop an “OIC
Strategy for Empowerment of Marriage and Family Institution and
Preservation of its Values in the Muslim World,” based on prior IPHRC
recommendations made in this area. 486 Recall that the IPHRC’s 2015 meeting
on “Protecting Family Values” endorsed a definition of family premised on “a
long-term consensual relationship between a man and a woman who are bound
by the reciprocal rights and responsibilities enshrined in Islamic teachings.”487
The IPHRC further “condemned the growing trend of confusing the definition
of family with new and controversial notions of LGBT families based on sexual
orientation that were neither universal nor recognized by international human
rights standards.”488 Recommendations that emerged from this 2015 session
included, for example, opposing UN publications that “elaborate on the socalled notion of sexual orientation and comprehensive sexuality education,”
and urging the UN and other human rights institutions to “put the family at

Blitt, supra note 327, at 16 (“The problem of providing a workable definition of ‘defamation of
religion’ is so apparent that after ten years of passing resolutions, neither the HRC nor the
U.N.G.A. has ventured to undertake the task.”).
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the core” of their human rights agendas and avoid “misconceptions and
controversies, which contradict the universal family values.” 489
Another notable resolution that emerged from the OIC’s first conference
on preserving family values welcomed the OIC CFM’s earlier action rejecting
UNHRC Resolution 32/2 and endorsed the IPHRC’s mandate to prepare a
“comprehensive study” to refute SOGI rights. 490 Ministers also took the
opportunity to urge the OIC to continue pursuing repeal of all SOGI-related
UNHRC resolutions on the basis that sexual orientation has no link to human
rights. 491 The conference’s accompanying “Jeddah Declaration” recommended
“[c]ategorical rejection of the advocates of homosexuality and of the voices
calling on the Member States to recognize in their legislations the rights of
those groups as minorities . . . .” 492 A second ministerial conference, under the
banner “Empowering the Marriage and Family Institution and Preserving its
Values in Member States,” is scheduled to be held in Turkey in 2019. 493 If the
outcome of the first meeting is any indication, developing and implementing
OIC strategies for opposing SOGI recognition will continue to dominate this
agenda.
CONCLUSION
This article has traced the evolution of the OIC’s approach to international
human rights law since the organization’s inception. As part of this history,
the organization has maintained and continues to espouse a relativist
approach, as encapsulated by its 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam. At the same time, the OIC has increasingly attempted to “mainstream”
its views as consistent with and embracing of human rights universality. This
has proven to be no easy task, particularly in the face of a growing
international awareness of SOGI persecution and the need to affirm equality
and nondiscrimination protections for the LBGTI community.
The OIC’s efforts to protect its vision of “traditional” family values and
deny SOGI recognition have forced it to move from an abstracted and
generalized endorsement of universality to a more granular response. This
shift has betrayed a rejection of the obligations associated with upholding
universality when situated in the context of actual practice. As demonstrated
above, where the OIC’s revisionist and narrow framing of human rights
489

Id. at 8, 42.

OIC Res. 3/1–F, pmbl. (Feb. 8–9, 2017). Here too, the resolution’s language betrays the
predetermined outcome of the IPHRC SOGI study. See supra notes 415–16 and accompanying text
(noting the IPHRC already deemed “so-called” sexual orientation unsuitable for rights protection);
see Blitt, supra note 463 (providing a critical assessment of the IPHRC’s SOGI study).
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universality is exposed as deficient, the organization is quick to fall back on its
longstanding relativist rejoinder that places its own vague religious doctrine
ahead of the international human rights obligations owed by its member
states. The same pattern is manifested in the IPHRC, the OIC’s newly minted
“independent” human rights commission.
The OIC’s underlying approach identified here builds on and reinforces
similar findings drawn from a previous study of the organization’s treatment
of women’s rights.494 This, in turn, confirms that the challenge mounted by the
OIC against an authentic and purposive interpretation of human rights
universality is concerted and deeply problematic. Like its approach to women’s
rights, where the OIC attempts to justify its SOGI-related redlines that digress
from international equality and nondiscrimination norms, it characterizes any
applicable human rights obligations as non-universal and thus non-obligatory.
And where this stance becomes untenable, the OIC—together with its vassal
the IPHRC—contests that such rights are simply incompatible with its own
nebulous interpretation of sharia. As demonstrated above, the validity of this
approach is premised, among other things, on a faulty interpretation of the
VDPA that distorts the substance of universality and its ensuing state
obligations. It also hinges on accepting the OIC’s interpretation of sharia
norms as definitive.
Even if one subscribes to the view that human rights norms in the context
of SOGI are not “fully ripened,” the OIC’s position—outright rejection of the
possibility of protection—is antithetical to the very idea of human rights, and
arguably to Islam as well. As An-Na’im has concluded in the context of
protection for religious minorities, “no cultural relativist argument may be
allowed to justify derogation from the basic obligation to uphold and protect
the full human rights of religious minorities, within the Islamic or any other
cultural context.”495 The same can be said in the context of SOGI protection.
Indeed, the international human rights framework has confirmed as much,
albeit with insufficient directness. Hila Jilani’s observations on the possibility
of rejecting or denying protection against discrimination and violence based on
SOGI are apropos:
[such a position] is neither useful nor . . . prudent as a policy
for any government that claims the commitment to human
rights and to the promotion and protection of human rights. It
is also rather difficult and not convincing when culture and
tradition are used as a shield for the failure to fulfill the
obligation to protect from human rights violations . . . There
are no notions of responsibility that allow governments and
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duty-bearers to…hold out that responsibility and hold out that
protection selectively.496
For all its advocacy, the OIC’s interpretation of Islamic religious norms
also is not universally shared by Muslims everywhere. Despite the
organization’s pretensions to the contrary, it is but one voice purporting to
represent Islamic norms. 497 There remains a strong claim that the
organization even distorts the true essence of Islam and the actual
requirements of sharia.498 Nevertheless, as Moosa has remarked, “[w]hether
one calls it progressive Islam, critical Islam, or critical traditionalism, they are
far from being established intellectual discourses and in all honesty they are
at their mere infancy . . . What is doubtless is that the critique of outdated
orthodox paradigms of interpretation requires viable alternatives.” 499
More immediately, setting aside the actual viability of this “progressive”
approach, the OIC continues to formally represent over 50 member states at
the UN and thus flexes an unmatched level of access and influence, including
a sizable and constant presence on the UNHRC. The reality remains that this
outsize influence dominates the narrative on Islam far beyond the voice of any
academic, activist or NGO. More importantly, it colors not only the debate
around rights but their substance as well. Mindful of these realities, criticism
of the OIC’s positions should not be interpreted as denigration of the Muslim
faith. By the same token, the organization should not be permitted to deflect
such criticism by brandishing the specter of Islamophobia against its critics.
Permitting it to do so only feeds the narrative that its policies undercutting
equality and non-discrimination do in fact embody the collective view of nearly
two billion Muslims.

Panel Discussion Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, supra note 378. Jilani’s comments
begin at approximately 2:14:00. Id.
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Ultimately, allowing the OIC’s positions to be perpetuated without a more
systematic and concerted response contributes to actively obstructing
international progress in this area, triggering delays, weakening consensus
and most troublingly, risks exposing individuals and communities to ongoing
rights violations, including violence and death. In an effort to begin advancing
this concerted response, advocates and policymakers are advised to take the
following measures.
First, at the United Nations, continue to renew and build support for the
mandate of the independent expert on SOGI. Specifically, seek to incorporate
SOGI-related reporting obligations and data collection into other relevant
special procedures mandates and treaty bodies, as well as into the UNHRC’s
Universal Period Review (“UPR”) process and the UN’s Sustainable
Development Goals. This can begin by dialoging with states abstaining 500 or
opposing key votes on SOGI, protection of the family, and related measures.
Working to build greater understanding with these states can enhance clarity
around international human rights norms relating to SOGI-based protections
as well as with the shortcomings inherent in narrowly defining those families
entitled to international protection. Plainly, each state that shifts its position
away from opposition or abstention serves to further attenuate the OIC’s
claimed absence of consensus around SOGI recognition. Therefore, this
engagement should be designed to vigorously and consistently communicate
detailed information rebutting OIC arguments and concerns, including
highlighting their internal inconsistencies and incompatibilities with
international human rights law. This agenda should also be integrated into
multilateral fora as well as bilateral relations.
At the same time, building support for the mandate of the independent
expert on SOGI should not be restricted to making demands of others. Rather,
supportive states must demonstrate their individual commitments to SOGIbased rights. Accordingly, states endorsing the SOGI mandate should move to
extend to the independent expert open invitations to undertake country visits,
opportunities to comment on draft legislation, and be responsive to any
communications or inquiries sent by the expert. Similarly, these states should
continue or begin providing detailed reporting information on SOGI-based
discrimination and related issues in their own countries in the context of other
UN human rights mechanisms and mandates, as well as within relevant
Sustainable Development Goal (“SDG”) forums.
Second, moderate voices within the OIC should be supported, while also
taking steps to lessen the organization’s impact within the UN’s human rights
mechanisms. OIC states that have opposed or abstained from OIC-backed
IHRL measures at the UN, such as Albania, should be recognized for the
potentially moderating influence they may have on the organization’s internal
deliberations. Such states can be encouraged to generate OIC moderation from

In the past, abstaining states have included Botswana, Ghana, India, South Africa, Namibia,
the Philippines, Hungary, Georgia, Mexico, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
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the inside. For example, they can initiate amendments to internal OIC human
rights-related resolutions and take steps to restrain policy positions sought at
the UN. These moderates can also work to promote internal clarifications
concerning the nature of IHRL and urge the organization’s positions to better
reflect the reality of diversity within Islam (and among member states),
particularly as it relates to “alternate” conceptualizations of sharia being
developed by Muslim jurists, scholars, and activists. Here, positive measures
including trade and other incentives can also be used to signal support as well
as cultivate additional potential state partners.
Together with this, states and NGOs alike should actively oppose OIC
efforts to install sympathetic members within the UN’s human rights
infrastructure in favor of candidates more inclined to embrace the universality
of IHRL. Among other things, concerned NGOs and states can place greater
emphasis on the fact that when electing members to the UNHRC, states are
obligated to “take into account the contribution of candidates to the promotion
and protection of human rights and their voluntary pledges and commitments
made thereto.”501 In the same vein, states and NGOs alike need to reassess
whether cooperation with the IPHRC or permitting its formal engagement
with international and regional human rights mechanisms serve a useful
purpose. Given the IPHRC’s track record, the commission does not appear to
have an independent stance or interest in promoting and protecting human
rights. Rather, it merely acts as an echo chamber for OIC policies. Support for
human rights universality and integrity within regional human rights
mechanisms demands that the IPHRC clearly adopt and endorse (rather than
build conflict with) existing IHRL norms, including standing and future UN
treaty body general comments. Related to this, the practice of naming and
shaming should be made more systematic and more widely disseminated to
call attention to the incompatibility of certain OIC positions with IHRL and to
seek concrete clarifications from the organization regarding its asserted
support for universality.
Third, funding, training, and other workshops should expand to support
moderate organizations and initiatives committed to developing and
disseminating interpretations of Islam that more fully comport with IHRL;
protecting human rights defenders in OIC states; reporting on rights violations
in OIC states; and advocating and educating for a fuller understanding of
equality, non-discrimination, and tolerance. States and other parties can
empower these moderate voices by boosting their international exposure and
increasing their opportunities for engagement. For example, LGBTI Muslims,
Muslim women, representatives of religious minorities in OIC states, Islamic
scholars and others can be invited to participate as witnesses and experts at
the UN and other international fora in the context of equality and
nondiscrimination-related events. States should also track and support
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protection of human rights defenders in states opposing SOGI recognition, 502
and continue to raise this issue whether through funding, diplomatic
demarches, or other techniques. Likewise, NGOs working within domestic
political contexts to educate and inform citizens on human rights, international
norms, and alternate interpretations of sharia should be similarly supported
as a means of building greater awareness and consensus around the issues.
In the end, abiding the OIC’s efforts to dilute the spirit of universality
encapsulated in the UDHR’s grundnorm that “all human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights,” or to invoke a relativistic, religiously-justified
waiver on equality and non-discrimination norms risks legitimizing ongoing
rights violations against the LGBTI community and women, among others.
More broadly still, the failure to decisively reject and systematically counter
such efforts poses a direct threat to the viability of universality and is
antithetical to the nearly century-old push to secure a universal human rights
framework that recognizes and protects every individual’s fundamental
human dignity.

Nick J. Mulé has called attention to the “risky and insecure” position of LGBTQI human rights
defenders, and the reality that “while defending others in their communities, themselves face
opposition from those within the UN who hold traditional, religious, and culturally based values,
as well as a result of state sovereignty and state-sanctioned criminalisation of their gender and
sexual diversity.” Nick J. Mulé, LGBTQI-Identified Human Rights Defenders: Courage in the Face
of Adversity at the United Nations, 26 GENDER & DEV. 89, 101 (2018).
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